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Abstract 
This work is an exploration of the relationship which psychotherapy has with 
religion. Siglnund Freud and Carl Rogers were chosen for this exposition because 
they \yere each seduced by the high status given to science. Freud and Rogers, both 
founders of psychotherapies, left a legacy which is not that of scientists whom they 
c lailned they \yere. Freud and Rogers each had a problematic relationship with 
religion. This has had a lasting effect on the work and attitudes of their respective 
folk-)\yers. In order to explore effectively this relationship, the dissertation begins 
\yith a critical exalnination of the historical context in which both Freud and Rogers 
\Yen-ked, and ho\\' in their detennination to be scientists both missed the importance 
of the religious. The dissertation continues with an exploration of the effects of this 
legacy on the \York of conten1porary psychotherapists. The context in which their 
follo\yers \vork relies on·a relationship with the founder, which goes beyond that of 
science, and in addition, each practitioner is influenced by socio-economic 
CirCUl11stances \\'hich are peculiar to them. The resistance from psychotherapists to 
en1brace religion has been complex, although, as it will be illustrated, today there are 
S0l11e \\'ho are acknowledging the importance of the spiritual. That psychotherapy 
functions as a religious movement has been excluded by practitioners in their 
determination to reflect the wishes of their founder, which was that their work should 
be regarded as science. Psychotherapists have traditionally been considered the 
custodians of the real and that their clients are the ones suffering from delusions. 
\Vith respect to their attitudes to religion - not least the spiritual- the positions seem 
to be reversed. 
I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and is therefore my 
own work, except where explicitly stated in the text. 
Signed: 
Preface 
This projcct \vas conceivcd while I was training to becolne a psychotherapist. Iwas 
intrigued by the frequency with which n1y colleagues and the literature in the field, 
lire\v on language which is n10re traditionally used within religious discourse. Later 
as a practitioner, I observed that when lny clients struggled to find words to describe 
their experiences they wcrc also drawn to religious language. In addition to my 
training in psychotherapy I have a degree in Religious Studies. The synthesis of these 
two fields has afforded n1e a position which may best be described as a hybrid and 
\yhich consequently has given 111e a peculiar awareness of the analytical dimensions 
of spirituality and psychopathology. In its rudin1entary stages this project explored 
the structures and functions of psychotherapy and counselling, uncovering clear 
parallels \vith religion. However, as the project unfolded more subtle and nuanced 
resen1blances \Vere uncovered, both in the tradition and in contemporary 
developn1ents. A recuning question has been why it is that psychotherapists and 
counsellors. \vho locate themselves within the natural and medical sciences, rely so 
n1uch on language which would associate them with the realm of religion. Both 
"science' and "religion' are slippery terms which, once defined, lose much of their 
potential - in the \vay that an eel may lose its 'eelness' once it has been pinned down. 
The Gaelic poet Sorley Maclean once said of his work "what is lost in the translation 
is the poetry". My continuing interest in this project is because some of the most 
original developments in contemporary theory and practice have broken through 
inherited stereotypes and are redefining the relationship between psychotherapy and 
religion. 
Prologue: 
Freud in a letter to Jung (1908): 
\Ye are certainly getting ahead; if I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession 
of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall only be able to glimpse from afar .... I 
In a lakr letter Freud states: 
It is strange that on the very same evening when I formally adopted you as eldest son and 
anointed you - in partilms illjidelil1l11 - as my successor and crown prince ... 2 
\\Tilhehn Stekcl a follower oCFreud stated: 
I \vas the apostle of Freud who was my Christ!·, 
\\Tebster argues: 
in scientific terms the reasons for adopting his theories were, as I have tried to show, no 
better than the reasons \\hich might be given for imitating his way of talking or over his 
neurotic habits. In both cases we are confronted not by a reasoned decision but by an act of 
inational submission to the power of Freud's personality and to the capacity he had for 
projecting himself both in his life and his writing as a prophet, sage, healer and even 
redeemer. 4 
\Iax Grafthe father of young Hans, one of Freud's patients, described Freud as: 
head of the psychoanalytic church5 
George \Yeisz: 
The group's elitism and sense of exclusiveness, combined with an eschatological vision of 
reality which made adherence to the group an experience approaching religious conversion; 
and, more important, an exaggerated reverence for the founder which transcended the normal 
bounds of scientific authoritarianism. 6 
Peter Gay claimed: 
J ones took some pains to disabuse the public of the reputation for intolerance that Freud had 
acquired, and in particular he attacked the analogy that compared psychoanalysis to a 
religious movement, with Freud a new ... 7. 
Ernest Jones: 
Freud was of course the Pope of the new sect, if not a still higher Personage, to whom all 
owed obeisance; his writings were the sacred text, credence in which was obligatory on the 
supposed infallibilists who had undergone the necessary conversion, and there were not 
lacking the heretics who were expelled from the church. It was a pretty obvious caricature to 
make, but the minute element of truth in it was made to serve in the place of reality which 
was far different. 8 
I McGuire. W (1991) (Ed) The Freud lung Letters. Penguin Books. Letter no-125F p133. 
2 ibid. Letter no. 139F. p144 
3Webster. R. (1995) Why Freud was Wrong: Sin, Science and P5ychoanalysis Harper Collins. p.305 
4 ibid p.3 
5 ibid p310 
6 ibid p308. Webster here uses a quotation from George Weisz in Sulloway.FJ. (1979) Freud 
Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Myth ofP5ychoanalysis. Fontana. London. 




\\'hen I am at my best, as a group facilitator or a therapist, I discover another characteristic. I 
find that "hen I am closest to my inner, most intuitive self, when I am somehow in touch 
\\ith the unknown in me, when perhaps I am in a slightly altered state of consciousness in the 
relationship, then whatever I do seems to be full ofhealing.9 
Rogers argues: 
Our relationship transcends itself and becomes part of something larger lo ... 
This kind of transcendent phenomenon is certainly experienced at times in groups in which I 
han? \\orked, changing the lives of some of those involved. I I 
Further: 
I realise that this account partakes of the mystical. Our experiences, it is clear, involve the 
transcendent, the indescribable, the spiritual. I am compelled to believe that I, like many 
others, have underestimated the importance of this mystical, spiritual dimension. 12 
9 Kirschenbaum. H and Land Henderson.V (1990) The Carl Rogers Reader. Constable London. p137 




I haye set out the quotations above as a way of illustrating that psychotherapy has an 
issue to be addressed: psychotherapy today functions as a religious movement. This 
because despite Freud's overt rejection of religion he none the less relied on it and 
exploited religious figures and language for his own ends. Those quotations from 
Freud hinlself are evidence of this. Psychotherapists have difficulty in coming to 
tenns \yith this and deny or exclude religion from their remit. This is ironic given 
that they are trained to uncover the denials and repressions of their clients. In other 
\yords they are capable of exploring the defences of others but are blind to their own: 
the area of religion has proved to be particularly problematic. 
Freud's oyert criticism of and theoretical rejection of religion has resulted in a 
turbulent relationship between psychotherapy and religion whether or not the 
practitioner claims allegiance to Freud. To exemplify this point the case of Carl 
Rogers and his adherents have been used in this study for the purposes of 
comparison. Although Rogers, like Freud, is an inspirational character he has not 
COlnnlanded the same amount of interest as Freud and consequently the weight of 
Inaterial on each is unequal. However, the choice of approaches which appear here is 
only illustrative of phenomena which exist across the wider psychotherapy 
cOlTImunity and other approaches would have illustrated similar journeys. 
The aim in this dissertation is to uncover the religious aspects of psychotherapy by 
first using a historical critical reading of two approaches and by deconstmcting 
psychotherapy as an ideology. This is necessary for the discussion which follows in 
which an exploration of contemporary psychotherapy shows how difficult it has been 
for practitioners to embrace religion and the spiritual. This is critical and it points to 
the new openness to religion among some forward thinking psychotherapists who 
recognise the importance of the spiritual and its dimension of the transcendent. This 
project is unusual as religious studies scholars usually remain faithful to the study of 
identifiable religion and religiousness and rarely trespass into areas where they 
would traditionally be unwelcome. For example, it is common to have a psychology 
of religion but to reverse this and look at the religious study of psychology is much 
less common. Those scholars who have ventured into studying the religion of 
psychology have, it seems, delivered results which demonstrate more than a little of 
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their Judaeo Christian bias. Scholars of religion are familiar with defending religion 
~lgainst the attacks of psychology now is the tin1e for scholars of religion to offer 
their assistance to psychotherapists with their religious problem. I have been drawn 
into this field because of l11y training in both religious studies and psychotherapy. 
Peopk haye relationships to Freud, or to their chosen founder, which are different to 
what they say they are. What you see is not what you get. In order to explore this 
area I h<1Y(' dra\\'non t\\'o traditions of psychotherapy, the psychodynamic and 
person-centred. The balance of inforn1ation is unequal by virtue of shear volume of 
\york about Freud and psychodynan1ic theory, although quantity does not equate with 
quality and there is a good deal of repetition in the Freudian literature. Freud's 
central position is also due to his influence on the person-centred tradition and his 
responsibility for the conception of the psychodynamic approach. The frequency in 
the literature. \\'hether theoretical, biographical or autobiographical, of both Freud 
and Rogers and their followers, of language which one would expect to find in 
religious discourse \\'as such as to be worthy of exploration. 
Although the comments in the prologue are of differing orders, some are by Freud 
and Rogers. and others about Freud, the use of religious language is undeniable even 
if uttered with a sense of irony or condescension. To say that language is religious is 
to imbue words with meaning which have a cultural context. For example, when 
Freud describes Jung as Joshua and himself as Moses he draws on the biblical 
tradition, the Judaeo Christian tradition with which he was most familiar. In making 
such comparisons Freud does not really mean that they are Joshua and Moses but 
that their relationship stands up to such comparison. There is an element of tongue in 
cheek about what Freud says but there is also the arrogance of using such heroic 
figures as comparisons. Freud also compared himself to Hannibal and to St Paul. 
However can we deduce from this that he believed that his stature was in their , 
league? We shall see. 
Freud was aware that the psyche or, as he would call it the unconscious, had 
historically been a matter for religion. The psyche had been the concern of religion 
because it was other worldly, unseen, unidentifiable. But what does it mean to say 
that something is religious? (It appears that, if some exponents of religious studies 
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had their way, the word religion would be elinlinated. i ) The use of the word religion 
is pecu liar to the user and their particular anthropological lens detennines what it 
Ineans. \\,ittgenstein noted that the use of a word deten11ines its n1eaning. 
T () support any c lain1 about the religiousness of the n10velnents of Freud and Rogers 
it would be useful to be clear about the use of religion for this dissertation. There is 
little to gain in trying to define religion, as noted, how the word is used is what 
Inattcrs. In this dissertation the word is used in what lnay be regarded as a COlnlnon 
sense \yay. For e\.anlplc, if I speak to other English speakers about religion they do 
have sonlC idea of what I l11ean. Of course it is their idea and will differ from my own 
but there \vill at least be an understanding a family resemblance. The family 
rcsclllblance ht't\ycen organised religions and psychotherapy is uncanny. However, 
the religiousness of psyc hotherapy is n10re subtle than such a reductionist reading 
\yoldd lead us to belieYe. 
\\'hilst this is not a dissertation about language the notion of linguistic hygiene is 
\\'orth noting. This is the idea that each discipline should use the language which is 
their o\\"n and not trespass into the language of other disciplines. So that the 
frequency of religious language in a subject which claims to be science2as does 
psychotherapy would not occur. My interest is that psychotherapists use the language 
of religion because they do not have appropriate tenns of their own. This is because 
\yhat is going on in therapy has more in common with religion than therapists admit. 
The continued active exclusion of the COlnmon features of religion and 
psychotherapy by contemporary psychotherapists is explored below. 
The use of irony has allowed an unquestioning acceptance of language which is 
supposed to be so far removed from their field that it is overlooked. The language 
that Rogers uses in his quotations is more to describe his experience and the process 
of therapy than in the case of Freud, which is to borrow from the Judaeo Christian 
traditions. Rogers describes what he experiences and feels and does not make 
I Lancaster University December 2003 had a conference asking questions about the state of religious 
studies. Is it a field? A Discipline? Should it be either at all? Should it become cultural studies? With 
each question there was the clear message to disconnect religious studies from theology as if the two 
are not inextricably linked. And the most controversial comment was that there is no such thing as 
religious studies. 
2 Elliott. A (1999) Ed. Freud 2000.Polity.London. Elliott and Frosh (1995) Psychoanalysis il1 Context. 
Routledge. London. Bollas.C (1999) The Mystcr1' of Things. Routledge. London 
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l'l)lnparisons ofhilllSdf or his followers with historical heroes. His concern seems to 
be to reflect \\'hat he is doing. Freud, on the other hand, in comparing himself and 
others with historical figures, set a trend which his critics and his followers have 
continued. \Vhy'? He did not conlpare hilllselfwith heroic scientists such as Newton 
or Darwin although others since his death have n1ade such cOlllparisons. 
As 111entioned abon~" there is an inequality of weight given to each tradition. The 
biographical literature on Sigillund Freud appears infinite and on Carl Rogers there is 
\'ery 1 ittle3. They eac h contributed to the biographical literature by writing their own 
con fcssional \\'ork, again follo\\'ing in the tradition of religious thinkers. It is the 
content of these \\'orks \\'hie h, arguably, sets theln apart and encourages their readers 
to ,iew then1 differently to other great nlinds. The choice of literature has been 
deten11ined by a\'ailability therefore those chapters on contelnporary psychotherapy 
are dependent on those practitioners who have published. With the exception of 
Adan1 Phillips, \\'ho has published extensively, there is limited availability in each 
tradition. 
The biographical literature on Freud can be loosely divided into two groups, critics 
and de\'otees. \\'ith only the occasionallnaverick who on first reading appears to 
occupy some middle ground but ultilnately ends up in the devotee's camp. Frederick 
Cre\\'s. Richard Webster. Adolf Grunbaum, and Jeffrey Masson are regarded as the 
n10st ,ehement of Freud's recent critics, and although they appear intent on 
demonising him. ultimately they cannot. Ernest Jones, Frank Sulloway, Ronald 
Clark. Paul Roazen are the most often cited of those who deify him. Fritz Wittels 
\\Tote the only known biography of Freud which Freud read, and although Freud did 
not want Wittels to publish he still wrote a foreword for it. We shall see that 
'"paradoxical" is the best way to describe Freud. Peter Gay's works on Freud are 
scholarly in their attempt to be objective but the reader is left in no doubt about the 
author's allegiance to Freud. 
Whilst this may not be a dissertation to reclaim the humanity of Freud it is fair to 
point out that those who write about him rarely do so without taking sides. The 
reasons for them doing this are part of the dissertation, as both Freud and Rogers, 
although Rogers to a different degree, suffer from either deification or demonisation. 
3 I have attempted to take into account the major trajectories and trends in both traditions 
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Their hUlllanity has becOllle obscured by layers of construction both by themselves 
and by others. The \Yay in which Freud and Rogers have been bipolarised is not 
peculiar to thelll: it is part of a process to which Inany significant thinkers have been 
sUbjected. Freud, in particular, played a significant part in his own construction and 
therefore he tnust take sonle responsibility for what has becOlne of hin1. It is 
interesting to note that even in the public donlain, that is, the non-analytic 
conlnlunity, Freud is rarely described with indifference. 
The bipolarisation of Freud and Rogers appears to happen across the board. Whilst 
pr~lCtitioners trained in a variety of traditions, psychodynamic, person-centred, 
cognitive behavioural, gestalt and others who acknowledge their training in one 
approac h \vOldd not confinl1 any specific orientation in practice. Interviews with 
tnany of then1 were invaluable in corroborating this thesis albeit in anecdotal fonn. 
The nlention of Freud raises passions unparalleled by other thinkers. We seem to 
love or hate hinl as if \Ye knew him and yet the man we think we know is a construct. 
Freud is often regarded with suspicion, described as a charlatan or the man who is 
ahvays on about sex. I have even had him described to me as "the man who has 
caused 1110re destruction to the human race than any other single human being" and, 
by a clinical psychologist, as "'having no sense of humour". I encountered a similar 
response to Rogers by those who, although familiar with him, are not of a person-
centred persuasion. Although Rogers is not the household name that Freud is, none 
the less. \\'ithin the field, he engenders responses which go beyond the so called 
objecti\'e. 
\\'e are fortunate that both Freud and Rogers wrote about themselves. Although these 
primary sources give us insights into the minds of each they were both clever men 
and had their own motivation for such writing. As we shall discover below, each was 
capable of economy with the truth and Freud in particular was aware of what he 
could do to shape how he and psychoanalysis would be received. Freud and Rogers 
were selective as were their followers and critics, about what became known about , 
them. The result is a fascinating tapestry of stories which even if they are outright 
lies, have become part of the mythology and are consumed by a process of 
decontextualisation which has produced a kind of faction. The process of uncovering 
the other Freud and Rogers, for there are doubtless multiple layers of each, only 
serves to reconstruct them. The material for construction is in the first instance 
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selected by the parents 0 r the child who treat theln in specific ways. Both Freud and 
Rogers \\'ere singled out by their parents, although each for different reasons. The 
l'hild finds \\,~lys of responding to this and then eventually his followers and critics 
respond to this construct of a hmnan being. Each person builds with what they have 
selected then adds to this their own ell1bellishn1ents. They lnay exclude aspects 
\\'hich they arc either blind to, a version which could be regarded as benign, or they 
Inay actively delete aspects of the Ii fe which do not quite fit with their mission, as 
has been the case in psychotherapy. Scholars come along and begin to deconstruct 
this product and then reconstruct it in their own in1age. This process is continuous 
and the product is never con1plde, as the next wave of scholarship endeavours to find 
the real founder. The 1110tivation behind such scholarship is, in part, a quest for truth 
and authenticity, the evidence of this process is no better exemplified than in the 
quest for the historical Jesus. People want the real thing and set about their 
scholarship in the belief that there is such a thing. 
The delusion, to \vhich I refer in my opening question, is that those involved in 
psychotherapy are blinded by virtue of their position inside4 their tradition. The 
theory of psychotherapy ailns to expose a reality which is, as yet, unknown, but they 
cam10t See the ,,-ood for the trees and there is an aspect of their process which is 
unavailable to them by virtue of their occupying it. Each therapist chooses a school 
"ith \Yhich they have an affinity and in so doing becomes a disciple of the school 
and to the founder. This discipleship has been described as being like that of the 
Greco-roman schools of philosophys but it may be argued that this is not the case. 
F or sure the \york of Plato and Aristotle, among others, has been celebrated, but their 
follo\vers seem more concerned with their words than their characteristics. Whilst the 
philosopher or the artist may engender a following who want to copy his work or 
e\-en the way that he dresses, there is less evidence that the same deification or 
demonisation occurs with them as with Freud. Perhaps a closer comparison lnay be 
made \\'jth that of the eastern guru where the disciple lives with the master in the 
hope of learning not only a mental training but a particular way of living. As for the 
-+ The insider outsider debate is on going in religious studies and we are aware that to make a 
distinction such as this is itself a binary tactic. None the less it serves to highlight those who are 
blinded by a position which is motivated by tacit knowledge. The author has both ins~der and ?utsider 
perspectives which allow her a position which is not hampered by fear of the accusatIon ofbemg 
irrational or religious. 
5 Ellenberger. H.F. (1970) The Discol'el), of the Unconsciolls: The HistOlY and Evolution of Dynamic 
P\ychiafly. Fontana. London. 
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scientist, it is unlikely that he will copy the way their predecessors spoke, or the way 
they dressed, l)r for that Blatter the way they snl0ked. Freud's followers have 
en~a~ed in all of these. Freud is, as noted, often conlpared to Marx and Darwin for 
the Inagnitude of his work but these two do not engender the extremes of devotion 
and denl0nisation which Freud does. This is not to say that followers of Marx and 
Dan,in do not respond passionately to thein. We need only observe any nlarch in 
Red Square to sense the passion of Marxists. A follower of Freud or indeed Rogers 
becOlnes an insider \,ith a peculiar relationship to their founder which has religious 
feryour. The analo~y 0 r psychotherapy and religion goes beyond those overt criteria 
such as scripture, doctrine, ritual, nlyth, conlnlunity, which may serve to define 
religion but tell us little of the subtleties of how it functions. 
The prolo~ue illustrates that psychotherapy has more to it than those practising it 
ha\e been able to analyse effectively by virtue of their position as practitioners. This 
111eans that they are so caught up in the traditions of psychotherapy, that they are no 
longer able to \"ie\, it dispassionately. There are of course people who are themselves 
hybrids, \\'ho are part psychotherapist and part other things, who may find it easier to 
ha\-e a \ie\\" fronl outside. There is no view from nowhere. 
Chapter One examines psychoanalysis and Freud's determination to have his work 
accepted as science. This I do by asking "what was at stake for Freud if 
psychoanalysis \\'as not accepted as science?" Why did it matter so much that 
psychoanalysis was located in science? What of the context of Freud's work in 
Vienna? Rogers suffered from the same desire as have his followers. Was theirs the 
same moti\'ation? As we shall see, it is of little use to define science any more than it 
is to define religion because, as noted, their meanings are determined by their use. 
E\'en if one argues that Freud and Rogers were not concerned with real or hard 
science, those metaphors which perpetuate the status of science, it is the behaviour of 
those involved which has determined this dissertation. 
Chapter Two explores the construction of Freud. The Freud that is for public 
consumption is a fabrication made up in part by his family, himself, his followers, 
critics and the media. There is no definitive Freud. Whilst it may be said that the 
whole is greater than the sum of his parts, with Freud there have been parts which are 
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re~ard('d as 1110re signi ficant than others. The selection of what is ilTIportant depends 
Up011 the presuppositions of the viewer. 
Chapter Three turns to Freud's legacy. The COn11TIlll1ity which still declares an 
al k~ia11ce to Freud has a di fficult inheritance to negotiate and the way in which each 
follo\yer responds to this legacy is influenced by their COlTIlTIitment to Freud. A 
selection of contel11porary psychotherapists whose views differ on what they do and 
"here psychotherapy should be located illustrates their diversity. From their work it 
appears that psychoanalysis is defined 1110re easily by what it is not rather than what 
it is. 
Chapter Four explores the \York of Carl Rogers as person-centred therapy is held in 
opposition to Freud's psychodynanlic psychotherapy. The construction of Rogers 
follo\\s a sil11ilar path to that of Freud, although we have as yet fewer layers of 
Rogers to disentangle. Although he has not cOlTImanded the same degree of interest 
as Freud it is too early to disnliss his ilTIpact as superficial. Rogers' work was also 
de\Oeloped in a context and, as with Freud, religion was a specific taboo. 
Chapter FiYe examines Rogers' legacy. The community which still declares an 
allegiance to hilTI demonstrate parallel thelTIeS to that of Freud and the Freudians. 
The front nlnners of the person-centred approach have until recently displayed 
sinlilar resistance to developing cel1ain aspects of Rogers', work but are beginning to 
take risks. This process is one where some followers develop the work of the founder 
and posit their own version of his work. This process accelerates after the death of 
the founder. 
Chapter Six introduces the ideas of the "post-secular" and explores how these may 
impact on psychotherapy. The inextricable links between the history of philosophy, 
psychology, and psychotherapy appear to have gone through a cycle with the 
consequence that practitioners are returning, albeit rather tentatively, to the idea of 
spiritual practice without dogma. Their new found openness to the spiritual does not, 
however, translate into their rejecting the structure which they have built for 
themselves as a religious institution. 
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Chapter one: Science and status. 
In ll)l) -~ Time lnagazine clain1ed "Freud is dead"(). However, over a decade on the 
eyidence is to the contrary. Attention to Freud by both Freudians and psychodynaI11ic 
practitioners, if we can use publications about hin1 as a l11easure of interest, shows 
little sign or abating. Interest fron1 elsewhere, the media, and his critics in particular, 
also indicate that interest in hin1 is very n1uch alive, although it is not unusual to find 
Freud in discussions about God, which is what the article in Time is about. If Freud 
had been sllccessful in his mission, to have psychoanalysis accepted as science, his 
\\ork \YOllld n10re often be found on the scientific pages of the popular press and of 
scientific joull1als than on those pages where it is 1110St often found in discussions 
about religion . 
.-\S \yill be discussed below a good deal of criticism about Freud and his 
psychoanalysis is in relation to the 'lack of scientific validity' of his theories and of 
the attitude of Freud and his followers to him and his work. The attitude is illogical, 
and ranges fr0111 reverential at one end to demonising at the other. Attitudes to Freud 
and psychoanalysis are rarely balanced and rarely from a perspective which is 
dispassionate. Perhaps this becomes more understandable when we notice that Freud 
had an unbalanced \'ie\\' of himself and his work which he modelled effectively. At 
tin1es his selfbeliefwas countered by over whelming self doubt. Such swings in 
attitude appear normal for the prophet, which is often how Freud has been viewed. 
He is compared to religious leaders, gurus, comparisons which Freud himself also 
indulged in. 
Freud \vas a scientist whose research was in the field ofneuro-anatomy for twenty 
years before he developed psychoanalysis. He was 'a l11an in a white coat' kind of 
scientist. He \\'as a modernist, a biological determinist who resisted cultural 
explanations for human behaviour. His work on psychoanalysis was l110tivated by the 
tradition of determinism. Biological determinism was very much in vogue in Freud's 
time: thus he saw humans and their behaviour as a result of their biology. Freud's 
thinking was revolutionised when he visited the Salpetriere School in Paris where he 
\\'as privileged to work with lean-Martin Charcot who demonstrated, through his 
6 Elizabeth Valklong President.(l993) In Time Magazine (November 29 1993). 
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\\l)rk on hystcria, that the n1ind functions or rather it "behaves as though anatomy did 
I1l)t c:\ ist or ~lS though it had no knowledge of it,,7. That Freud was in the company of 
such clnincnt scicntists as Charcot goes part of the way to explaining his need to 
hayc psychoanalysis accepted as science. However, it would be unwise to define 
Frcud only in these tcnns because although he was a scientist he was other things at 
thc S~llnc tilne, including a selfproclain1ed "atheistic Jew" and one of religion's 
Inajor critics. This lnakes it nlore paradoxical that his detennination to have 
psychoanalysis accepted as a new science was such that it became a quest which 
i tsclf \\as bcyond reason: 
1 startt'd my professional acti\'ity as a neurologist trying to bring relief to my neurotic 
patients. Under the int1uence of an older friend and by my own efforts I discovered some 
important ne\\' facts about tht' unconscious (unsighted or inside?) life, the role of instinctual 
mgt's and so on, after these findings through a new scicllce, psychoanalysis, a part of 
pSYl'hology and a new method of treatment for the neurosis. I had to pay heavily for this bit 
of good luck. People did not believe in my facts and thought my theories unsavoury. 
Resist~1l1ct' \yas strong and umelenting. In the end I succeeded in acquiring pupils and 
(bringing about'?) an international psychoanalytic association. But the struggle is not yet 
~ oyer.' 
The aboye quotation is a transcription of the only known recording of Freud, in 
En ~dish, in \Yhich he leaves us in no doubt that even at the end of his life, when he 
recorded this, he \\'as still determined to have psychoanalysis regarded as a new 
science. He kne\\' that he would have to part-company with traditional sciences but 
\vas still detennined to stay in the sciences. Although he claims that he had 
"succeeded", he also assures us that the "struggle" would continue. As we shall see 
belo\\' Freud \\'as inconsistent about how he regarded what he did. As noted, he 
fluctuated between self assurance and self doubt about his place in the academy. He 
could not haye foreseen just how problematic his comment on his "new science, 
psychoanalysis", would be for his biological and theoretical descendants and we can 
only speculate as to what was in his mind when he said "the struggle is not yet over". 
However, no one can deny that he was right in his prediction that psychoanalysis 
would continue to struggle to be a science. Many practitioners today still regard 
7 Sulloway. F.1. (1979) Freud Biologist qfthe Mind: Beyond the P5ychoana(vtic Legend. Fontana. 
Great Britain. P35 
8 This is a transcript of a recording which Sigmund Freud made in the year he died (1939). Those 
sections in brackets are difficult to make out as the recording is of poor quality and so I have taken a 
guess at what he may have said. The italics are my own for emphasis. The recording may be obtained 
from the Tavistock library. Tavistock Clinic. Belsize Park. London W3. 
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ps),clll)analysis as a science but their argl111lents are unconvincing if we hold to a 
notion of science which is about elnpiricisnl and proof). Psychoanalysts continue the 
justification of their scientific validity in debates, conferences, journals and books, 
\\'hich is kstinl0ny to Freud's work not yet being afair accompli. Their continued 
'unrelenting struggle' to conyince the world of their scientific validity is, a sign that 
psycho~lllalysts still protest too nluch. 
The reasons \\'hich Freud had for c lailning that psychoanalysis had scientific status 
are different to the reasons offered by contenlporary Freudians. In Freud's tilne and 
culture science \\as a nl0re dynmnic tenll. Contelnporary psychoanalysts, whilst 
clinging to the desire to be scientists, have the cOlnplication of their relationship with 
Freud and the huge body of traditions which they inherit. In other words, the 
atnbitions of contenlporary psychoanalysts, seeking to be scientists, are tainted by the 
desire to be true to the clain1s of their founder. Today's psychoanalysts live in an era 
where science enjoys a different kind of supremacy to that which it held in Freud's 
tilne and consequently contelnporary psychoanalysts are battling to be accepted by 
\yhat could be regarded as an out dated model. 
Apart fron1 the obyious lack of empirical evidence one of the stumbling blocks for 
psychoanalysis as science is that if it was/ is science followers of psychoanalysis 
\\'ould haye little difficulty in rejecting Freud and/or his findings and moving on. 
This is not the case. Psychoanalysts and psychotherapists of a psychodynmnic nature 
reyere Freud and his work in ways which contradict what we understand as a 
scientific paradigm 10 which traditionally demands the fall of the existing theory as it 
. h h 11 gl \'es \yay to t e new t eory . 
:\"either Freud nor his work has engendered this kind of take over. Even those who 
hcl\'e left the Freudian camp do not dismiss his ideas completely but build on them 
regardless of their flaws. And as will be demonstrated below, even those opposed to 
Freud rely on the psychoanalytic model to deconstruct him. Freud commands the 
kind of reverence which other great men of science, Charles Darwin, being an 
9 ElliottA & Frosh.S Eds. (1995) Psychoanalysis in Cont('xt is a collection of papers many of which 
take for granted the scientific nature of psychoanalysis. Routledge. London. See also Elliott Ed.( 1999) 
Freud 2000. 
10 Kuhn.TS. (1970) The Structur(' ofSci('nt~fic Revolutions. Chicago University Press. 
II Ibid. In addition, as I imagine Kuhn would testify, the task of the scientist is rarely (if ever) as 
'black and white' as the fantasy which is often held of it. 
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obvious c\.al11ple, do not enjoy. In fact, even to explain psychoanalysis as art, which 
Pcter Gay and Susic Orbach havc tried, does not explain their reverence for Freud. 
People who l11ay want to paint like Picasso or Monet, who even copy their ways of 
drcssing, sl11oking, speaking and even walking, as has been the case with Freud l2 , 
wl1uld rarely ha\'e such difficulty in accepting their nlistakes both theoretical and 
personal. A point \\'orth noting is that even sonle who clainl to be anti-Freudian, who 
\l1ice their distask for all things Frcudian, are ultinlately unwilling to depart from 
hinl.13 
\ Vhi 1st scientists cndea\'our to usurp their predecessors by disproving their theories 
the psychoanalyst holds fast to Freud and his work and is cautious not to disprove 
Freud or offend his Inenlory. This is where the activity of delusion by contemporary 
psychodynanlic practitioners is 1110St present, by virtue of its glaring absence. 14 In 
Freud's tinle psyc hoanalysts \\'ho developed his ideas were accused, by Freud, of 
being heretics. Toda~/s psychoanalysts still have this legacy to consider if taking a 
silnilar risk. ~-\s I hope to den10nstrate below, to be seen to contradict Freud is not 
acceptable if you \\'ant to relnain a psychoanalyst. From his grave Freud still directs 
his l1l0\'el1lent. Freud stated that to be a psychoanalyst one had to believe in what 
have COl1le to be regarded as his four pillars 15. In lnaking this statement he was 
creating a dogn1a \\'hich his followers have found difficult to challenge, at least 
0\"ertly16. This \\'e shall explore in a later chapter. This said the parallels between 
Freud and religious founders whose words and actions become sacred and as such 
unquestioned by those who wish to be followers become understandable. 
In Freud's time science had become the God of all things: to be scientific was 
beyond just being a man in a white coat. There were social, political and financial 
ilnplications which were peculiar to being a scientist. To be a scientist held status 
\\'hich out \\"ei ghed those who would once have been competitors. If one was a 
12 \"1any biographers note that some of Freud's followers did go to great lengths to copy his every 
uesture. Roazen (1975) p306. Webster (1995) p307-8 
r~ \\'ebster, \1asson and Crews some of the most vehement of his critics as we shall see below have 
difficulty giving him his last rites. 
I .. Derrida. J.( 1972) The Margins a/Philosophy. University of Chicago press. Chicago.( 1982) 
Translation. 
15 Jacobs. M . (1988) p\yc/u){i1'1l{llllic Counselling in Action. Sage. London 
16 Islam has Five Pillars and Buddhism has Four Noble Truths and the Old Testament has the Ten 
Commandments. Acceptance of these foundations is a prerequisite for ,being a member of the 
community 
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sl'ientist this had inlplications for what one was not. For eXaInple, science was not art 
and l'ertainly not religion. Science would eventually have answers, would explain the 
uni\'erse in \\~lyS which religions had not. To be religious, to believe in the 
ulh.'\.plained, was regarded as superstitious and undesirable. But more than this, 
belief in things beyond science carried further connotations of being unintelligent. 
Freud found science and religion irreconcilable and his followers have maintained 
the sanle attitude. These beliefs, although out dated to a degree, have left a legacy for 
those \\'ho continue to debate about the divide between science and religion. Such 
debates arc as con1pelling as eyer but wan"ant a discussion which is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation . 
. -\s we kno\\' fron1 Freud's \york and correspondence his views on religion were less 
than flattering. F c\\' people who are religious would regard Freud's oft quoted view 
of "religion as a uni\"ersal obsessional neurosis,,17 as cOlnplimentary. Freud did say 
this but \\"hen \'iewed in the context of his other work, he also regarded religion as 
necessary if only as a \yay of preventing anarchy. For Freud and many others to be a 
scientist \\"as to den10nstrate evolution: science and atheism had become bed fellows. 
Science for Freud \\"as a secular practice which excluded religion and did not rely on 
faith. and although this is now more of an area of contention, for Freud science, 
atheism. and the secular were allies, if not synonymous. This is ironic given that 
history shows that science was largely the domain of men of religion, for example, 
Gali leo, :\ e\\"ton and even Darwin himself did not rej ect the possibility of God 18 .Lest 
\\'e forget Freud was a modernist given to grand theories, who used large brush 
strokes for his theories: to universalise religion as neurosis was but one of his brush 
strokes. As we shall see below, Freud was selective particularly in his choices about 
\\"hat \\"as deemed an obsessional neurosis. For example, his own cigar smoking was 
omitted. His famous retort when challenged about his cigar smoking that "sometimes 
a cigar is just a cigar" is but one example of this. 
By and large today when people talk of science they ilnply qualities such as truth and 
objectivity, implied in which is distance and reason, detachment from the object of 
17 Freud S. Volume 13. The Origins o.lReligion. Penguin Freud Library (here after PFL) includes his 
works on religion from 1907-1938. p40 . 
I ~ Charles Darwin was a religious man and claimed on his death bed that he had never demed that 
there had been a creator. He was read his last rites as a continued commitment to Emma, his wife, who 
was a devout Christian who feared that they would not meet again in the afterlife. 
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study, but ultin1ately the ability to reason without the burden and this is how it was 
~l1H.i still is yie\ycd - or sUbjectivity. These are the illusions l9 under which science has 
delnanded status. Scicncc and the secular have becon1e alnl0st synonynlous, in so far 
as to be secular carries yalues and status which overlap with science. So when Freud 
n1ade his fmnous clain1 that he had discovered a new branch of the science of 
psyl'l1010gy he was also n1aking an alliance with the secular. This is the legacy which 
his Ccdlo\yers haye to contend with. Freud as a selfproclain1ed atheistic Jew, or as the 
title of Peter Gay's book states, 'A Godless Jew,2(), has n1ade it extreillely difficult for 
his descendants to vie,,' religion in a positive way. The irony of Gay's title has yet to 
be fully c\.plored! If you arc a God you do not need the idea of other Gods. 
Although Freud's clain1 about his new science has been the cause of immense 
controversy both during his life and since his death, scholars have noted that the 
notion of science for Freud \\'orking in Europe did not hold the same ideals of 
elllpiricisnY:; I as in the United KingdOlu. Whilst this work is not about a religion 
yersus science debate it is useful to question what drove Freud's determination to 
reinvent science so that psychoanalysis could be accepted. Freud knew what was 
e\.pected of a scientist, he had been one for twenty years before he discovered 
psychoanalysis. and his new work did not fit the criteria of empiricism or objectivity. 
Freud's \vorks have been divided in various ways. For example, his works on 
religion have been regarded as an independent canon. These works were a form of 
aIll1Chair anthropology, derived from books rather than field studies. Added to this 
\\'ere Freud's observations of patients and his inferences and comparisons of 
obsessional behaviours with that of religious ritual. Freud's findings relied on his 
interpretation and inference of individual cases which could not be repeated and as 
such were not empirical in the way science demanded. Freud's notion of science was 
stretching the common use of the word. 
What is often marginalised is the context in which Freud felt it necessary to make 
such a claim and what was at stake if he did not. Freud was neurotic, had luany 
19 Religion is the 'Illusion' which Freud writes of and by virtue of this position he cannot see his own 
illusions about science. 
20 Gay.P. (1987) A Godless j(!W' Fr(!ud, A th(!isTIl, And The Making ofP5ychoanalysls. Yale university 
press, New Haven and London. 
21 Bettelheim.B (1982) Freud and Man's Soul .Whilst criticising the translation of Freud's work by 
the Stracheys also notes this distinction in the meaning of science. 
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illnl'sses and was at tinles bordering on hypochondria22 . He was, as is often noted, an 
insecure acadetnic seeking approval. There is plenty of evidence which points to his 
not fitting itr~J. Ho\vever, he also countered this with delnonstrations of unparalleled 
self-belief. Freud, unlike nlany of his contenlporaries in science, did not enjoy the 
financial support of his fatnily and therefore had a basic econOlnic drive: he needed 
the tnoney. \\'hen we discuss tnen such as Freud it seenlS inlpolitic to discuss such 
tnatters as inconl('2~, although we may it seenlS discuss anything else related to them. 
Private tnedical practice \vas one way for Freud to eanl a secure incOlne and by 
splyialising in psychiatry, an area which he identified as in need of development, he 
tnanaged to do this. He could not indulge hilnself in a full tilne research post and 
support his \vi fe and fatnily. Practicing medical science was a position of social 
status. It "as announced in a Viennese news paper that Privatdozent Freud, an 
elninent doctor. was to begin private practice in Vienna. Such was Freud's name in 
the University of \"ienna for all he believed he was undervalued. 
In Freud's tinle the scientist was by vi11ue of his title an objective observer too 
intelligent to belie\e in God. Freud's chosen area of practice, psychiatry, and in 
particular the unconscious, had a genealogy which was ambiguous. Medicine has not 
long been in the realnl of science, in fact quite the contrary. In 1864, one of Freud's . 
ll1edical contenlporaries, Moritz Benedikt, claimed that "hysteria could be cured by 
the confession of pathogenic secrets".25 Freud in a joint paper with Breuer 
ackno"'ledge this. (This is worth specific note as Freud is often accused of not giving 
credit to others. an accusation which may be partially true but not absolutely). Cure 
bv confession without external prescriptions for punishment and which allowed the 
person confessing to abdicate responsibility for their behaviour was a departure from 
confession as it \vas experienced in the Christian tradition. Freud's development of 
Benedikt's idea lead to his own technique, but not before experimenting with 
Breuer's technique of hypnotism. 
22 .\J olnar. .\1.( 1992) Translated, Annotated with an Introduction. The Dimy ofSig771wld Freud J 929-
J 939 A Record of the Filla! Decade. Scribner New York. In these final years Freud limps from one 
ailment to another with differing degrees of severity. 
2J Freud's disputes with Nothnagel, Briicke, Fechner and even Brentano, who made a lasting 
impression on him, are well documented. For a delicious explanation of this see Gay (1988) Freud: A 
Lile lor Our Tillie. 
2·f If' Freud had been born into poverty we may regard him as even more heroic, in so far as his journey 
to fame and fortune would have had a more difficult start. 
25 Ellenberger. (1970) p46 
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Frcud worked \\'ith sonK' of the n10st respected men in his field26 . The University of 
\,ienn~l had son1C of the n10st en1inent thinkers of the tilne, many of inten1ational 
t~llnc. Franz Brcntano had a lasting influence on Freud and his work. Brentano 
cncouraged Frcud to r('\'isit Feuerbaclr27, son1e of whose ideas Freud adopted for his 
()\\n theories. Brentano was both a believer and a Darwinist with whom Freud had 
enjl)),cd debating and \\'ho had led Freud to question his atheisln. Freud had also 
\\orked \\'ith Charcot and Breuer, both regarded as pioneering medical researchers. 
Carl Claus taught con1parati\'c anaton1Y and gave Freud the opportunity to go to 
Trieste to do what tun1ed out to be ground breaking research on eels, for which Freud 
gained a reputation for excellence. En1est Von Brucke taught hil11 physiology. Freud 
s~id that Brikkc \\'as the n10st influential n1an in his life. There are more too , 
I1l1111erOus to list. But this givcs us son1e idea of Freud's academic foundations. With 
this it is all the n10re ren1arkable that he was as acadelnically insecure, as is often 
noted. 
He \\as unsure of his o\vn place in the academy and, as he himself notes, had to 
OVerC0111e "unrelenting resistance", and "struggle,,28, because people thought that his 
ideas were "ul1savoury". At times he ascribed these difficulties to his being a Jew but 
he is inconsistent about this. He is, it appears, consistent about very little. Freud's 
desire to find a secure home for his work was a significant driving force for him. He 
did not \vant to be regarded as anything other than a scientist, although the paradox 
of Freud is his claiming. in that oft used quotation in a letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, that 
he \\"as not a man of science at all but "a conquistador, an adventurer. .. ,,29 As 
suggested abo\"e. Freud had more to gain in private practice than as a research 
scientist, both in tenns of status and income. He had experienced the humiliation of 
\\"hat he perceived as poverty, and consequently feared a return to this. The Freud 
family had relied on an uncle to support them financially and therefore Freud only 
had himself to support his research and his ever growing family. He had six children 
and so this was an important consideration. Economic as well as concerns about 
status \\"ere real for Freud and were certainly a part of what was at stake when he 
made his claim about his new science. 
26Different versions of who was responsible for Freud's trip to Trieste exist 
27 Gay (1988) p28-9 , 
28 In a recording (available from the Library of the Tavistock clinic)which Freu? made 111,1939 he, 
states that he had succeeded, eventually, with his struggle to gain psychoanalYSIS a place 111 the SCIence 
of psychology, 
79 7 - Sulloway" (1979)p47 
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As noted, Freud's works on rei igionJO are regarded as an independent canon and are 
testil110ny to his belief that religion was for people who were unable to think for 
thel11Sc1Yes, people who abdicated responsibility for their behaviour. However, he 
W~lS rl'signed to the fact that it was part of the social fabric necessary to 111aintain a 
l'ivill/ed society. Freud turned to other thinkers who had rejected God, for exa111ple, 
~ietzsche, once a bclic\'cr himself. in pronouncing the death of God, a l11etaphor for 
the de~lth of religiousness, which gavc peoplc pernlission to believe that there had at 
least been such a thing to belic\'c in. What Freud proclainled see111ed l110re extreme, 
God ~lS 111 an 's in\'cntion \\'ithout any possibility of existence was beyond blasphemy. 
For Frcud God \\as the product of an over active inlagination, a projection as Freud 
clailned, and as FeuerbachJ1 had before hinl. 
Freud has to bc the nl0st deluded of all and duped his followers into believing that 
what they \\'cre doing \\'as scientific. Freud knew that to be successful he would have 
to Inake significant scientific discoveries and fr0111 early in his life he had reason to 
belicye that hc would. Added to this, is that science was where personal status could 
be found. Geologists had already l11ade discoveries to 'prove' that the earth was very 
nluch older than had been clail11ed by theologians. Darwin had 'proved' that there 
\\as indeed a design in biology, evolution, which did not necessarily rely on a 
desi~ner. Each of these theories caused major social fractures. The Christian God had 
been toppled from his established position and science became the replacement. To 
the question: \\'hat was at stake for Freud if science did not accept psychoanalysis? 
The ans\\'er is that he could have faded into oblivion, a place which many still argue 
he deserves. With some insight into Freud's early life we can see how he was 
motivated to prevent this. It was never in Freud's life plan to end in oblivion. 
The \'ienna in which Freud lived and worked for almost seventy eight of his eighty 
three years was, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a hot house of 
creativity. Vienna was regarded as a "microcosm of enlightenment,,32, a place of 
heightened creativity, especially among Jews. This creativity has been ascribed to 
fear of the rise of \lational Socialism, and the overt anti-Sel11itism in places of power. 
30 Vol. 13 PFL. Totem and Taboo. Fliture of an Illusion. Civilisation and it's Discontents and Moses 
and ,\I{)notheislll 
31 Gay (1988) . . 
-'2 Janik.A Toulmin. S. (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienl7([ . Elephant paperbacks. ChIcago. (1996) repnnt. 
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Hit kr and his work did not happen in a vaCUUl11 but was the culn1ination of a specific 
genealogy. Freud shared Vienna with n1any n10re creative intellectuals than those he 
encountered in his field within the university. For eXaInple, the philosopher Ludwig 
\\,ittgenstl'in, \\'hose t:ll11ily converted to Christianity because of their fears of being 
Jl'\\ish in such a clin1ate ofinstabihty, was Austrian33 and in 1922 he published his 
t:U110US Tl"Llctatlls Logico-Philosophicus in Vienna. There was also An101d 
Schonberg who becan1(, fanl0us for the develop111ent of twelve tone 111usic. Also a 
group of artists kno\vn as the Secession n10ven1ent, one ofwh0111 was Gustav KJil11t, 
nourished at the ti111e. The Scottish architect and artist Charles Rennie Mackintosh 
planned to n10\e to Vienna. It was aln10st incestuous. Doctors such as Freud were 
pri\y to \\'hat \\as going on beneath the surface and although there was a good deal 
of intellectual e:\change this 111ay be seen as a bi-product of political and social 
unrest. The date gi yen to the beginning of this highly creative period coincides with 
an econon1ic decline in 1873 and ultin1ately ended, so far as Jewish artists and 
intellectuals \\ere concerned, with the annexation of Austria by Hitler's Third Reich. 
In the contc\.t of this 111ulti-faceted enlightenl11ent the work of Freud seems in some 
respects less daring. For e:\an1ple, in the field of sexuality he was less outrageous 
than Karl Kraus. \ \Tilhelm Stekel or Otto Weininger who in 1903 published Sex and 
Character \\hich had, according to Sulloway, "stunned the world,,34. Weininger 
cOln111itted suicide the same year. With this in mind why did Freud become a 
household na111e \,hen others in his city in his time were clearly more risque than he 
was? This is one of the issues we shall proceed to explore. 
33 As a professor in Cambridge he was the most important figure in the English movement of 
Analytical Philosophy. 
)-+ Sulloway.F.J. (1979) p224 
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Chapter Two: The Construction of Freud 
So \\'ho is this n1an \vho has transcended the bounds of normal criticislu? This 
l'hapkr ain1s to deconstruct S0111e of the stories about Freud which have beconle 
taken for granted, part of psychotherapeutic folklore. When studying a figure such as 
Freud one faces the challenge of the volU1ue of information and consequently one has 
to be se\cctive in a process \vhich by definition is exclusive. The result of this is that 
it is unlikely that anyonc will find a definitive Freud. The following, is one version of 
Freud. He \vas b0111 on the 6th May 1856. Even this has been disputed with some 
belicving it \vas l\ larch. Renee Gicklho11l is persuasive that May is luore likely 
c()rrccr~5. It \\as predicted fron1 the nlOluent of his birth that Sigismund Freud was 
destined for grcat things. Sigisn1und the nanle on his birth certificate he changed to 
Sign1und. However, he \vas known to the fanlily as Sch1OlU036, an old family name, 
sOindinles translated as Schelonlo, a Hebraic version of Solomon from shalom 
Ineaning peacc-'-. His n10ther had pet nanles for hilu and called him 'her little Sigi' 
and 'her little Blackamoor'-'s. Although the validity of these has been questioned 
there is no reason that it has to be either/or: it was probably both and others. 
Freud could trace his family back a long way. His fatuily tradition was that of 
Hassidic Judaism, known for its luastery of allusion39 . The inscription from Freud's 
father to him in the family bible is "To IUY son Schlomo". This is interesting in itself 
as traditionally the bible is handed down to the eldest son and although Freud was the 
first son of his mother Amalie Nathanson, his father Jakob Freud had been married 
t\vice before and had two sons by his first wife Sally. Ernest Jones, regarded as one 
of the most significant biographers, has luade no reference to Jakob's second wife 
Rebecca, \\'ho died after three years of marriage, although she is believed to have 
brought the sons from his first marriage to live with their father and her in Pribor. 
Jakob's first wi fe did not want to move with Jakob when his grandfather offered hilu 
-'5 Renee Gicklhorn used the records from Pribor to confirm Sigmund's birth date as May 6
th 
1856. 
36 This name 'Schlomo' has been given to a Square in Israel in his memory. 
37 For back up of this information I am indebted to Michael Molnar the archivist at the Freud museum 
London. Telephone conversation on 18/02/03 AM. 
38 Witte Is .F. (1924)The Man, His Fol/owers and His School. Translated by Eden and Ceder Paul. 
George Allen and Unwin. London. . 
39 Scholem. G.G (1977) (Ed) Zohar: The Book o.lSplendour. Basic Readings/rom The Kabbalah. 
Rider and Company. London. 
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~l position in thc t~llnily wool business in Pribor, a town in Moravia now the Czech 
repub lie. Jakob's l1larriagc to Rcbecca was short. When Rebecca died he Inarried 
Alnalie, sOlnetilnes called Al1lali a.fU, who was twenty years his junior. 
\\'hen Freud \\'as born he was already an uncle to his halfbrother Elnanuel's son. 
Freud had scycn siblings in addition to his two half brothers Elnanuel and Phillip. He 
had a younger brother Julius who died in infancy in 1858, and who is, like Rebecca, 
h~lYc bccn Olnitted fronl SOl1le biographies.f'. Freud had a Catholic nanny for the first 
three yC~lrS ('If his life, \yho took hinl to l1lass with her. She was accused of stealing 
[roln the t~llnily and \\as dislnissed. Freud had five sisters Anna, Rosa, Marie, 
.-\dolfine and Pauline and then his younger brother Alexander whose name is 
bclic\cd to hay(' been chosen by Freud. The Jones biography was subjected to major 
editing by Anna Freud, Freud's youngest daughter, regarded as her father's most 
dc\"oted disciple. Shc is belicyed to have censored out infonnation which would not 
sho\v thc t~1l11ily in a positi\-c light. Anna was very protective of her father's melnory 
and \\"as intent on keeping it as untainted as possible. 
Infonllation about Freud and his falnily is plentiful, although selective. Working out 
thc truths about Freud and of Freud is a difficult project. Biographers rely on 
preyious biographies with each selecting, either consciously or unconsciously, 
infonnation \\'hich fulfils their ideologically led questions. For example, those who 
\\'ant to sho\\' Freud as a heroic figure omit infonnation regarded as less favourable 
\\"hilst others d\\-ell on the unfavourable in order to show hiln as a delnon. Freud's 
biographers, \\'hat e\"er their motivation, have reused the numerous predictions 
belieyed to bear witness to the inevitability of his becoming great. 
Of the many incidents in Freud's childhood there are three which he held to be 
significant and are therefore repeated by his biographers. The first was that he was 
bonl \\ith a caul on his head, traditionally a sign of greatness. Fritz Wittels, the first 
of Freud's biographers, wrote of Freud that he had in fact been born covered in black 
hair a feature which led his mother to call him "her little BlackaInoor,,42. Although , 
4() Gay( 1988) uses Amalia_ 
.11 The difficulty with writing on Freud is that new material keeps being released Puner.H.~.(1947) 
make no mention of either Rebecca or Julius. Nor does Webster (1995). Gay (1988) MentIOns that 
Amalia \\as Jakob Freud's third wife but does not give the names of the first two. He mentions Julius, 
Freud· s brother. 
-12 Wittels.,F. (1924 ) 
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one stnry n(,ed not ('xclude another, S0111e stories are given Inore elnphasis than 
\..'Ithers, indicati\'(, of a sdection process which is of interest in itself. The second 
incident \\'~lS when a gypsy/peasant WOlnan told his n10ther that she had given birth to 
a l'hild \\'ho \\'as to becolll(, an ilnportant n1an in the world~3. And the third, when 
Freud W~lS an adolescent he was with his fatnily in the Prater, a Viennese park, when 
an itin(,rant p('rtonner predicted that Freud would become a cabinet minister when he 
~r('\\' up.-+-+ This is the seen as the basis for his choice to study law. He changed his 
lllind and studied llledicinc instead. 
It lllay be difficult for the conteillporary lllind to realise the importance of such 
predictions. HOWC\'tT, their significance becOlnes apparent below. These events 
indicate that ('\,en before Freud had taken his first breath he was believed to be 
special. It should therefore COllle as no surprise that he both behaved and was treated 
differently, aln10st with re\'erence, particularly by his Inother and by many others 
\\'ho encountered hin1. 
Freud, later in his life, clailned that the story of the peasant woman had been greatly 
significant in gi\'ing hin1 his "thirst for grandeur,,45. Although most people have 
nlen10rab1e childhood stories Freud's have been emphasised, elnbroidered more than 
others. \\,ith such a destiny predicted it would have been difficult for Freud not to 
attenlpt to become important, (even had he chosen a different route of dissent). These 
predictions caused both Freud and his family to behave as if they were true,46 thereby 
adding to Freud's self-belief. He was treated differently to his siblings, treatment 
\vhich set him apart from them. Ifwe believe at all in his own psychoanalytic 
principles - that childhood events continue to ilnpact upon us throughout our adult 
li\es - the \\'ay in which these stories were recounted to him would have had some 
bearing on his driven personality. 
·u Sulloway (1979) p476. There are different versions of each of these stories. No one relates .then~ in 
exactly the same words. Puner. H.W.(1947) Sigmund Freud: His L(j'e and Mind. (1992) repnnt WIth 
new material. Transaction. New Brunswick. USA. London. UK. She excludes both Rebecca and 
Julius and claims that the 'gypsy' was the midwife. There are numerous discrepancies in the books. 
But most are similar enough for the differences to have been over looked. 
44 ibid p477 
45 Roazen. P. (1975) p54 
46 In our contemporary climate these tales would be taken with a pinch of salt. 
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Freud \\as ~l\\'arc that he was the favoured child and talked of this in his adulthood. 47 
Furthcr exmnp ks of Freud bcing regarded as special and being singled out for 
!:l\ours arc to bc found in the dedication to hin1 from his father in the family bible, 
Inentioned abo\'c. Also, as an adolescent, he alone was given an oil lamp (a new 
inyention) for studying, and another, at Freud's request another of his siblings was 
prc\,cntcd fron1 playing the piano because it disturbed hin1. 
Thcse stories arc repeated again and again and are regarded in a positive light. There 
~lrc others \\'hich paint a kss rosy picture. For exalnple, Freud as an adult recalled his 
bther s~lying that hc, Freud, would never n1ake anything ofhil11self. This becaI11e 
part of a recuning drean1 for Freud and indicates just how much the statement 
~ltTected hin1. Another story which had a n1ajor influence on Freud was his father 
tclling hin1 that when he (his father) had been a child he was out walking, with a new 
cap on. when a gentile child hit his cap off his head and shouted "Jew get off the 
payen1ent!".+8 \\'hen Freud asked his father what he did his father replied that he had 
just picked up his cap frol11 the dirt and walked on. This story made Freud angry and 
he ackno\yledged that it had had a lasting effect on hil11. 
:-\.s a young man Freud had been very keen to have a career in research. However, as 
noted abo\'e the Freud family were not wealthy and depended on an uncle for 
financial support. This led Freud to resent his father as he was unable to support hil11 
in a career \\'hich did not pay enough to support a family life. Freud felt forced to go 
into pri\'ate practice. For these reasons he regarded his father as something of a 
disappointment-+'). This story is somewhat anti-heroic and Freud's response to his 
father's death showed signs that none of these issues were resolved. The story of his 
father's cap being hit offby a gentile shows something of the relations between the 
J cws and the gentiles of the time as well as showing us something of the character of 
Freud's father, who unlike his son was not a revolutionary, but rather, a man willing 
to acquiesce, 
.. - Sulloway (1979) p477 
.. x Roazen (1975) p49 , " 
.. () However, for someone who did not have a career in research hIS contnbutIOn to the field was rather 
significant. Today there are few who would argue against th~ n?tion that he did become one, of the 
most influential scholars of the 20 t l! century. Testimony to thIS IS the fact that there aI:e few, I~ ,any, 
disciplines in the academy which Freud's theories do not impinge upon. Not always 111 a posItlve 
sense but his presence is felt none the less, He may even be found in aquaculture! 
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Freud's autobiographical writings denl0nstrate that the conlbination of investment in, 
and expcctations of. hinl was both difficult and enjoyable for him. Again, if we draw 
upon the principles of psyc hoanalysis, overt denl0nstration of self-belief is often 
intel1weted as o\'er cOl11pensation for deeply felt insecurity. Freud's family had high 
expectations of Freud. He always had s0111ething to live up to and was self critical if 
he did not succeed. 
\Yhilst Freud seenlS to ha\'e done very well at school he was not regarded as a child 
prodigy or genius, although later in his career he, perhaps with a touch of irony, 
regarded hit11sclf in this light. Freud nlade no declaration of himself as a genius, 
ho\\'c\'er. he did, at tit11es, deenl hinlselfto be in the same prophetic league as Moses 
and St Paul,:'o both powerful Jewish role nl0dels. Of course we can have no evidence 
of \\'hethcr Frcud was being ironic in his analogy, but even so it takes a certain kind 
of confidence to put ones self in the same category as such heroes. Freud was acutely 
a\vare of his Je\\'ishness and although not a practicing Jew,51 the influence of 
Judaisnl nlay be traced throughout his work52 . But what do we mean by practicing 
J e\\'? He \\'as a Inenlber of the B 'nai B'rith a Jewish society to whom he lectured and 
used as a testing ground for Inany of his ideas. He remained a member during his 
,,"hole life and acknowledged his debt to them for their support at times when he 
belie\"ed that he was being acadelnically persecuted. Freud acknowledged the Jewish 
calendar and its festivals and his work follows in the tradition of Jewish mysticism 
\\'ith its convention of allusion53 . He is also believed to have spoken Hebrew as an 
inscription from his father in the family bible is in Hebrew. In addition Bakan notes 
that a Professor Hammerschlag is believed to have taught him Hebrew.
54 
Freud. a self proclaimed atheist, became one of religion's most formidable critics. 
This \vas difficult for his wife Martha who was an observing Jew and a point of 
interest is that none of Freud's children married gentiles. Freud's criticism of religion 
is well known, as are his views on the ways in which it served a purpose, but his 
"!\Vebster.(l995) p100 see also Freud's letters to Jung and Thomas Szasz(l979)p1?5 
51 Freud may best be described as an atheistic Jew because his he belonged to a natIOn of Jews and he 
was ethnically a Jew. 
52 Freud's Jewishness has been well documented by scholars both Jewish and gentile. Gay (1987) 
Freud: The Godless Jew is comprehensive. Bakan.D. (1958) Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical 
Tradition. D.Van Nostrand Company,Inc. Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, New York, London 
53 Bakan.D. (1958) Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. D.Van Nostrand Company,Inc. 
Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, New York, London. 
54 Ibid p50-51 
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l'ri t il'isn1 did not prevent hin1 fron1 having nun1erous friendships with believers. He 
had Inany friends who \vere believers both Jewish and Christian. Of particular note is 
his relationship and correspondence with Oskar Pfister a Swiss pastor. From this we 
Inust inkr that although he was anti- religion he was not a fundatnentalist atheist and 
hl' Inaintained ~1 significant connection to things Jewish throughout his whole life. 
:-\l'corLiing tl) Tholnas Szasz, Freud had differing views on his Jewishness, one for 
public and one for private life. This is not surprising as lnost people have public and 
private persona. \\'hat Inatters is to what extent Freud's public and private selves 
contradicted each other. Freud believed that his being Jewish was at tilnes a 
hindrance and blan1ed this for holding hiln back, a notion which Sulloway claims is 
greatly exaggerated. For exan1ple, when he failed to receive promotion he blamed his 
rej ection on being a Jew, believing that there was an anti-Jewish faction in the 
. . "" unlversltv.' , 
Contrary to Freud's belief in this anti -J ewish faction there is evidence which 
indicates that n1any other Jews were employed and in promoted positions at the time. 
His rejection \vas therefore more likely to have been because his work was regarded 
as ha\'ing n10ved a\vay frOln his n10re scientific neurological work and some of his 
ideas clashed \vith the social values and cultural climate of the time. His colleagues 
had particular difficulty hearing his theories on sexual abuse and infantile sexuality. 
His \'ie\vs \\'ere regarded by some as extrelnely controversial, in this late Victorian 
period, Ho\\'e\er. there were others whose writings were far more radical than 
Freud' s56but who have faded into oblivion compared to him. Freud had an extra 
characteristic. best described as charisma, which allowed his followers to suspend 
their reason and become enraptured by the Inan. 
As mentioned above, Freud did declare his J ewishness and this was at least to declare 
an awareness of an affinity with a cultural milieu. At times he believed that his being 
a Jew played a significant part in the success of his movement, but was equally 
aware that the psychoanalytic movement was in danger of becoming a ghettoized 
Jewish society. He believed that the dOlninance of Jews in the moven1ent was not a 
55 Sulloway (1979) p464 . . . ' . 
56 The work of Wilhelm Stekel, Karl Kraus, and Wemmger were all far more ns~y for the.lr tune th~n 
Freud's own work. Each of these men supported Freud in his work. Added to thiS was Reich, Rohem1 
and \11 arcuse each of whom adopted Freud's views and developed them in a more radical way. 
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~nl)d thing and onc of his reasons for cultivating the kind of relationship which he 
did with .lung was in the hope of giving the society a gentile as a leader57 . Freud 
en~inecrcd ~l plan that .lung was to becon1e his successor in order that the 
psychoanalytic con1n1lmity would widen and becon1e international. His desire was to 
fllund a \\nrld n10\'Clnent. 
Freud's self-belicfhas been explored by lnany, for eXaI11ple, in Anthony Storr's Feet 
(~( (,IllY."", ~ln exploration of figures whon1 he regards as gurus, and in which there are 
chapters on both Freud and .lung. 59 Storr argues that Freud and .lung have l11any of 
the negati\'e charactcristics \\'hich would cause theln to seek and find and enjoy guru 
st~ltuS. Howc\,er. Storr, by clain1ing that Freud also had altruistic characteristics, 
gi \'cs us snn1C insight into the difficulty of categorizing a Inan such as Freud who is 
described as a despot(lO on one hand and somewhat altruistic on the other. 
If Storr is correct it is unlikely that we would have stories about Freud's own feelings 
of a\\'e to\\ards SOI11e of his Inentors, as gurus have difficulty in accrediting others' 
success. For example, as a student Freud was in awe, to the point of reverence, of 
Charcot. ~-\pparently on retun1ing from Paris after studying with him Freud is 
described: 
not so much a student reporting on a study trip as a zealot who had undergone religious 
. 61 
con\"ersIOn . 
Both Ellenberger( 1970) and Sulloway(l979) have comprehensive lists of those who 
were influential on Freud. From thel11 we can see that he showed admiration for 
l11any, Charcot, Breuer, Brticke, Brentano, .lung al110ng others. However, Charcot, 
Breuer and Li ebault62 , (a practitioner of hypnosis) are most often cited as his 
mentors. Freud's teachers were nUl11erous and must include those with WhOl11 he had 
no direct contact, other than through their work. He was exceptionally well read. For 
57 Szasz .T.(l979) The /vfyth of Mental Illness. pISS 
58 Storr.A. (1996) Feet 0.[ Clay: A S'tlld) , 0.[ Gurus. Harper Collins. London. (1997 paperback edition) 
59 It is interesting that Freud and lung are chosen to rest among other alleged gurus all whom are 
regarded as having had a negative effect on their followers. The thing which seems to distinguish him 
most from those other alleged gurus in Storr, is the fact that he was a loyal husband and father who 
appears not to have had any extra marital affairs. Although, there has ?een some talk of an affair with 
\1inna, his sister in law who lived with them, it is so far only speculatIOn. When would he have had 
time? 
6°Wittels. (1924)p 18 
61 ibid piOO . . 
(,2 Sachs. H. (1945) Freud Master and Friend. p45. Imago Pubhshmg. Co, ltd. London 
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l':\~llnpk, \\'c kno\\' that he read Plato, Nietzsche, Benedikt, Bachofen, Feuerbach, and 
Oar\\in. Hc ~llso rc~\d literature. Freud, like others, was in awe of In any people but at 
tin1cs this faded \\'hen his OWI1 knowledge grew. 
Throughout his lifc Frcud worked hard, in his studies, in his research, in his practice, 
~llH.i ~llso in his correspondence. According to Hans Sachs, one of his disciples, who 
spent a ~rcat deal of tin1c with Freud ovcr along period, Freud always had just a little 
n10re to gi\'c than anyone elsc. Sachs gi\'cs exalnples of Freud's great physical as 
\\cll as n1ental rcsiliencc.()-~ Further c\'idence of this resilience is to be found in the 
final sc\'cntcCI1 ycars of his Ii rc, when he continued to work with the SaIne 
application ~lS hc al\\'ays had. He did this despite having cancer of the mouth, on 
\\'hieh he had nlllnerous surgical procedures, SOlne say as lnany as thirty three, which 
wcre a source of great pain to hin1. He wore a prosthesis, a source of deep discOlnfort 
\\'hieh interkred \\'ith his speech, and he had to have daily treatment (administered 
by Anna his youngest daughter) to clean his wound. His cancer was, even then, 
attributed to his dependence on large cigars. He found theln difficult to give up but 
c lain1ed that he n1anaged to cut down on the nun1ber. 
The picture of Freud which we are beginning to build indicates that he was, as is 
often the case. n1uch n10re complicated than his critics and admirers have been able 
to illustrate independently. The paradoxical character of Freud comes to light 
through the con1bined biographical works, and his autobiographical writing. As 
n1uch as they tr;/'-+, it has not been possible for his biographers to separate the lnan 
from the myth():'~ they are now one and the same. Freud also had difficulty in 
separating himself frOln the growing myths, and it is no wonder that he becalne just 
as guilty of creating and perpetuating them as anyone. When people around you are 
intent on ele\'ating your position it is easy to come to believe, delude yourself, that 
\\'hat they say is right rather than taking the opportunity to counter them and asking 
what their need for such elevation is. This would have happened if Freud had applied 
his own psychoanalysis. 
63Sachs passim 
!,-+ Sulloway believed it was possible. 
65 ElIenberger.H. (1970). 
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Freud had difficulty in settling as a scientist and found some tension between himself 
as a scientist and as an adventurer. For him, these did not necessarily go hand in hand 
and it is \vorth quoting him in full: 
"for I am actually not at all a man of science" he once told his friend Fliess, "not an observer, 
not an experimenter, not a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a conquistador, an 
adventurer, if you wish to translate this term - with all the inquisitiveness, daring, and 
tenacity characteristic of such a man. ,,66 
It seenlS that Freud's difficulty was in believing that he could be both a scientist and 
a "conquistador" at the same tinle. This problem appears to be, of integrating 
different paradignls, a problem which echoes the on-going struggle in psychoanalysis 
and other therapies. The tension created by the need for scientific67 recognition on 
the one hand and the subjective human qualities required for successful practice on 
the other is still around for today's therapists. 
The notion of psychoanalysis as science is perpetuated by many of the biographers. 
For example, Ernest Jones in defence of psychoanalysis as science states: 
Mediocre spirits demand of science a kind of certainty which it cannot give, a sort of 
religious satisfaction. Only the real, rare, true scientific minds can endure doubt, which is 
attached to all our knowledge.68 
This statement, in claiming that only "true scientific minds can endure doubt" is but 
one example of a follower protesting too much. If psychoanalysis is not a science 
then \\"hat is it? The alternatives which have been suggested are dismissed. 
Psychoanalysts have more to gain, as Freud had, by being regarded as scientists. 
Perhaps the "grain of truth" which Jones, in the prologue, claims there is behind the 
notion of psychoanalysis as religion is beginning to mature. 
However, it is evident that Freud himself was aware that the techniques and skills of 
the practitioner were of little consequence if the relationship between patient and 
practitioner had no rapport. The efficacy of psychoanalysis relies on the faith of the 
patient in the practitioner and the practitioner in the patient. For example, Paul 
Roazen states: 
As rationalistic and intellectual as Freud sounds, he was also concerned to show that what 
turns the scale in a patient's therapeutic struggle is not his intellectual insight -which is 
66 Sulloway (l979).p477. Quote from Schur M.(1972) Freud: Living and Dying. The p~ychoan~lytic. 
library, London Hogarth press and The institute of psychoanalysis: New York: InternatIOnal umverslty 
press. 
67 This includes medical science. 
68 Jones. E. (1955) Sigmund Freud. Life and work. Years of Maturity. Volume 2, 1901-1919. 
Hogarth.p466 London 
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neitl~l'r str~)ng enough or \r(( enough for such an achievement- but simply and soley his 
rl'iatlOnslllp to the doctorb ). 
\Yhilst being aware of the in1portance of theory for the wider recognition of 
psycho .. malysis, Freud knew that no an10lmt of theory could make therapy successful 
if the patient Idoctor relationship was n1isn1atched. This should leave us in no doubt 
that he bc1ie-yed that the-re is son1ething n10re required for the process of therapy than 
good te\.tbook practice, a 'sOl11ething' which ren1ains out with the reach of scientific 
study. In t~lCt Freud did not behave as a scientist in any traditional sense with regard 
to eithe-r his subject or his patients and was aware of his effect on his patients and his 
eye-r increasing band of fo11o\yers, who responded to Freud as ifhe was an 
indispensab Ie giant. Freud realised that he was part of this therapeutic process, his 
po\ye-rful . ::mra' was necessary for the cultivation of the transferential relationship, a 
relationship \yhich he cultiyated with patients as well as his followers. Such 
be-hayiour was is not e-\.pected of l11en of science. It is this behaviour which raises the 
question of the nature of psychoanalysis. Scientists are not supposed to influence 
the-ir \\"ork with their personalities. The psychoanalytic movement was built from 
Fre-ud's personality. Freud was offering salvation and became the One for whom the 
psychoanalytic cOlnmunity existed. The cOlnmunity functions as a sangha does with 
a leader \\"hOl11 they follow and whOln they cannot hope to usurp. 
Freud's \\"ork sits more comfortably in the field of meta-psychology. It is not 
repeatable in the way that empiricism requires as it relies on interpretation. Freud's 
life is also based on interpretation. Thus what we have of Freud is tantamount to a 
body of mythology. It is useful to understand that there is mythology in Freud's 
\\·ork. and of, Freud. That is, Freud drew upon ancient myths for inspiration for his 
theories, the most famous of which is Oedipus Rex. In addition to this there are 
numerous myths about Freud which have a different function to those which he 
adopted for his theories. 
Myths about Freud have served to construct a history which, as noted, both deifies 
him and or demonises him. The effect of these myths has been that any notion of a , 
real Freud is lost in favour of a make believe heroic figure
7o
. As we can see frOln 
69 Roazen .. ( 1975) P 132-3 quoting introductory lectu~es V.ol 16 p4.4~ th 
70 Robert Segal. Unpublished paper given at The Umverslty of Stlr1mg on May 7 2001 Segal argues 
h 
. t k 'heroes' of people (undeserving though they may be) because we have the t at we contmue 0 rna e 
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~lbo\'c Freud, fronl the beginning of his life was used to special attention. This 
l'l)ntinued throughout his Ii rc and indeed after his death. Many C01nmentators note 
the different Inyths of Frcud~ in fact Sulloway devotes a section of his book to "The 
\ lyth l)fthe Hcro". The hero has always had an inlportant role in n1yths and has been 
the subjcct l)f Inuch interest for a long time. For exan1ple, Thon1as Carlyle wrote a 
serics of lecturcs on the hero in history and the way in which our attitudes to heroes 
h~lS changed 71. Our heroes wcrc once Gods with extraordinary qualities and powers, 
wherc as now thcy ha\'c c\'ol\'ed into humans with different extraordinary qualities. 
These nc\\" Gods have come to be so b.y a process of adulation and their adaptation to 
it. One of the consequences of enjoying such adulation is that they bec01ne seduced 
by cconOlnics and PO\ycr. There are exceptions to this, for eXaInple, Mother Theresa 
~ll1(,i ~elson \ landda who dct\ such cynicisn1. 
\\'hat is Incant by nl:1h is detennined by its use. Contemporary use of myth differs 
fr01n even a decade ago. It functions today as a substitute for lie. For eXaInple, there 
is a trend in popular culture to state that smnething is a myth when it is untrue. For 
exatnpk. the notion of the nuclear fan1ily is heralded a lnyth: any notion ofnol111al is 
deelned a nl: 1h, perfection is also a nlyth. Alnl0st without exception, when used in 
the nledia n1:1h is used as a fonn of condescension, or irony, with connotations of 
fablication. \ly own use of the word is unlike this contemporary popular use which 
sees m) 1h as synonytnous with lie. The lnyths of Freud have constructed a Freud 
with n1ultiple personalities. Each version of Freud, including his own, has had a 
purpose. or function which has kept Freud alive. Freud is not theoretically dead yet. 
If\\'e \'ie\\ a m:1h as a c01nponent of a c01nlnunity's social cohesion and a way of 
capturing e\'ents which have been chosen and perpetuated for reasons beyond the 
indi\'idual it is more empathetic than seeing myths as creations which are actively 
misleading. Freud did actively mislead us, as have many who have written about hiln 
but to call them liars would be too strong an accusation. History and mythology are 
subjective versions of events which bear the observers truths- how they have 
interpreted what they saw or experienced. 
ability to suspend our disbelief and our belief so that they may fill a role which is absent in a secular 
culture. 
71 Carlyle. T. On Heroes Hero- Worship and the Heroic in His tOl y. H.R. Allenson. London 
(1905 )India paper edition. 
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.\l'l'l"rding to Robert Segal it was with the work of Freud, and subsequently .Tung, 
that th~ subj ect tnatter of nlyth ceased to be about the extel1lal, physical world and 
becnne internalised to the subject of the unconscious. Segal claims that by building 
on this, adding, for ('\.atnpk, the work of another psychoanalyst, W.D.Winnicott, 
tnyth beconles not only about the internal world of the unconscious but a transitional 
~1diyity \\hich allows the boundary between reality and illusion to be blurred 
- t 1 7' conltorta) y. - Belo\y, the usc of the word nlyth reflects sOlnething of the need of the 
lISer and certainly, \yhen used as a fonn of condescension, says much about the user 
~lnd little about the nlyth. 
Freud has been so shrouded by nlyth as to nlake it ilnpossible to find a pre Inythical 
Freud. The tnyths of Freud have beconle established in the traditions of 
psychoanalysis but are used in nmnerous disciplines and reflect how Freud touched 
upon then1. Sullo\yay is not alone in exploring the significance of mythologizing 
Freud. Henri Ellenberger states: 
One of the difficulties of evaluating Freud's contribution to psychiatry is that psychoanalysis 
has grown up in a sphere of legend, with the result that an objective appraisal will not be 
p(lsslble before the true historical facts are separated from the legend. 73 
Ellenberger. \\Titing in the nineteen sixties, still thought it possible to find 'true 
historical facts': an idea which lnust be regarded as illusory. He agrees that Freud is a 
legendary figure. Paul Roazen clailns: 
1 d 74 Freud kne\\" the power of the egen . 
A claim \\hich is certainly borne out in Freud's contribution to his own lnythology. 
\lvtholoS!izing Freud is common place. In fact it is difficult to say anything about - ~ ~ 
Freud without it becoming part of the biopic. Trying to discover the real Freud has 
, 
been the task of many of his biographers. Ellenberger, Sulloway, Roazen and 
\\' ebster have taken particular interest in trying to unravel him. They attelnpt to 
separate Freud from his work. With each attelnpt the biographer is left confused as 
there is no clear way of delineating them. Even with the knowledge that some of his 
theories were flawed Freud's awesome character is continually elevated. Even his 
most vehement critics fall into the trap of perpetuating the greatness of Freud the 
72 Robert Segal. (2001). 
73 ElIenberger. (1970) p 16 
~4 Roazen. (1975) pIT? 
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tHan, "hi 1st knowing his theories were wrong75 . It SeelTIS that lTIythologizing takes 
place regardless or one's stance on Freud. Any notion that there is a single lTIyth of 
Freud nlust be disnlisscd. There are tnany and they vary frOiTI highly prOiTIotional to 
dOOin laden, with others still whose intentions nlay not be borne out. For example, 
Richard \\' cbstcr conlpares Freud with the "self doubting" Jesus. His intention is not 
to prOlnotc Freud, as his own \'iews on religion suggest that his lTIotivation for using 
such ~l quote \\'as one of condescension: 
Read sl'epticaily the Gospels portray Jesus not as a messiah confident of his cailing, but as a 
Se If l~~)ubting prophet whose tendency to submit to others is almost as great as his impulse to 
lead. ) 
\ \' ebster is not the tirst of Freud's biographers to comnlent on the mystique which 
~~ . 78 
sUlTounds Freud . NUlnerous other bIOgraphers note that there were followers who 
renlained blind 'enough' to his flaws to continue to build successfully on the 
Inythology \\'hich had already been established by his fan1ily and himself. 79 
That a story has becOine "'ide-spread Inay give it power and credibility but it does 
not Inake it true. Ho\\'e\'er, by virtue of the popularity of many stories about Freud 
they ha\'e bccon1e regarded as such. To use the word myth in the contelTIpOrary, 
derogatory \yay is not the only way. Stories about Freud and by Freud, like other 
n1;'1hs. ha\'e been designed to serve a purpose. This purpose, or function, may change 
over tinle for the service of different groups. 
Freud's biographers have shown repeatedly that he was economical with the truth. 
For exan1ple, Jeffrey Masson, regarded as one of Freud greatest critics, (originally a 
Freudian psychoanalyst), whilst working in the Freudian archives, discovered papers 
\\hich endorsed Freud's original theory of sexual abuse: 
\Ye know that his insistence (in 1896) that women were telling the truth about having been 
sexuallv abused in early childhood did not last, and that, by 1903, he had retracted this 
- 80 
statement. 
75 Richard Webster for example. 
76 Webster (1995) p301 
77 Biographers such as Jones (Implicitly), Roazen , Grosskurth Sulloway. 
"7S Jones, Roazen. Sulloway and Wittels . 
79 In his letters, paliicularly those to Jung and to Fleiss~ ther~ is evidence that Freud, m th.e process of 
elevating others, was in fact in the first instance ele~atmg hImself. The many sources WhICh sought to 
mythologize Freud, did so because they had a ne~d 111 themselves. . . 
80 \11 J (1988) Against therap1'. Harper Collms, London. 1993 edItIon. p25-26, p45 . asson. . . 
80 ibid p45 
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1 f 1\ lasson is correct it took seven years before Freud retracted his findings. Seven 
years in the acadelny is a very long tilne. What took hin1 so long? Freud had found 
th~lt a nunlber of his fenlalc patients had been sexually abused by either their fathers, 
or ~l l'l()se t~llnily friend, or relative. However, Victorian Vienna was not ready to 
hear this and Freud eventually denied this as fact and invented a theory which stated 
th~lt all of the testilnonies he had heard may be explained as fantasies or melnories of 
t:1ntasies. 1\ lasson's clainl, that this theory "'did not last", is off the Inark if the dates 
above are Cl)ITect. Seven years is not an insignificant tin1e and one can only speculate 
as to what \vent on in the intervening period which nlade him retract his 
infonnation. ~ I 
As \ve shall see below Freud \vas not adverse to actively distorting facts in order to 
cover his own back. Ho\vever. he was also used to positing infonnation which people 
found uncolllfortable so what ever was going on at this tilne Freud made a decision 
\\'hieh \\'as sonle\vhat extrenle. However, that the original theories were still available 
for \ lasson to discover begs a whole lot of different questions. If Freud had really 
decided that these theories \vere untrue why were the originals still available in the 
archives fift\' \'ears after his death? Did he want theln to be found at a tilne when 
they 111ight be nlore accepted as true? Was this just another way for Freud to have fun 
\\'ith his biographers82 ? One thing is that if Freud had not intended this work to be 
found he \\"ollld not have had any hesitation destroying it. 
Another example of Freud's distortion of facts, was during the famous cocaine 
episode. He \\"as conducting experiments into the anaesthetic properties of cocaine, 
\\'hich included using cocaine himself. Elizabeth Thornton argues that Freud's 
research from this period was flawed as his findings had been influenced by his 
altered state of consciousness. s3 Thornton is more critical of Freud than Webster but 
still leaves her reader with a sense that she, as others have, found him both aweson1e 
:-; I What e\'er happened in those seven years perhaps we will never know ~ut i.t is not a~l insub~tantial 
time gi\'en Freud's normal rate of research. This is not to condone Freud m hIS retractIOn but It does 
beg questions about the intervening years. . . 
IC.'.,,, I shall expand in the text in a letter to Martha he, havmg burne~ l~IS correspondence, commen~s 
that he is intending to lead his biographers "astray". ~hat he ,:"as ~ntlclpatm~ bl~graphers (~lural).ls. 
something wOlih noting and adds credence to the notIOn that If thmgs are bemg uncovered now It IS 
because Freud intended this to happen. ._ 
83 Thornton. E.M. (1986) The Freudian Fallacy: Freud and Cocaine. Paladm. UK. In Webster (199)) 
p33 
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~lS wd 1 as abhorrent. The paradox of Freud is that those who despise him can also 
achnire hin1 at the satne tit11e. 
The act of distorting t~lctS was further exen1plified by Freud when he destroyed all of 
his lnanuscripts, diaries, notes and conespondence, not once in his life but twice, the 
first tin1(, in 1885, and then again in 190i'"+. This was incredible in itself but added to 
this he confessed in a letter to his future wife, Martha, that: 
I am J lrt'ad y looking fnr\\J rd to seeing them (the biographers) going astra/5 
Such acts \"ere ckarly intended to distort history and were a way of covering his 
tr~l('ks. \ Ye wi 11 ne\'er know \\'hat it was that he was so frightened that people would 
disco"er about hin1. His disposal of correspondence, of things which he did not want 
people to find, 111akes \\'hat he did with his fan10us sexual abuse theory all the 1110re 
intriguing. It is also incredible that when writing this he was a young luan of twenty-
eight. \"ho already belie\'ed that he would have biographers (plural). Self-belief 
indeed. 
Freud \yas COlTect in his prediction that there would be biographers (plural). He may, 
n10re accurately, haye called them his cO-luythologizers. Biographers, too numerous 
to list. ha\c been unable to resist perpetuating old, or creating new myths. As 
preyiously noted, Ernest Jones had to have permission from, and a great deal of 
editing by, Freud's daughter Anna, before he could publish his biography86. Anna 
Freud played a significant role in mythologizing her father. When editing Jones' 
biography she is said to have cOlTected the punctuation of the quotations of her father 
and removed large sections of text but never acknowledged it as having been taken 
out or 'lost'. That Jones complied with this indicates his respect for the Freud family, 
although it is also probable that without such changes he would not have been 
permitted to publish and remain friends with the family. The phenomena of either 
embroidering or omitting information, is not peculiar to Freud or his biographers. It 
is almost par for the course in any historiography. When researching we see what we 
are looking for, not what we are not looking for. 
84 Within this period the controversy about sexual abuse was taking place. It is therefore of greater 
interest that he did not destroy the information about this and left it to be 'found'. 
85 Sulloway.( 1979) p7 
86 As note above others have also 'lost' bits of Freud. Anna was very close to her father and would 
be intent on his being respectfully portrayed. 
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Although Richard \\'ebster is still regarded by contelnporary psychoanalysts as one 
of Freud's severest critics (his 1995 book was received as a n1ajor attack upon 
psychoanalysis)n he c1aillls: 
... ~t mit'-ht \wll be said that the incorrect theory elaborated by Freud has been infinitely 
preterable to no theory at all, and in the vast desert of twentieth-century rationalism it is 
sl'arl'l'iy :mrprising that many han' seen, in the drop of imaginative water which is contained 
in Freud's theoril's, a veritable oasis of truth. 
In this \Yebskr ilnplics that whilst Freud n1ade Inistakes it is better to have tried and 
t~liled than not to havc tricd at all. This attitude is not bOll1e out by Webster as he 
l'ontinues in his atknlpt to topple Freud. The toppling of Freud has proved a lTIOre 
ditlicult task for the critics than they expected. Webster is saying one thing and doing 
another. ~ ian\" of Freud's critics condenln his work but have admiration for the man - , 
althou~h. ~lr~uabl\". there is little differentiation between the work and the man ...... ...... - . 
\\' ebster talks of Freud as a "n1essiah"~~, which has different connotations to "guru", 
the title \\"hich StOlT bestows on Freud. It is interesting to speculate about what 
Freud's o"-n preference would have been and although commentators continually do 
speculate \ve \vill ne\"er really know what Freud actually thought. His written words 
are only one aspect of his COnllTIUnication, for eXaITIple, his sense of humour, his 
acute Jewish \vit \vas such that when quoting his words now we lose his sense of 
SL) 
irony. L For example, Webster states: 
Freud himself consciously identified with Moses. and the prophetic and messianic 
dimensions of his character have been noted again and again even by those who have written 
sympathetically about psychoanalysis90 
Freud did compare himself to Moses and also to Hannibal and St Paul among others. 
And this may be good enough reason to accuse him of making a concerted effort to 
cultivate himself as a messiah91 but he 111ay just have been having fun. That he is 
accused of intentionally being messianic does not take into account the fact that there 
was an audience willing to receive him and his message. This willing audience were 
87 \larcus Bowman "The significance of psychoanalysis on modern thought". 
http://www.psvchoanalysis.org.uk/bowman.htm. On 12/04/00 at 11.50. 
88 Webster. (1 995) Also talks of lung as messianic.P370-1, 376-7 
89 \ rurray CuddihyJ. (1974) The Ordeal of Cil!ili(I'." Freud, Marx, Lel'i-Strauss, and the Jcwish 
Struggle lI'ith\fodernit)'.Basic Books. New York 
90 \Vebster (1995) p9. Szasz (l979)is also guilty of this in The Myth ofP.~ychot!lerapy . 
9191 I often call myself a "Domestic Goddess" (Nigella Lawson the cookery wnter ~1as made use of thIS 
term) and only were you to be present would you identify the irony.in my declaratIOn. Wa~ Freud 
being ironic? He was not adverse to having fun with peopl~. See .MIchael Molnar's The Dlmy 0.( 
Sigmund Freud /929-/939: A Record of the Filial Decadc 111 whIch he shows Freud as a man WIth a 
significant sense of humour. 
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dC~lrly pcopk "'hose spccific needs were nlet by such an attitude. The luaking of a 
111l'~siah is 110t a solo pursuit: he could not have becotue a 11lessiah in isolation92 . 
Such dainls arc 11lade as i r thc Freud we think we know has arisen in a vacuum. He 
\ya~ nc\'cr an ISO latcd character, as he sonle tin1es clain1ed hiluself: this waslis 
bntasy a part oftl1c e\,er increasing nlythology. 
\\T cbster also nlakcs a judgenlent about the psychoanalytic cOIuluunity by stating that 
eycn tl1o~e \\'ho ~lre synlpathctic to psychoanalysis use these religious, heroic 
~lnalo~ics. notin~ that it is not only critics fron1 outside who luake these comparisons. 
A~ illustrated in the prolo~uc, it seenlS that few, if any, either insiders or outsiders, 
are asking \\l1y thcse c0111parisons haye been luade. May it not be that they are the 
lll()st accurate'? Others hayc tried to use political analogies but these are less 
conYincingl)-~. The \yays and frequency with which religious analogies have been used 
has added to the resistance of the psychoanalytic community to anything religious. 
Their dit11culties in reappraising religion arise from their hallowed founder's views. 
Freud's yie\\'s on religion set a fran1ework for his followers which confines thelU to 
continue to yie" it as negatiye and until recently even the most forward thinking of 
the111 has ayoided theoretical engageluent with the subject. 
\\T ebster notes Freud: 
attempts to use reason in a "magical" rather than in a scientific manner - to use reason, that is 
to say. not in order to provide a genuine solution to an intellectual problem, but in order to 
pro\ide a defence against the forces which we fear, and against aspects of our own nature 
I ' h ,94 \\' 1lC arouse SOCIety. 
Freud \\'as \yilling to step outside of the rigid paradigm of science. He challenged the 
boundaries of science \\'hich Webster finds inconceivable, even although luany early 
scientists were themsel\'es alchemists and as such using approaches that today could 
be called creati\'e or as Webster would have it "magical". Freud's 'magpie' approach 
to knowledge is difficult for luany to concede. He was an original interdisciplinarian. 
As noted above, Freud was not adverse to complicating n1atters. However, he was a 
trained scientist and was very keen to keep his findings and ultimately 
psychoanalysis within the realm of science. 
97 6 - Szasz.(1979) pISS-IS. , , , 
93 Adam Phillips, Start the Week BBC Radio 4 with Andrew MalT. PhIllIPS compared Fr,eud s 
movement to a political movement but his argument did not encapsulate the subtlety whIch the 
religious comparison does, 
')4 \ \' ebster. (199 S) 
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\\'hat docs it Inean for knowledge when we begin to prescribe how reason must be 
used? \\T e Inay be in danger of a kind of ethnic cleansing by advocating such 
disciplin~lry hygiene. Does reason not cease to be such if its uses are prescribed _ 
\\"hen it then takes the fonn of dognla? There is sonlething in Webster's criticism 
about Inagic \,ersus reason which echoes the continuing dilemlna in psychoanalysis 
and psychodynatnic psychotherapy and is part of the wider debate of science versus 
religion which finds solace in perpetuating either or thinking. 
Freud has becOIne ~l \'aluable conlnl0dity in the biographical industry: with each 
conlnlcntator there is an agenda which is peculiar to theln. Each has a question which 
dri\"C's their \\'ork, the results of which nlake a significant contribution to the 
111)1hology of Freud including those who have invested in finding Freud's mistakes. 
For C'xmnplc, \\"ebster clainls that the case of Anna 0 becaIne one of the Inost 
"ilnpo11ant C'lC'nlents of the Freudian legend",9s and goes so far as to say: 
to entertain any serious doubt about the diagnosis of Anna 0 would be to deal a devastating 
bIo\\' to the psycho:lllalytic church. 96 
Practising Freudians know that this case was a disaster and Webster only serves to 
create yet another myth by making this clailn. Freud is often shown as dogmatic and 
one can see that this makes him a more interesting character. However, it would 
appear that for e\'ery negative claim about Freud there will be a counter claim just 
around the comer. So, contrary to the claim of his being dogmatic, some of his 
follo\\'ers claim that he was willing to engage in discussions and with criticisms 
about his theories, but one can see how this makes a less dramatic story. As with 
finding a pure Freud there is little if any chance of finding a purist Freudian, which is 
"'hat \Vebster implies. And it may be useful to remember that within all churches 
belief is peculiar to the believer. In the Freudian church this is no different. There are 
some who believe that Anna 0 was useful and others who see it for what it was, a 
product of an over emotional collaboration of Freud and Fleiss. The case of Anna 0 
has been questioned again and again and shown to have been a complete 
misdiagnosis and most Freudians know this. Freud's relationship with Fleiss was 
95 ibid p131 
96 ibid p131 
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l'IJlnplicated ~lnd froln their letters lJ7 we can tell that there was lTIOre to it than a 
Inerely proCessional alliance. 
\ Ve can sec frOl1l the abo\'e that Freud waslis part of an ongoing process of 
c()l1struction. People \\'ith an interest in Freud arc rarely dispassionate and never 
\\ork in a \'aCUUln. Each COnll1lentator adds to those layers of Freud's lTIythology 
\\hich he and his fanlily carefully set in n10tion. The following chapter turns to his 
leg~1Cy \\hich illustrates the continuity of the nlyth building. 




Chapter Three (i): Freud's Legacy. 
The pelVetuation of the l11any nlyths of Freud relied on a community which grew up 
in response to his character and his work. The conlnlunity began with a snlall group 
(If friends. colleagues, l11eeting in his hOllle at Berggasse 19, in central Vienna on a 
\y ednesd~lY evening. The original four l11enlbers, Stekel, Adler, Kahane and Reitler, 
\\'ho b('canle the first psychoanalysts after Freud, l11et up to discuss ideas. By 1908 
this group had gro\vn too big to continue to l11eet in Freud's home and the bigger 
gr()up \\,~lS nallled The Yiennese Psychoanalytic Society. However, it continued to 
expand and nl0ve beyond Vienna, and subsequently became known as the 
Psychoanalytic ~ lovenlent. \\'hilst this did not happen ovenlight it was fairly quickly 
established ~lS a nlOVenlent of sonle significance. 
Phyllis Grosskurth, a biographer who falls into the critical camp, illustrates the 
degree of conlnlitnlent \vhich was necessary for the development of the lTIOVement. 98 
For eXalllple, she notes that not only were there weekly meetings but once 'the 
conllllittee', a group \VhOn1 Jones suggested should Ineet together to make sure that 
psychoanalysis developed in the way that Freud wanted it to, was established they 
\\ent on specific trips to discuss the future of psychoanalysis. Of this group we shall 
hear nl0fe below. Ho\\e\'er. although it was intended as a secret group, many people 
seelned to know about it. Minutes of their actuallTIeetings add to the correspondence 
bet\\'een thenl and show evidence of their individual commitment both to Freud and 
the development of psychoanalysis. The fact that it was called a movement at all is 
significant and there was a great deal of resistance to this tenn at the tilTIe. 
';-'lovement' implied a less than scientific group. Ernest Jones argued that movelnent 
was appropriate and cited others such as the: 
Tractarian movement, the Chartist movement. .. characterised by the ardent desire to 
promulgate ... beliefs that are accounted exceedingly precious 99 
As noted in the prologue, Jones was willing to admit "the minute element of truth" in 
the charge that psychoanalysis was a religion but that "the reality" was "far 
different". The socio-political context in which psychoanalysis was conceived held 
science in such high esteem that 'movement' was deelTIed an inappropriate title for a 
98 2 Grosskurth (1991 ) p2 
99 Gay ( 1 988) p 1 75 
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11l'\\ society advocating a new area of science. As was Freud's wish, there are today 
~lS tHany. if not n1lWl' lay analysts in practice than people with a medical background. 
HC1wl'ver, this was not the case in Freud's tin1e. Most of his early followers were 
tr~lined in tnedicine and as such, scientists. The four lnen who were the original 
\ \T l'dnesday group were all physicians. 
Those people who helped to put Freud into a position of power have been described 
as disciples and follo\v(Ts.1ooThat the word disciple is deemed the most appropriate 
tCl dl'scribl' the followers is often over looked. Unlike those gathered around Plato, 
thl')' \\l're not described by the secular tenn pupil. Nor has psychoanalysis been 
regarded as a school or an acadelny. Why? That the tenn 'movement' was chosen to 
describe the collectivity of psychoanalysts and their practice was not without 
n10tiYation, if not 'reason'. 
In the lnain Grosskurth's interest is in those who were regarded as Freud's 'Inner 
Circle'.101 But she distorts Freud by clailning that he only had "two real friendships". 
His greatest friend, in her view, was Eduard Silberstein with whom he had been a 
friend since childhood. And if Grosskmih is to be believed the only other person 
considered a friend was Wilhelm Fliess. In this narrow definition of what friendship 
is she is doing a great disservice to both Freud and his lnany other friends. Freud 
described n1any people as his friends, for eXaInple, Oskar Pfister, and Jung. The fact 
that friendships \vere tenninated does not mean that he did not have them. 
The friendships, which Grosskurth describes, each came to an unsatisfactory end. 
\Yith Silberstein it \vas less public than with Fleiss. This said, with Silberstein, there 
\\'as an e\'ent in which, having sent his wife to Freud for help (she was depressed), 
she fell down (or threw herself down) the stairs of Freud's apartment in Vienna and 
died. Thereafter Freud and Silberstein drifted apart, although later in Freud's life 
they did meet up again. After an intense period of communication Freud and Fliess 
parted company. It is believed the break occurred as a result of Fliess claiming that 
Freud had stolen his ideas on bisexuality. According to Grosskurth even those people 
\\'ho managed to gain Freud's friendship had difficulty in maintaining it. She claims 
that e\'en when Freud and the committee returned from their trip to Hildesheim and 
100 Ellenberger (1970) 
101 Grosskurth P. (1991) Her whole text is devoted to them. 
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Sdlierc ke there was no sense that deep friendships had been forged, only a sense that 
the patriarch \\'as pleased with his subjects.l0~ With this notion of friendship, a 
l'('llltelnporary idea of what friendship nleans, Grosskurth is adopting a silnilar stance 
to that (d' Storr who c lainls that gurus are unable to maintain friendships. Storr adds 
that being single nlinded, despotic, and isolated are also features COlnlnon to gurus. 
The di fficulty \\'ith Freud is that he is so volatile. Fronl one day to the next and one 
tc\. t to the ne\. t \\'e find characteristics which are inconsistent. However, it is this 
inc()nsistency \\'hich Inakes his character interesting and also responsible for his 
productivity. Freud \\'as no angel and behaved in ways which are alnlost 
inc(llnprehensible for one so conce1l1ed with the behaviour of others. He was at times 
insecure, single Ininded and, as he would c1ailn himself, isolated but he was not all of 
these things all of the tilne and rarely all at the Saine time. There is a good deal of 
evidence t(1 counter such c1ainls. 
Freud apparently adnlitted that he was a "fisher of men" a biblical quotation which 
\\'ebster exploits, by clailning that Freud 'fished' for young vulnerable, 
inlpressionable. easily indoctrinated nlen: 
the kind of intelligent. imaginative but also deeply insecure intellectuals who he felt worthy 
of his attention and who he intuitively felt would submit to his leadership. 103 
If this \\"as the case, any notion of Freud's followers becoming a hOlnogeneous 
mo\'enlent is sOinewhat doubtful. They were a group by virtue of having allegiance 
to Freud. \lany spent time vying for his attention and, as such, were in competition 
\\'ith each other. 10.+ Stekel, as noted in the prologue, c1ailned "I was the apostle of 
Freud \\'ho was Iny Christ!,,105 Stekel was obsessed by Freud, and when Freud 
became disenchanted with him he was devastated, and set about trying to win back 
his affections. Sadly, he never succeeded and Stekel, as many others in Freud's 
\\"ake. committed suicide in 1940 the year after Freud died.
106 
If it was the case, that 
the psychoanalytic movelnent was merely a collection of weak and vulnerable 
people, the chances of it surviving after the death of the founder would be remote. It 
102 Grosskurth ( 1991 ) p22 
103 \Vebster. (1995) p305 
III .. Grosskurth.( 1991) 
105 \\" ebster.(1995) p305. quoting Gay,(1988).p 179 . ' 
106 There does not appear to have been a reconciliation between the two, and there IS only speculatlon 
that Stekel' s death was influenced the death of Freud. 
40 
is testin10ny to their strength that the Inovelnent continues to go from strength to 
strength. 
Of this con1n1unity there were n1en1bers both devotional and disparaging. The vast 
~Ul1ount of biographical n1aterial both sceptical and reverential, is indicative of 
~lttention \\'hich is arguably unparalleled in other areas of the secular academy. It is 
likened by Ellenberger to the followers of the schools of Greco-ROlnan antiquity.]07 
The difference is that the schools which developed from, for example, Plato and 
Aristotle relied on critical analysis of the work which was isolated from the founder. 
To criticise Plato's thinking was not to criticise Plato. For Freud this appears not to 
be the case. \Yhen Freud's \York was criticised he often, but not always, regarded it 
as personal. And today the followers of Freud still find it difficult to criticise his 
theories for fear of being disrespectful. Whether Freud's followers may be regarded 
JS hOll1ogenous is doubtful~ there are probably as many varieties of Freudianism as 
practitioners \\'ho say that they are Freudian, in the way that there is no such thing as 
a Hindu because there are too l11any variables in the practice of Hinduislns. However, 
this does not prevent a significant cOlnlnitment to evangelising about Freudianism. 
Even those \\'ho criticise psychoanalysis feed the notion that any attention is better 
than none in the same way as the atheist gives credit to theism, albeit indirectly. 
Of Freud's earliest followers, we hear much about Ferenczi, Adler and lung. This is 
due in part to the fact that they took the risk of challenging Freud and were either 
"excommunicated" from the group or left. In fact, "Freud himself applied the term 
heretics to defectors,,]08. That such terms as "heretic" traditionally applied in a 
religious context, and "defector" more commonly used in an ideological context, are 
llsed to describe anyone who left the fold gives credence to the notion that what 
Freud created was definable as a society rather than a science. 
Many of the heretics became famous in their own right, developing theories which 
deviated from Freud's psychoanalysis but none the less had relied on it as a 
foundation. lung, the most famous of them all and arguably Freud's favourite, left 
the fold with bitterness and a drive to create his own approach with which he 
eventually outshone the others, known as Analytic Psychology. 
107 Ellenberger. (1970) p550 
108 Storr. (1996) p117. 
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Fronl the abovc wc can see that Freud's success was in large part because of his 
l'harislnatic personality, rather than as a result of his scientific credibility. Despite the 
dubiety of the theories, his followers continued to work with and in SOlne cases to 
bui Id on thcse shaky prcnlises. Freud was not the first and will not be the last person 
to hayc beconle fatnous in spite of his nlistakes. Carl Rogers' (of whom we shall see 
Inore bek)\\,) theories hm'c been hugely successful in spite of 'proof of their failure. 
\ Yebster, although less vitriolic than Masson, still nlanages to create a significant 
tOlne by dcconstructing Freud and Freudianism. However, even after Inanaging to get 
an extensive book out of deconstructing Freud's work and concluding that Freud was 
\\TOn~. he neyer the less finds it difficult to cOlnpletely topple the Inan: 
In the largeness of his ambition at least, Freud may serve as an example to those theorists 
\\'ho come after him, For this reason, if for no other, any wholly negative assessment of his 
Jehie\'ement \,"ould be mistaken,I09 
Interestingly. \ Yebster' s critique relies on that of which he is so critical, 
psychoanalytic theory, That psychoanalysis has been built on flawed premises, which 
\ Yebster exposes. appears of no consequence when he uses it for his own ends. There 
is no yie\\' \\'hich is \yithout Freud. Psychoanalysis has become a significant tool for 
the literary critic, \yhich Webster claims to be. This tool has become such a part of 
their tacit currency that they are often unaware of how much they rely on it. 
Freud is a slippery character: just when you think you have the measure of him, 
something else tunlS up. He is described as ambitious, and with an ilnpulse to lead, 
both characteristics \\'hich need not be seen as negative, but often are when it suits 
the critic, The aspects of Freud's personality of a positive nature such as "generosity" 
and "considerable moral courage" are to be found, even in Webster, as well as in his 
letters to his wife, to Oskar Pfister, and to his teachers. These qualities do not Inake 
as con\'incing a guru as those which paint a more despotic picture. As noted above 
the construction of Freud often takes the fonn of demonizing or deifying hiln: few 
people explore his frailty without interpreting it as active despotism. Even those early 
followers, such as Max Graf, regarded his own participation in the Wednesday group 
as akin to being part of a religious sect. He declared: 
1" , 1 t 110 There was the atmosphere of the foundation of a re IglOn III t la room 
109 Webster (1995) p508 
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.-\l'cording to \\' ebstcr, Graf left because he could not stand Freud's "dogmatism".!!! 
R()azen on th(' other hand shows that sOlne of Freud's followers really wanted to live 
in his shadl.)'" and con1pares then1 to the followers of Mahatn1a Gandhi.!!2 And it is 
\\'I.:)l"th repeat ing \ V eisz who stated: 
The group's elitism and sense of exc\usin'ness, combined with an extreme mistrust of and 
hostility to\\ard the outside world; an eschatological vision of reality which made adherence 
to the group an experience approaching religious conversion, and more important, an over 
eX~1~g(Tated rc\'erence for the founder which transcended the normal bounds of scientific 
~1Uthoritarianisll1. I D 
\Yeisz Inak('s it clear that there was an outside world which Freud and his followers 
belie\'ed "as hostile. There are advantages and disadvantages to being either inside 
or outside but to be both is not necessarily a vantage point: it could just mean that 
e~lCh position has been diluted. When insiders Inake the cOlnparison of 
psychoanalysis with religion it is never con1plimentary. 
Sulloway also cOlnpared the psychoanalytic Inovement to an organised religion: 
Fe\v theories in science have spawned a following that can compare with the psychoanalytic 
movement in its cult-like manifestations, in its militancy, and in the aura of a religion that has 
d ' 11.+ permeate It. 
.-\gain \\"ith Sullo\\'ay there is no sense that he views this as a good thing his use of 
the \\'ords "cult" and "n1ilitancy" are not exactly celebratory. Max Grafin addition to 
clain1ing that Freud \\'as the head of the psychoanalytic church commented on 
Freud" s dogrnatism. Further. Wittels clailns: 
He \\'atches over this theory jealously, will not tolerate the smallest deviation from it, and 
fences it round with a palisade ... "
s
. 
These claims are not just negative they are describing sOlnething other than science. 
The clailns. "approaching religion" and the "aura of a religion" are fairly typical 
comments but as \\'e shall see do not go far enough. However, for each negative 
clailn it is possible to find a counter-claim. For example, Lou Andreas Salome 
testifies that he \\'as always open to developing his theories with suggestions from 
others. 1!6 
J 1'1 \\'ebster.(1995) p305. Quoting Sachs p57 but has no full refeI:ence to which Sachs, e,i~her in the 
h b
'bl' h Sachs H (1945) Freud' Master and Fnend Imago. London. Fust pub. by notes or tel lOgrap y. .. ' 
Hanard University press. Cambridge. (1944) 
III Ibid .p305 
112 ibid p307 
113 ibid p308 
I 1-+ I . OC.Clt. 
115 ibid 309 ' 
116 Livin~stone. A.( 1984) Salome. Moyer Bell Ltd.MT, Kisco, New York. Salome claImed that he 
\\'as always open to suggestions. 
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Fr~ud' s being dognlatic about his theories was not the only way in which he echoed 
('Ither belief systenls: 
~r~ll~i the prot~llndl)~ ~theistic scientist and skeptical foe of the 'illusions' fostered by 
lehglOn, \\as hllnselt 111 thrall to a particularly subtle form of theistic fantasy, It was the 
crypto-theulogll'al \"Ie\\' \\'hich sustained his belief that he could find the key which would 
\'1l11~1ck thl' mysteries of human nature by studying the mechanism of the 'spirit' or 'soul' 
\\"hldl supposedly controlled human behi.1\'iour, 1 17 
Freud's ainl \\'as to 'scientize' the soul or 'psyche' by reclaiming and renaming it as 
the 'unconscious' and in this he was successful. 
Freud' s t~l\"ol.lred discip Ie, J ung, whilst having a relationship with Freud which I11ay 
b~st be de-scribed ~lS like- no\"itiate to nlentor, none the less became critical of Freud's 
c harisl11atic status and could sec the danger of this being developed at the expense of 
scientific rigour. J ung states: 
In scientific terms the reasons for adopting his theories were, as I have tried to show are no 
better than the reasons \\"hich might be given for imitating his way of talking or taking his 
neurotic habits, In both cases \\'e are confronted not by reasoned decision but by an act of 
irrational submission to the pO\\"er of Freud's personality and to the capacity he had for 
prOJecting himself, both in his life and in his writing, as a prophet, sage, and even 
redeemer l18 . 
This illustrates the po\\"er of Freud's character and reflects how impressionable SOl11e 
of those \\'ho follo\\'ed him were. However, in the context of Jung's own relationship 
\\"ith Freud he nlay also have been making a point about those 'disciples' who not 
only clung onto Freud's every word but also copied his mannerisms and speech as 
,,'ell as taking to smoking the same large cigars. 
Freud's theories, contrary to his belief, were contingent on his own world, a world in 
\\'hich it \\'as impossible to escape the influence of the Judaeo-Christian ethics, which 
119' . h h . he sa'" as illusory . Freud and hIS work were born at a tIme w en t e repreSSIon 
il11posed on society by the church was at its most vehement. It is no coincidence that 
"hi 1st Freud set out to build a science of the mind he was determined that what had 
once been finnly in the realm of religion, the cure of souls, I110ved fin11ly to that of 
. ' 120 
the pseudo-scIence of psychoanalysIs. 
117 Webster. p179 
118 Webster. p308 
119 Future olan Illusioll, In this text Freud explores religion as illusion 
120 Ellenberger.( 1970) 
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Thus, whi 1st Freud belic\'ed he was usurping the telTitory of religion, of which he 
\\'as so disapproving, he sin1ultaneously echoed their beliefs but by couching theln in 
the language of his ne\\' science, deluding hin1self into believing he had created an 
entirely nc\\' science. Webster con1pares Freud's theories to St Augustine's Doctrine 
of Original Sin, and states that his theories of sexual developlnent and hUlnan history 
\\'ere based on a: 
culturally orthodo\: beliet~ deriYl'd ultimately from Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic. 121 
:\n interpretation of Freud's l11otivation is that it was exactly those cultural mores, 
prescribed by Judaeo-Christian traditions, which prevented people from having 
fulfillcd li\'('s, and ga\'e hin1 fodder for his theories on repression. It became Freud's 
\\ork tlJ undo these problems \\'hich prescriptions frOln these traditions had caused, 
not as \Yebster suggests, to control thel11 in the way that the church had tried to . 
. -\lthough Freud \\as undoubtedly a product of his time there was a good deal more 
\\hich influenced hin1 than religion. The rise of National Socialism is but one, albeit, 
significant eXaI11ple 122 • 
Freud belie\'ed psychoanalysis could be useful to everyone, however, not necessarily 
in the \\"ay \\hich \Vebster suggests, as Augustine had, that all souls were in need of 
redel11ption: 
by enlarging the notion of disease and by applying it to those whom, in reality, were not ill at 
all 12J. 
In Christianity the act of confessing sins to a priest, followed by a suitable penance, 
can lead to redemption and may cause relief. Similarly, the process of psychoanalysis 
also leads to relief by enabling the patient to understand their allegedly sinful urges. 
Christianity and psychoanalysis playa part in controlling or directing people's lives, 
but psychoanalysis, if it is an alternative means of redemption, relies on an authority 
on earth. Webster appears not to see either as having any positive attributes.
124 
That psychoanalysis might provide an opportunity to air one's difficulties without the 
fear of judgement is not acknowledged by Webster. In psychotherapy punishment 
abounds in the form of the self-punishment of the client, an issue which itself should 
121 Webster p311 .' . . . 
122 Janik and Toulmin (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienna does more JustIce to the Impact, on 111tellectuals 111 
Vienna. of National Socialism than can be shown here. 
123 ibid p313 
12~ ibid p324 
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be c\.plored in the therapy. Acceptance and tolerance are sought-after outcOlnes of 
psychotherapy and counselling, each of which seems to have lost its significance in 
thc al't ions 0 r lwganised religion. 
1 f ~lS \ \' cbster bdieves, Freud's theories perpetuate the Christian view that evil souls 
need cleansing: 
Freud represents the 'anal character' by the image ofa man who, like the devil is given to 
hoarding, sadism and pedantry, and who like the devil is a secret lover of excrement l25 . 
Then psychoanalysis nUlst also cultivate a sin1ilar process of, "demonological 
projection"L'll, as in Christianity. However, in psychotherapy clients are not in the 
satne position of abdicating their responsibility, are not expecting an outside force to 
correct their issues but con1e to understand that the corrections come from within 127. 
Therefore. if there is a "den10nological proj ection" it is internalised. Webster's work 
reflects a particular reading of Freud, through his own anthropological lens and his 
vie\\s are not necessarily borne out by practitioners who claim that their goal is to 
enable: 
a) freeing of the impulses;b) the strengthening of the reality by use of ego functioning 
including its perceptions so that it appropriates more of the id and ;c) the alteration of the 
contents of the super-ego so that it represents human rather than punitive moral standards. 
Psychoanalysis is a process of re-educating the ego. 128 
\lost people in the west have a view of Freud. Rarely does one encounter 
indi fference to Freud, and more often antagonism than acceptance. He has had an 
ilnpressi \'e amount of attention for someone who, as Webster testifies, got it wrong. 
Daf\vin and \Iarx who each arguably got it more right than Freud and made highly 
significant contributions to academic development have much less attention than 
Freud. \\'hy should this be? Why does Sigmund Freud attract the attention, not 
necessarily in the positive sense, of so many, across disciplines? Let us tum to his 
movement to see if we may shed more light on such questions. 
As we have seen above Freud had many followers. Some continued his work whilst 
he was alive and then after his death. Others began with Freud and then evolved their 
125 ibid p325 
126 ibid p325 . . 'bT . 1 h 
127 Jacobs (1988) describes the text book client. People do 111 fact abdIcate responsl 1 Ity 111 t lat t ey 
hope the therapist will have the answers. . 
128 ,. 1 -J R (1995) The Theory and Practice ofCounsellll1g.p172. Cassells. London. Second . "e son ones. . 
edition. 
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o\\'n th('orit.'s. During his Ii tC, in the early stages of the developlnent of 
psydloanalysis he gathered around h1nl, at the suggestion of Enlest Jones, a group of 
l11en \\hOI11 he trusted to de\'c1op the psychoanalytic movement in the way that he 
bdi('\'ed it should. This group have come to be called "The Secret Ring"I29. In 
Grclsskurth's book of this title she explores the politics of psychoanalysis in direct 
rebtion to a scil'ct fe\\ nlen, "the conlnlittee", who were the tnelnbers of this group. 
Thl'y each \\cre gi\'t.'11 a ring \\'ith sonle fornl of intaglio, by Freud, who also wore 
ont', as a sYI11bol of their allegiance to the nl0Vetnent. Surely if he had apostles this 
group qualifies. Ironically Stekel \\ho nlakes the clainl about being the apostle of 
Freud was kast likely to be one and perhaps it was for this reason he so desired it. 
To discuss Freud's lC'gacy is difficult because, as nlentioned above, he has touched so 
tnan), disciplines that such a task could be a life's work. However, if we look at SOlne 
of\\'hat Freud left to the industry of the psychodynamic branch of the talking cure it 
is nl0re n1anagt'able. It is appropriate to use the word 'industry' because the talking 
cure has beconle regarded by SOlne as a commodity, viewed in the negative, as a 
S: l11ptonl of the disenchantment of industrialised, capitalist, societies 130. The notion 
that psychotherapy is rarely found in developing countries, where religious 
institutions and indigenous traditions still have a significant hold, is an area which 
requires further research 131. When we categorise psychotherapy as a developlnent of 
religiousness it becomes part of an even more extensive lineage. 
\\That Freud created in psychoanalysis was a contemporary confessional, a zone in 
\\'hich the patient pays the person whom they choose to receive their testilnony. This 
presupposes a belief that with the skill of the practitioner they will engage in a 
transfonnati\'e process. The fact that this relationship is under contract is one of the 
issues leading to the accusation of the commodificaton of the self. A covenant is 
entered into in the fonn of a contract, often written, between the practitioner and the 
IYJ Grosskurth( 1991 ) . . 
130 This is an under explored aspect of psychotherapy and counselling. Alex Howard has wnt.ten on It 
in his book Challenges to Counselling and Psychotherapy. MacMillan pr~ss ltd .. ~ 1996) In thIS. text he 
has a chapter on "Counselling PLC".Carrette.J.R and King.R.(2005) Sellzng Spzntuahtr The Szlent 
Take 01'(!1' of Religion. Routledge. London 
131 In a pap~r given at University of Abertay an academic fr?m Qua~ar ~xplored the deve.lopment of 
counselling or rather the difficulties of setting up a counsellIng. s.ervIce 111 a country d01mnate~ by 
Islam. She demonstrated that there were layers of resistance ans111g from the cultural expectatIon that, 
in difficult times the answers are to be found in the Quran. 
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dient. This creates an alkgiance, not an alliance which presupposes equaliti32, 
\\hich secures confidentiality and con1n1itn1ent frOlTI each person. One could argue 
that there \\as also 'currency' in the religious confession in the form of a tithe. 
Thl' idea that one can cure or at least gain relief fron1 life's difficulties by talking 
about thenl \"1thin the conlpany of a specialist is nothing new. Freud did not invent 
the talking cure. ;\s Thonlas Szasz and others have argued, the idea of catharsis was 
around nluch earlier than Freud or even Christianity: 
Plato n.'cognized the ,~nKial role of katharsis in the dual sense of purgation and purification 
in the cure of souls, I.", 
Ho\\('"er, it \"as later \"ith Cicero that the power of the 'talking cure' was 
~1Ckno,vledged: 
CiCL'rl) (1 O()--L~ BC) provides \\'hat may be the earliest articulations of the idea that the person 
suffering from a sick soul cannot be his own healer but must entrust himself to the care of an 
c"\vert: "the soul that is sick cannot rightly prescribe for itself, except by following the 
instruction of \\ise men'" added to which Cicero recommends the use of healing words,134 
This c lainl. by Cicero is still crucial for psychotherapy today. People who argue that 
psychotherapy is a twentieth century indulgence, peculiar to capitalist economies, 
need to look at the \\Titings of Cicero in which the contemporary practitioner's role is 
gi"en justification through an extensive genealogy. When one is, at the very least, in 
a state of disenchantlnent it is difficult, as Cicero notes, to get a perspective which is 
untainted by the state of disenchantlnent. Thus, in this state it is profitable to elnploy 
the listening skill of someone who experiences the person's testimony through a lens 
\\"hich is not (usually) disenchanted. Added to this, whilst the practitioner gains 
professional kudos from the task, the contract ensures that they will not use what 
they hear against you. The power dynamic within therapy is complex and does 
become more so with payment. This is an area for further exploration. What do we 
mean by 'payment'? 
132 One of the ongoing debates between person-centred and psy~ho~y~amic practitione~'s is about 
equality, In the psychodynamic tradition they believe, th~t equahty IS ~l1usory whe.re as 111 person-
d d " 't ' d tory I I'ealize that equalIty IS a complex Issue but for now that someone centre tra ItlOns 1 IS man a , ", ' 
, , f t' I d' tess and tIle other one is not imphes 111equahty of states already eXIsts, IS 111 a state 0 emo IOna IS r , , . . 
Th " f t d t some extent by the payment to the practItIOner. More research 111 thIS IS IS 0 course coun ere 0 . ' 
area would be useful but is not within the limitations of thI~ cur~'ent project. 
133 S T (1979) Th'J Ml'th of psw-!lOthem}J.l' Oxford Umversity press. Oxford p13 zasz, . t.., 
134 Ibid p13 
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Such Cl)nlp\cx dynamics were, long before Cicero, endelnic in religious traditions 
across the globc, and being en1ployed both in the hierarchy between priesthood and 
laity ~lS \yell as \yithin the priesthood itself. The Platonic idea of katharsis was 
d('Yell1p('d by Cicero, with talking becoming recognised as a form of purgation and 
puri tication. This was further exploited by the Christian church with confession 
\yhich Frcud proceeded to usurp. 
Frcud n('Y('r knc\\' his own legacy, and indeed even scholars of Freud can only 
speculate about its ('xtent. What lnay be said is that his belief in the kathartic value of 
talking \\ithout being punished by an external force, as was the expectation with 
confession, is a significant aspect of his legacy. However, as Storr notes we are 
indebted to Freud for other things as well. For example: 
increased tolerance, conh'ibuted to the teclmique of psychotherapy , and revolutionized the 
\Yay \\"e think about our behaviour. Twentieth century man is greatly indebted to Freud. 
The process of psychotherapy is one of mentoring. The therapist, either overtly or 
coyertly. delnonstrates different ways to view the events of which the client has 
spoken. and by cxan1ple teaches theln to be less judgmental. Not making overt 
judgenlents, for eXaInple, demonstrates a model in which the client sees that it is 
possible not to judge themselves and others. There are hopes for this process which 
go beyond the individual. For example, one hoped for epiphenomenon is that if 
indi\"iduals become more accepting and less judgelnental of themselves then they 
\yill apply this knowledge with the consequence that society will come to behave 
\yith more tolerance. The Delphic Oracle's adage of 'know thyself is present in 
contemporary psychotherapy. 
Although it is often said that Freud was ahead of his time, in some other ways the 
tinle was right for Freud. The increasing secularity of society and continued decline 
in numbers attending churches 135 created a gap which Freud's meta-psychology was 
ripe to fill. He offered something which churches no longer could, delineated tilnes 
of refuge in which there was the opportunity to get to 'know thyself. He offered a 
place where guilt about things deemed sinful by the church (and upheld by society) 
could be explored without fear of retribution 136. This is still the case for 
135 Webster. (1995) claims that the decline of the church was one of the main reasons for Freud's 
success. 0 ObI £; 0 h t . I d 
136 The idea of there being something out there which IS roes~onsl e or pums men IS rep ace ~ 
o 0 I 0 d The JOudge is not ehmmated by the absence of an external Judge. 
psychotherapy With an mterna JU ge. 
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psychothcrapy and counselling today, although retribution appears to have taken up a 
nc\\' position, internalised within each individual 137 . 
For Freud the 1110del of a hunlan being was as a receptacle of both good and evil 
fCllTt'S. In this belief his influence was undoubtedly the Judeo Christian model. Freud 
has been accused of perpetuating the sanle kind of control as that of the churches,138 
control of 1110rality and sinful urges. Another view would be that of Eric Fromm, 
\\ho, in conlparing psychoanalysis and religion states: 
The question is not religion or not but which kind of religion, whether it is one furthering 
man's deYdopment, the unfolding of his specifically human powers, or one paralysing 
them. 1:\9 
Freud's \'ersion of the talking cure intended to further the development of humans, 
not as seenled the case with the church, to cause psychic paralysis. However, to 
control \\'hat happens with the original prescription is difficult to police. For 
exanlple, the \\'ays in which Jesus' teachings are used is almost unrecognisable in 
churches today and the same may be said of Freud's work. Freud argued that the 
church ser\'ed to infantalize its followers by creating the illusion of a father who ,was 
ultimately responsible for everything. This illusion continues to allow people to 
abdicate responsibility for their actions in the name of God. Whilst Freud believed 
that psychoanalysis was a way of accepting responsibility for one's actions there are 
practitioners who by exploiting their position also keep clients in a state of 
dependency and in so doing perpetuate infantalization. An attempt to gauge Freud's 
legacy requires looking at his direct descendents as well as those who claim no 
lineage to Freud. So, let us now tum to psychodynamic traditions and those who 
ha\'e come to be regarded as his immediate disciples. 
In creating psychoanalysis Freud gave rise to a myriad of traditions which allowed 
those coming after him the reward, although many would dispute this, of developing 
a position of their own either as a response to Freud or in reaction against him. For 
example, Carl Rogers and his followers, whose works we shall explore below, whilst 
denying their links to Freud still owe a debt to him in so far as Rogers developed his 
work as a reaction against the Freudian model, which he perceived as outdated and 
137 As a practitioner I have experience of the ways in which clients demonstrate their internalised 
retribution in all manner of psychic and physical punishments. These range from internal dialogues to 
self mutilation. 
138 Webster.(1995). 
139 Fromm. E. (1951) Psychoanalysis and Religion. Victor Gollancz Ltd. London. p34 
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hi~rarchical. Rogers and his followers' distaste for this nl0del was that 
psychoanalysis had conl~ to synlbolise thc establishnlent where hierarchy, expertise, 
aloofness, interpretation and anything which was attached to tradition, and therefore 
the p~lSL \\'as ~:\pcctcd, Freud's ideas on the unconscious were actively excluded 
rrOlll this n~\\' 1110dc1 frOlll Rogers and his elnphasis was on issues in the here and 
no\\", H()\\'~\,(T, he could not ha\'c created this without Freud. 
Those \\ho stl\'~d \\'ith Freud had to embrace traditions which have COine to be 
known as the Psychodynanlic traditions, the 1110St inlportant of these is a continued 
beli~fin Freud's ideas on the dynanlic nature of the unconscious. There are many 
practitioners \\'ho usc this idea but there are a variety of names for their practices. 
\\'ithin this group there is also a hierarchy. For exatnple, practitioners who are called 
'c lassical' psychoanalysts are regarded as purist Freudians. They are as lTIythical as 
the figure of Fr~ud hinlself. The idea that there is SOineone out there who practices, 
to the letter. \\'hat Freud hinlself did is fantasy. No one knows what Freud actually 
did. Beyond the 'classical' Freudian there are practitioners who call themselves 
psychodynanlic psychotherapists, and psychodynamic counsellors, analytical 
psychologists and \\'ithin each of these groups there are sub groups. Their parallels 
with those of the Christian church with its different denominations are uncanny. Each 
group and ho\\ they name themselves is influenced by what is in vogue and each has 
its o\vn place in the wider psychodynamic scheme. Added to this the psychodynamic 
scheme has a place within a wider psychotherapeutic community with practices such 
as psychodrama and art therapy . 
.vI;: intention is to describe what it means to be one of these psychodynamic 
practitioners, by giving an overview of the techniques and skills which they employ. 
I \\'ill also illustrate some areas of contention for the contemporary practitioner. This, 
I do in an attempt at drawing attention to the aspects of what practitioners do which 
may be described as religious. 
In the description above of Freud's background, his work and the people with whoin 
he began, the Freudian community, it is clear that despite the flaws in his theories 
those who surrounded him, both admirers and critics were often in awe of him. Even 
the critics whilst condemning his theories are unable to disiTIiss hiiTI completely. 
Freud offered an alternative to the cure of souls. His was an allegedly secular 
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practice clailning to relieve the suffering of everyday living, giving hope to people 
who \vere disenchanted and socially anchorless. Smne believe that his alternative 
curl' ('d~ souls \vas just another f01111 of nlO1-aI, and therefore, social control. 14oThis is 
an interesting vie\\', givcn that Freud is nlore c01nlnonly regarded as smneone who 
was always on about sex and as such was going against the overt Inorality of his day. 
Freud's \Tienna, whilst appearing on the surface to be a city of high morals was not 
all that it appeared. Janik and Toulnlin in lViltgells/cin 's Vienna!.:!!, the same Vienna 
in which Freud \vas at work, show us a city of quite contrary standards. 142 
As \\e know, Freud's theory and practice provided the foundation for the moveluent 
of psychoanalysis and subsequently what has C01ne to be known as psychodynatuic 
psychotherapy, but that psychoanalysis was natned a nlovelnent has been discussed 
above. ~ 10\'enlent \vas not a word adopted by the philosophical or scientific 
C0111nlunity. they prefened the word school. As we have noted, the Platonists or the 
Stoics are described as schools not moveluents. In the beginning psychoanalysts 
\ven: Freud's fello\v Inedicalinen, scientists who would not have subscribed to the 
notion that they themselves were ill and would have to under-go treatment in order to 
practice nledicine: which was the case if they were to practice psychoanalysis. The 
idea that the \,'ould-be Freudian analyst had to undergo analysis before being 
regarded as able to treat others is itself indicative of a process which was alien to 
science. To become part of a movement with this kind of initiation is common in 
re ligious groups and therefore it is all the more surprising that Freud should make 
this process one of the requirements of becoming a psychoanalyst. 
This has another parallel with religion in so far as such prescription presupposes that 
all are ill and in need of healing in the same way as the church has assumed that all 
are sinners in need of healing and must be healed before they can heal anyone else. 
In both religion and psychoanalysis there is the belief that the practitioner will have a 
clean slate themselves before curing others of their ills. It is also worth noting that in 
psychoanalysis there is no eye contact which is interesting when in science seeing is 
believing. All social cues are removed in the same way as in confession. This is not 
new to healing: in the Ancient Near East it was a prerequisite to avert your eyes from 
140 Webster 1995. 
1.+1 Janik.A.and Toulmin.S, (1996 edition) 
1.+1 Freud and Wittgenstein were not friends but were of an over lapping intelligensia which included 
literary, philosophical, medical and artistic minds of the time. 
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the Goddess before seeking advice. If Freud had been analysing another group I 
l':\Pl'ct he \\ould have noted that it was an odd choice of training for a career in 
sl'ience and to n~llnc the group a nl0Vetnent would have sent his alarnl bells ringing. 
Ho\\"cver. Freud's pro:\in1ity to psychoanalysis caused him, and as we shall see, his 
fo11o\v('rs, to be so blinded by their position as to create and perpetuate the very thing 
of\\"hich he \vas so overtly critical. It is not difficult to ilnagine that the 
psydloanalysis of psychoanalysis could uncover this repression. But as yet there is 
little sign of it being treated. 
Thc psychoanalytic n10vcment has a tnenlbership which is as diverse as any religious 
nl0yetnent. Its rapid sprcad beyond Vienna and Europe to the United States of 
.-\lncrica and as t:1r cast as Japan, resulted in a lTItlltitude of cultural influences. There 
is a \vonderful photograph, taken in the nineteen thirties of the Japanese 
Psychoanalytic Socidy 14_
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\\'hich is of a rather ean1est looking group some of whose 
lnelnbers also Caine to Yienna for their own psychoanalysis - that prerequisite for 
practice. It is. however, unsafe to presuppose that, with such cultural diversity it was 
possible. e\en if desirable, to have a homogeneous group who practiced a single 
thing called psychoanalysis. In fact quite the contrary, their petty squabbles are 
parallel to sectarian relations between religious groups which serve to unduly 
nlagnify their differences, ignoring how much they have in common. There is still 
confusion today \\'ithin the psychotherapeutic community about what certain 
practitioners should do and what they call themselves. 
Traditionally the term psychodynamic has been used by therapists or analysts, whose 
practice reflect all or some of Freud's prerequisites for practitioners and at the very 
least it reflects belief in the existence of a dynamic unconscious 144. More recently 
there has been a trend for some therapists to call themselves counsellors instead of 
therapists. 1.+5 This may appear to be a superficial distinction but on further 
examination there is more to it. The relationship in psychodynan1ic therapy between 
client and practitioner, is as previously mentioned, regarded as hierarchical. 
Counselling, the term adopted by Carl Rogers, on the other hand is believed to 
I-n \'folnar. \1. (1992) Ed. The Dim)' afSigmund Frelld .. The Final Decade 1929-1 939. Scribner. New 
York. pII5 . . 
1-1-1 Freud did not discover the unconscious as Ellenberger's work shows. He dId however POSIt the 
idea of its dynamic nature. 
1-1' Feltham. C (1999) (Ed) COl1tr01'ersies ill Psychotherapy and Counselling. Sage London. 
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describe a n10rl' l'galitarian rdationship between practitioner and client. This tenll 
has. t\."lr the n10n1l'l1t, bl'COnle nlore politically correct. 
Thl' l' hoice thl'rl'ilwe of therapist or counsellor is influenced by a cliinate where 
p() I iticllcorrl'ctnl'ss has bl'coml' paral11ount, and pressure froln other practitioners 
\\'ho rl'g~lrd then1sd\,l's as ll10re al igned to this political clin1ate has had a significant 
il11pact I.H). The ll1ain criticisn1 of using the tern1 therapist is that it reflects an outdated 
ll10del \\'hil'h is patriarchal and imperialistic. For exanlple, person-centred 
pr~lctitioners. along \\'ith other hunlanistic counsellors, have regarded their own 
practice as egalitarian and thereforl' without the overt power ilnbalance of 
psychodynmnic therapyl.+7. Sonle sensitive psychodynatnic practitioners, in an 
attel11pt to l)('(ol11e politically correct. have adopted ·counsellor'. This is not the only 
s()urce of tension bet\\'een the psychodynanlic and person-centred traditions. There is 
further e\'idence of tension as sonle psychodynamic practitioners have borrowed 
"el11pathy" one of the nlain tenets of person-centred counselling. Bateman and 
Holnles argue that: 
This emphasis on empathy may have arisen to counterbalance the rather rigid interpretive 
tcclmique of some ego psychologists, but it also represents a shift from conflict to deficit as a 
148 central theoretical theme 
This in sonle \yay echoes the conflict of the Reformation in the 16th century where 
each denonlination \yas striving for status by nlaking the claim that they had 
sonlething different to offer. The psychodynamic tradition and the person-centred 
tradition do ha\'e different things to offer and it appears that if one adopts the 
techniques enlployed by the other it is regarded as a form of trespassing. Although 
the tenl1 counsellor is regarded by some as Inore client friendly those who use it are, 
paradoxically, often equated with superficiality and a lack of qualifications and thus 
some\\-hat light weight compared to psychotherapists. So whilst therapist can signal 
tradition. and be criticized for this, counsellor has a down side which is to do with a 
perceived lack of depth. The religious parallel here is with the gravitas of the 
. .. 149 Th fi Catholic priest and the informality of, for example, the BaptIst InInlster . e Irst 
].H) What one calls oneself has a different impact depending on the situation. A point which supports 
the idea that the way a word is used and in which context determines its meaning. 
147 Feltham.( 1999) (Ed) Chapter 24 by Thorne. Ps)'cilotilerapy and counselling are Indistinguishable. 
148 Bateman. A & HolmesJ.(l995) Introduction to P.n'CilOanalysis, Contemporary TheOlY and 
Practice. Routledge. London and New York. p169 
14') Each of these traditions has different expectations of their clergyand the training for each 
determines this. However, I am aware that whether it be Catholic or Baptist the individual practitioner 
has some scope for their personality to inspire their practice. 
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rl'lies on and relishes their depth or tradition whereas the other has rejected thel1l and 
rq;,ards hilllsel f ~lS refonned. An area we have yet to explore is the' apostolic 
succession' of those Inaintaining the strict tradition of the n1aster. Those closest to 
the founder, regard less of how tenuous, still hold n10re credibility than those 11l0re 
recent in the genealogy. 
Dcpth psychology has historically held the senior position but 11lUSt be exposed for 
\\'hat it is, a po\verful1netaphor, illusory. There could be a whole debate about what 
is 111eant by depth and the \\'ay that it has been exploited because implied in depth is 
the counkr \\'hich is superficial - if not deep it follows that one must be shallow. 
Cll111ulati\'e traditions are a fundan1ental part of a depth claim for a psychotherapist 
but tor pCTson-centred practitioners it is equated with an old model, a framework 
held in place by people \\'110 c1ain1 to be experts and their need for control. This could 
be one reason for adopting the tenn counsellor which whilst politically expedient, 
could also be saying sOlnething about the beginning of a power amnesty. These 
controversies 1."0 are influenced by current trends and reflect how easily swayed 
professionals are, to be in fashion even when it comes to health. The dynamic nature 
of practice is not ne\v as frOl1l Freud's comlnentators we can gauge the extent to 
\vhic h he \vas influenced by the social Clil1late of his til11e. For example, his desire to 
be recognised as a scientist was tied to his desire to for professional status. Freud's 
n1istakes \vere often to do with his timing. He on l110re than one occasion released 
inf011.11ation that his contemporaries were not ready to hear and he was subsequently 
condemned by them. Conten1porary counsellors and psychotherapists are no less 
subject to desire for recognition and status than their respective founders were. 
The \\'ord psychodynamic means that the psyche or soul is involved in an ever 
changing process. It is a hive of activity which is constantly in dialogue with internal 
(intra) relationships and external (inter) relationships. Both psychodynaInic therapy 
and psychodynamic counselling use a model of human development which, whilst 
sharing a foundation with psychoanalysis, holds less dogmatically to all that Freud 
originally prescribed as essential. Michael Jacobs gives an example of a 
psychodynamic model: 
... in which there is perceived to be a constantly moving set of relationships (dynamics) 
between different aspects of the personality, formed of past and present relationships 
between the growing individual and significant others, and therefore consciously and 
150 ibid 
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1I1ll'l)I1Sl'iously innuencing rdationships within the internal world o( the individual as well as 
the l'\.krnal \\lwld of the person and objects. ISI 
In other words thosc inter! intra relationships and dialogues mentioned above. 
There ~lrc 111any yariations in practice ranging fr0111 those who either regard 
thCl11Sclycs as, or, and perhaps nl0re inlportantly, are regarded by others, as at one 
c\.tren1e psychoanalysts or classical Freudians, and at the other counsellors. The 
re~11ity is that therc is no such bipolarity and it is a fantasy that so called classical 
practitioners adhere rigidly to Freud's particular theoretical fratnework with its 
pr()cedures and techniques, \yhilst others adopt a s0111ewhat eclectic or politically 
c\.pedienL intcgratiyc approach. 152 The eclecticlintegrative debate is another area of 
contenti()n, \vhere to be ec lcctic is believed to be unstructured, one might say 
unchurched, and as such, unsafe in ones practice. The Integrative practitioner appears 
to be l110re acceptable as they rely on a strong foundation of one approach with skills 
or techniques not traditionally associated with that approach being borrowed and 
inte~rated. This is all a Inatter of politicallnanoeuvring. This may be seen in the 
SaIne \'ein as the notion of being religious and having a comlnitment to a recognised, 
tangible tradition. \\"hereas being 'spiritual' which is regarded as '"airy fairy", "New 
A~ey" or "pick'n 'n1i\.". Such distinctions Inay appear arbitrary but are none the less 
a continuing source of debate. This debate echoes those within religious traditions 
,\'hose factions are ,"ying for suprelnacy. 
On the matter of safe practice there is little evidence to suggest that one practitioner 
is anyn10re unsafe than another because of their chosen approach. It is more a matter 
of the integrity of the practitioner which makes then1 safe or unsafe. However, it is 
likely that such accusations are fear based. For example, it is unsettling if you find 
that your devoted Christian friend also hangs out at the Buddhist telnple. The 
synthesising of religious traditions is common practice but theory and practice are 
different genres and have different nlotivations. Reading about Buddhism is not the 
same as being a Buddhist. If one is choosing a therapist or counsellor there is more at 
stake than simply scientific procedure. Clients wi1l1nake life choices which reflect 
the process which they have chosen to do their exploration. Practitioners have also 
151 Jacobs (1988 )p7 " 
152 I have spoken to many practitioners who believe it is less acceptable to have an eclectic approach. I 
am grateful to Marilyn Nicholl for giving me a detailed explanation of why this is cause for debate. 
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Inadc a choicc which have affected their lives. Ultin1ately there is something 
significant at stakc for each person in the roon1. With Freud's tTIodel it is easy to 
b latHc c\'cnts in the past for the discontent of the present because one of the tenets of 
psychodynatnic therapy is that the past is always in the present. In a tradition where 
thc past is occluded, as in the person-centred approach, the culture is one which is 
l)ptilnistic and forward looking. Each tnodel affects the outcOlTIeS of the client. In 
bccl'ln1ing a Buddhist one reflects the tenets of a specific Buddhism in the same way 
JS ~l Rogcrian (for all he \volild have objected to this title) or a Freudian reflect the 
traditiC'll1s of their chosen belief systen1. 
Certain traditions clain1 that Freud has nothing to do with what they do. For example, 
practitioners of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy describe their relationship with 
paticnts/c lients 1:'_' as an "educational alliance" in which they are also concen1ed with 
the present and the future but not the past. One could argue that the evidence of the 
past in the present lies just beneath the surface and one does not have to dig too 
deeply to find the influence of Freud. Freud believed that there was considerable 
e\-idence that the past is always influencing the present and therefore those claiming 
to \york in the here and now cannot avoid the past in the present. Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapists are unwilling to relate to the unconscious even though it has 
been acknowledged as a dynamic region of the psyche for a very long tilne. 
Ellenberger's \,·ork is testiiTIOny to this history. However, Freud's development of a 
theory about its dynamics has had the most wide spread and lasting impact. 
Co~niti,-e Beha,·ioural Therapists may deny Freud's impact in a way which echoes 
the denial bv The Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland of its relationship with 
Roman Catholicism. That one relied on the other as a platfonn from which to depart 
has been actively excluded from their understanding of their position. 
As is now common knowledge, Freud ensured that the COITIpOnents of the 
unconscious or psyche, which have been translated as the; ego, the id and 
superego 15--l, fonned his very own direct descendents of that other "Trinity", father 
son and holy ghost, and were acknowledged as constantly in Inotion, dynmnic. The 
153 What each practitioner chooses to call the people that they see professionally is n?t without. 
significance as patient sounds more medical than client, a term use in other non healmg professIOns_ 
For example, the law. . . , 
15.+ Bettelheim_B.(1982) Freud and Man's SOIi/ Penguin. London. p53 DIscusses how dIstorted Freud s 
meaning became because of the inadequate translations. 
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ul1cnnscious is equated with the psyche and is responsible for giving us the name, 
psychoanalysis. For son1e the psyche is equated with the soul, however, for others, 
sccular in outlook. the pretCrence has been to equate it with the Inind. Whatever 
pc()pk choose to call it. they believe that within it there are components, which are 
constantly active. This is relevant in so far as it relies on belief and not proof. There 
is nn hard cvidence that the psyche ex ists or has those components which Freud led 
us tn belicve. Proof appears not to be an issue for those who have relinquished 
thelnselves to believe. For exan1plc, psychoanalysts have suspended their disbelief 
and their con1tnitInent to the Freudian t110del relies entirely on faith in what Freud 
proposed. \vhich \vas not etnpirical science but a faith driven model. For this reason 
critics sce Frcud as a belicver in things unseen, a lnan of faith in that which cannot be 
denl0nstrated. Frcud chose to study the unseen and to be unseen hin1self in the 
process. hiding behind the patient in what he claimed was for the efficacy of 
psychoanalysis. Frt?ud' s nl0del works (or not) but as with religion its credibility is 
111aintained by assertion. authority and the excommunication of unbelievers and 
heretics. 
In Freud's 'Trinity' the assertion is that the ego acts as a mediator between the 
desires of the untmned id, and the social conscience, which the super ego is attuned 
to. Although these parts are intangible and as such indefinable, there are a variety 
argU111ents posited for and against their existence which serve to maintain a life for 
Freud's ideas. Even now, sixty five years after his death, the faithful maintain that 
this tripartite struggle continues. However, the so called heretics who question the 
existence of the unconscious ask, if it does exist in what does it consist? Freud had 
various arguments for its existence, one is that there are many times in every day 
speech \\'here \ve make it apparent that we experience different aspects of the self. 
For example, when someone simply says that they are not quite themselves today, 
one may infer from this that on another day they have another way of being which 
gives them a different sense of their selfl55 . The implications of this are that any 
notion of a, single core self as a fixed entity is redundant. The argulnents against its 
existence are of the 'you cannot see it therefore, it Inust not exist' variety.156 The post 
modem view of the self as socially constructed and constantly dynamic, if 'it' is 
anything at all, has its roots in very much earlier religious traditions: one need look 
155 For fUliher information/debate on the non existence of the unconscious see.Feltham (1999). 
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no further than the teachings o[the Buddha, (arguably a Hindu hilnself). Lest we 
l'or~l'1 Freud's OWI1 tradition, we need only look at his enlphasis on the significance 
l)f dreal11s. In this he continued a tradition of his ancient Jewish forebears of whose 
ll)ng acquaintance with drcanls he was well aware. 
The inferencc fronl the first ar~Ul11ent is that there is nlore than one aspect of oneself 
\\'ith \\'hich a person can identi Iy, and as such experience tinles when there is inner 
cl)ntlict tension. (\\,he11 all is harmonious there is less to talk about). Such tension is 
attributed to \\'hat psychodynanlic practitioners have referred to as splitting I 57. 
Statel11ents such as those above, where it is evident that SOll1eone is experiencing 
sonlC kind of inner di\'ision, or conflict, is confinnation enough for the 
psychodynanlic practitioner. They believe that each of us is capable of an inner 
di310~lle. and that it is possible to acknowledge and express these tensions which 
having such an c\.perience nlay cause. In so doing we can come to understand and 
nlanagc thosc c\.periences nlore usefully. What Freud did with this tension was to 
c lail11 that it \\·as intenlal. Before Freud such struggles were attributed to outside 
forces such as spirits or the devil or a poor relationship with one's God/s. The 
illlplications of this have been highly significant as people can no longer abdicate 
responsibility for their behaviour. It nlay be that a chemical imbalance in the brain 
causes sonleone to behave in an anti sociallnanner but this is no longer attributed to 
an unseen e\.tenlal influence. 
The tension bet\\een one part of the self and another has been the concern of healers 
for nlillennia. A person's inner conflict may be attributed to a sick soul, psyche, 
mind, unconscious or self, which ever tenn is used such disturbance is not new. For 
e\.ample, in the Old and New Testaments or in the recent past one need only read the 
literature novels of the pre psychoanalytic period to find nmnerous accounts of ilUler 
conflict and divided selves. For example, Mary Shelly's Frankenstein. Jmnes Hogg's 
Confessions of a Justified Sinner and Stevenson's famous Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde are 
each novels where the doppelganger and the idea of internal conflict is explored 158. 
Freud's was not a new account: he was adopting and expanding notions which were 
already well and truly established and illustrated. Whilst Hogg and Stevenson 
attribute their characters' conflict to the devil' s intervention, psychotherapy treats it 
157 This notion of splitting was explored most fully by the early Freudians, Klein, and Fairbairn. 
158 All three novels grapple with notions of good and evil within among other themes. 
59 
without personi fying it. In the san1e way as n1any people have used Freud as a 
Pllsition froln \\'hieh to depart, Freud's Trinity as internal was a departure froin the 
l'\.ternal Christian Trinity. However, his theories none the less continue to reflect the 
J uda~o Christian tradition within which he was so in11nersed. Freud's attempts to 
usurp the work of the Church were successful in so far as church nmnbers declined 
and the nmnbers seeking psychotherapy continue to rise. 
Th~ e\.istenc~ of a hierarchy in psychotherapy and counselling, and within the 
psyl'i10dynan1ic approach itsel r, is akin to those of other institutional hierarchies 
\\h~r~ past traditions arc still relied upon for current status and where such things as 
pro\.in1ity to the founder and strict adherence to the founder's word give power and 
influenc~ to those concerned. As n1entioned above, there is an 'apostolic succession' 
in \\'hich PO\\'(T is often disproportionate to the talent of the practitioner. For 
(,\'~ln1ple, those peopl~ \\'ho worked with Freud directly have been, and still are, held 
in higher regard than practitioners who had no contact with Freud. lung, despite their 
split and .-\.nna Freud, ceI1ainly gained more status through their intimate contact 
\\'"ith Freud. 
Thus there is a genealogy of power in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis still has the 
lion's share of it, although psychoanalysis is not only a treatment for disenchanted 
indi\'iduals but has been adopted as a theoreticallTIodel used for the analysis of social 
groups, institutions, and literature. However, as a treatment it still ranks highly not 
because it is better or more efficacious than other therapies but because daily 
sessions \\'ith a highly trained analyst over a long period of time are deemed 
necessaryl59. Many of Freud's clients had four or five hourly sessions each week. 
This means that there is a significant time cOlnmitment which incurs high costs and 
\\'hich maintains the status of psychoanalysis by surrounding it with an air of 
exclusivity. Each of these factors, until recently, rendered psychoanalysis 
inaccessible to all but the financially well off with time on their hands.
160 
159 In the same way as one might argue that a Rolls Royce is necessary when a Mini Metro would do. 
1()I)Today the Portland Clinic in London offer psychotherapy on a sliding scale which means that it is 
more available in financial terms, however, the time factor still remains a boundary to this exclusive 
zone. Freud advocated free psychoanalysis for those who could not afford it but this was not borne out 
in his practice. However, other Freudians did take up this mission and began clinics which although 
not free did charge on a pro rata basis. For more on this see Elizabeth Ann Danto (2005) Freud's Free 
Clinics: P5ychoanalysis and Social Justice (/9/8-38). Columbia.USA 
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There has been an atklnpt by son1e to introduce the notion of pro-rata paYl11ent a sort 
ortithe, so that people on low incon1es can have analysis, but, as we can gauge fr0111 
the abo\'e, payment is not the only prerequisite for this kind of therapy . 
. -\s noted, psychoanalysis has received son1e of its status by proxy in that it has 
Inaintained an alliance with the n1edical profession, which itself is regarded with 
disproportionate status. This belongs to the Saine process, as n1entioned above, when 
the status of the practitioner is increased by vil1ue of contact with the founder, or 
S(,ln1eone \vho kne\\' the founder and so on. Added to this is the social, political and 
historical context \\'hich influences which therapy is in vogue. It is not difficult to 
find psychotherapists \\'ho disagree with any notion of a hierarchy: as insiders they 
seen1 blinded by their position. One need look no further than the locations used by 
psychoanalysts: they are not to be found in areas of financial deprivation. Freud lnay 
haye inherited the disenchanted church goer but he did not entertain those powerless 
indiyiduals for \\'hon1 the church had, in its infancy, been designed to en1brace. There 
is little e\idence of a philanthropic Freud. He considered himself to have lacked 
priyilege and conce1l1ed hilnself with how to maintain a decent standard of living for 
hin1self and his fan1ily.( By the time Freud was forty two, in a letter to lung, he 
c lain1ed he was beyond sex as he already had six children and did not want any 
n10re). The tel11plate which Freud left was not one in which the practitioner would 
follo\y a yocation of benevolence and c01npassion but more an exclusive service 
\vhere the client patient should consider themselves lucky to get a place. (It is rare to 
lneet a financially challenged psychoanalyst). The Cardinal need not struggle in the 
\yay that the parish priest does. 
Some of the arguments used to justify the high cost of psychoanalysis are to do with 
professionalism 161. This sets a dangerous precedent which ilnplies that 
professionalism relies on high charges. The therapeutic community has a huge 
\'oluntary sector, which is unpaid, and would be offended at this assmnption i.e. that 
payment equates with professionalisl11, when they give their hours for free. If one's 
professionalism is the reason for high charges the il11plications of this for 
practitioners of other approaches, who charge less is that they are viewed as less 
professional. Again parallels lnay be drawn with the training of clergy who in having 
161 This current debate is about professionalism versus credentialism. Freud and Rogers believed that 
you could have all the qualifications in the world and you could still be a poor practitioner. 
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a uni\crsity training, nlay be conlpared with those with senlinary fonnation or the lay 
preacher. None is a guarantee to beconling a good pastor. Morality is not something 
\\hich one nlay train for in an institution and yet the belief that professionalizing the 
psychotherapeutic clergy as a way of ensuring nl0ral, conscientious conduct during 
pract icc is e\(T increasing. This expect at ion, of high Inoral standards for 
practitioners, itself should indicate that psychotherapy is Inore vocational or at least 
aligned to \ocations \\'here the sanle standards are prescribed and where it is still 
shocking \\hen people in such \'ocations transgress these standards. 
The CUtTent debate about professionalizing psychotherapy raises issues about what it 
takes to be professional. Not what it 111eans to be a good practitioner. To be qualified 
appears to be about hours, to have conlpleted a certain amount of hours of study and 
practice after \\hich one nlay be issued with a qualification. However, both Freud 
and Rogcrs belic\cd that the anl0unt of hours one has completed does not necessarily 
ret1ect ones conlpetencc, it only shows accounts of hours and not work. In other 
\yords pcoplc ha\c often done the hours but have not done the work. So that the 
lengthy. cxpensi\c, training of the analyst cOInbined with their own therapy which is 
also used as justification for high fees 162tells us little about the competence of the 
practitioner. People who becOIne analysts Inust begin from a position of financial 
strcngth \\'hich does not equate with a desire to become great analysts. Nor does it 
cxclude the notion that one can, in such circumstances. The danger with 
pro fessionalizing anything is that it can becOIne an exercise in credentialism. In 
psychotherapy people collect pieces of paper which permit them to practice, but such 
picces of paper do not tell us of their moral integrity, only of their ability to do hours. 
\\rhen engaging one soul to another, whether with psychotherapist or priest, there is 
no \\'ay of policing the encounter without transgressing the prerequisite of 
confidentiality which is one of their criteria for practice. 
Pieces of paper which prove a qualification are really part of a wide but covert issue 
which is more sectarian in nature. Who has the truth? For eXaInple, it is often the 
case that the psychoanalyst will work in a medical type environment, such as a 
hospital or clinic. Environments such as these add to the kudos of the approach. The 
J (,2 The talking cure as an industry has been explored by Howard (1996) and Carrette and King 
(2005 ). 
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publil'-priYak dichotOlllY is at work within the psychoanalytic community. Until 
recently psychothcrapy and counselling have not been nlade available on the NHS. 
1 kl\\cycr, it appcars that sonle GP practices have begun to employ counsellors to 
takc somc ofthc listening work away fronl GPs. This is done on the basis of 
cconoillics, arguing that it is ccon01llically nlore viable to enlploy a counsellor for 
this job than to takc up the tinle of an expensive GP. The nlotivation for this has 
cchoes ofthc systenl in the USA where psychotherapy is elnployed as a cOlnmodity 
to S~lYC a 11l0re cxpensiyc one and is donlinated by what insurance companies are 
\\illing to pay. But fron1 all of this may be seen, with a little scrape at the surface of 
psychotherapy, \yhat underlies this is a more fundanlental belief about answers, the 
ans\\crs to those big, 11leaning of lil'c questions which religion once claimed to have 
(and sti lllllay) .. ~\ II of this raises the question of what good practitioners do and how 
they becon1e the kind of people with whonl we associate moral conduct which is 
aboye the percei ycd aycrage. 
In addition. Psychodynalnic psychotherapy has created a further exclusivity zone by 
recoI11I11ending that it is only suitable for those who can understand, and therefore 
engage in the process of interpretation 163. Thus it presupposes a psychoanalytic 
kno""ledge. For S01neone without this kind of intelligence, i.e. access to the 
theory literature of psychoanalysis, it is not recolnmended. If it is only suitable for 
the educated Iniddle classes psychotherapy is flawed, as Freud intended it for the 
11lasses 16-+. Perhaps it is still the case that only the Iniddle and upper classes have the 
luxury of being neurotic. The above gives S01ne idea of the social, econOlnic, and 
political workings of the profession but we must be wary of any notion of 
psychotherapy operating in a vacuum. 165 It would be foolish to argue that 
psychoanalysis was once available to the financially limited it has always been a 
middle class pursuit. However, within the middle classes, and certainly in Freud's 
time, there were powerless groups, people who had Inoney but no voice. As noted 
above Freud's benevolence only ran to those who could afford it. However, as with 
early Christianity which began as a religion for the powerless and only later became 
a religion of choice for the powerful who could afford it, Freud's so called neurotic 
middle class women may also be seen as powerless in so far as they had been 
163 Jacobs. M (1988) Psvchodynamic Counselling in Action. In which he has a table of client 
suitability.p53 
IIA ibid .p53 . . 
165 Its 'middleclassness' appears to be one of the most common accusatIOns of thIS approach. 
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si klKCd unti I Freud heard their testilnonies, testinlonies that could not be told 
dSl'\\ hcre \\ithout jUdgcment. 
\ \7hi 1st Freud's ideas h"1\'c detennined the practice of the Freudian analyst, other 
practitioners using a psychodynanlic approach have chosen to emphasize some of his 
tenets Inorc than others. Post-Freudians, such as C.G. Jung, M. Klein, and 
\V.D.\Vinnicott also rcgarded as nlajor psychodynanlic theorists, developed their 
own theorics but not \\'ithout building on Freud's. Each relied, as Freud had, on a 
belief in the dynalnic nature of the unconscious. However, each departed frOln 
Freud's descripti\'e tenns, the id, ego, and super-ego. lung instead coined terms such 
.. lS aninla. aninlus. and dc\'eloped ideas of a collective unconscious and archetypes. 
\\'hilst Klein, dc\'doped ideas such as internal objects, Winnicott had ideas of the 
true sdf and the false sel( and the significance of transitional objects. These 
denolninations are not without conflict as each makes clailns about the necessity of 
their de\'eloplnents and therefore in1plies their subsequent superiority. 
Freud's inlpact on psychotherapy is imn1easurable. His legacy to post Freudians and 
psychodynaInic practitioners has been a wide body of theory upon which to draw and 
build their o\\'n practice. The effect of Freud's work and the work of those who 
de\'e loped from hiln means that it is difficult to categorize practitioners as they 
consciously, and unconsciously adopt practices which no longer belong exclusively 
to one framework. The notion of a post Freudian era is as unlikely as the idea of a 
post Christian era. The passion for the original may have been diverted but is by no 
means lost. The synthesis of different traditions of psychotherapy make it more 
difficult to detect what was once regarded as exclusive to a particular tradition, as the 
language of each has become part of our everyday communication. For eXaInple, I 
ha\'e heard a Gestalt therapist talking about "challenging empathically", being 
empathic to the needs of the client 166 drawing directly on Rogers's theory and in this 
they depart from the tenets of their founder Fritz Perls. Gestalt is still one of the most 
confrontational of the talking cures but confrontation Inay now be viewed as 
empathetic. 
166 In conversation with a Gestalt practitioner whilst on retreat at Dhanakosa. He practices in a FE 
college in Greenwich. 
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Idcnk)gics and their language arc in practice dynalnic: it is in theory that they are 
d()glnatiscd. Theory and practicc, orthodoxy and orthopraxy are different genres but 
~lre often c:\pccted to bc the sanle. What people say they do and what they actually do 
are often at odds. For c:\anlplc, we Inay see it as ironic that Freud's protestations 
about religion did not pre\'ent hinl fronl establishing one of his own. However, as 
"ith psychotherapists there is always a position which we cannot see by virtue of our 
st~ll1ding in it. Freud cnuld not see his own position any nl0re than anyone else. 167 
PsychodYl1aInic theory CaIne about, in part, due to a feeling of disenchantInent with 
purist. dognlatic, approaches to Freud's theories, nanlely strict adherence to his 
pillars or C0111erstones. In addition to this, there was pressure from other traditions 
\\hich obj eeted to the psychoanalytic notions of relnaining aloof, distant and 
e:\pertise \\'hich ,,'as e:\pected in Freud's day but is Inuch less acceptable today. To 
be nlore hunlan centred is seen by lnany as a necessary and welcome development. 
.--\.s noted abo\'e, the ,,'orld which Freud and his contemporaries inherited and 
inhabited \\as alnlost certainly a world in which the concepts of unconditional love, 
enlpathy. and congruence would never have been named as part of something which 
\\'as deenled a scientific endeavour. In fact psychoanalysis had already been 
criticised for not being objective enough. It was difficult to make a place for these 
attitudes in the scientific domain of psychoanalysis. Sandor Ferenczi did see the 
\\'orth in such concepts but was condemned by Freud for being too intimate with his 
patients. Psychodynamic practitioners today can be more like the practitioner that 
F erenczi \vanted to be. 
Freud's talent \Vas not so much in having original scientific ideas, but in assimilating 
the ideas of others and using them to create his own theoretical model, and in so 
doing, convincing the world that he had developed a new branch of the science of 
psychology. 16;.( His ideas were drawn from a variety of sources, some scientific, such 
as the idea of a unitary life force or libido theory. It is unclear how scientific the 
language, which Freud employed to describe his work was 169. For some, the 
translations are regarded as missing his real point, although we are left in no doubt as 
167 The author has the privilege of taking up positions as both an insider psychotherapist and outsider 
religious studies scholar. Each influences what is observed. 
16?\ Freud \1useum, Maresfield Gardens, London has a video with the voice of Freud where he makes 
this claim. 
169 Bettelheim. (1982) explains that the German language has a variety of terms where as in English 
science is a cover all. 
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t() \\'here he bdieyed his work bdonged. 17o Adan1 Phillips, himself a psychotherapist, 
in a recent publication clain1s Freud's work not as science but as literature and by 
doin~ SCI keeps psychoanalysis at a safe distance fron1 religion. 171 
\ Vhilst Freud \\'as often accused of bein~ dogn1atic, 17~ contelnporary therapists 
\\'orkin~ in the psychodynamic tradition do so because Freud's work has been 
dcydoped and has not rel11ained static. Many continue to interpret Freud's ideas and 
usc thel11 as guidelines rather than seeing then1 as doctrines, not open to 
intelvretation or deyelopl11ent. Devdopn1ent of Freud's work has probably been 
easier since his death as in his correspondence there is evidence of the difficulties 
\yhich arose \\'hen he \\'as challenged. He, at tin1es, fought his comer like a terrier 
and his opposition to change \\'as clear. However, Freud relied on the comments of 
his fello\\ scientists to nlake his discoyeries. For eXaInple, he relied on feedback 
fron1 111elnbers of the B 'nai B'rith, a Jewish society to which he gave lnany of his 
~ll'aden1ic papers. He renlained a n1en1ber throughout his life and was also an 
honor~lrY n1en1ber of Kadin1ah a Zionist organisation 173. Freud clailned to be 
indebted to the B 'nai B'rith for their continued support. The contemporary 
practitioner \\'ith a faith tradition has lnore to contend with. Freud's rejection of 
religion has n1ade it aln10st in1possible to practice religion and be a secular 
psychoanalysis or psychotherapist. There are however, individual practitioners who 
fcc I safe enough to n1ake claims about their spirituality I 74 . That is not to say that 
people do not say that they are for example, Christian or Jewish but this is qualified 
by ""not practicing". 
\\Tithout contraries there would have been little progress and Carl lung, although set 
up by Freud to be the first 'apostle', turned out to be Freud's biggest competitor. He 
\'-as Freud's choice of successor because as a gentile he was believed to be the lnost 
prudent next in line to lead the movelnent. He in fact became Freud's most famous 
opponent. The reasons for their split are Inore con1plicated than the doculnentation 
170 \ Tany authors have shown that Freud's work sits more comfortably in religion than in science, see 
\Vebster. \Veiss, Sulloway etc. Bettelheim argues that Freud did not try to make his work scientific but 
that translators of his works have. 
171. Phillips. A. In a prepublication review in the Guardian 9112/2000 of Prolllisc>s Promises. 
172 Wittels (1924) 
173 Bakan. D. (1958) Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition D.Van Nostrand 
Company.Inc. Princeton New Jersey, Toronto, New York, London.p49 . 
174 At the beginning of this project I interviewed practitioners and there were some who spoke of theIr 
spirituality most often without connection to a particular religious tradition. 
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WLIU ld ha"c us bl'! icvc 175 but that .lung saw religion as a necessary aspect of the 
lllllnan conditiLln \vas conlpletely contrary to Freud who believed it was an illusion 
whidll'aused nlorc danlagc than good . .lung's overt enlbracing of things religious is 
why he has such a stnall part to play in this work. Freud on the other hand claill1ed to 
bc an athl'ist whilst covertly giving rise to a powerful religious 1110Vetnent. .lung 
would also have denied that \vhat he created could also be compared to a religious 
nl0vell1ent. prefelTing to sce it as an ideology. Before their fanlous break Freud and 
.lung had givcn cach other years of intellectual stinll11ation and their irreconcilable 
differences had a dc"astating effect on thenl both. 
\Yhilst nluch of the docunlentation about this split is about differences in theory there 
tnay have bccn sotllcthing l'!se which is onlitted. Freud and lung gave each other 
tnutual analysis. the contents of which were confidential. lung's wife Emlna, who is 
belie\'ed to have been jealous of their relationship, wrote to Freud stating that she 
\vas conceTIled about lung's health . .lung found a letter in Freud's hand addressed to 
Enlnla and asked her \\'hy Freud \\'as writing to her. We lnay only hypothesise about 
his response. but psychoanalysis and medicine are each bound by secrecy and the 
idea that Freud "'as discussing .lung with Emma without his consent would have 
been regarded as a breach of trust by lung. The break up of their friendship was 
significantly detrimental to their health: Freud was, according to Anna Freud, 
depressed and lung had a breakdown from which he took about five years to 
]-h 
recover 
Freud \\as prone to dramatic splits and as with lung his parting from Fleiss was also 
a \'ery public affair. Adler and Stekel are also exmnples of men who challenged 
Freud and lost. The loss for each appears as more of a crisis of faith in that the effect 
\\'as much more personal than a professional disagreement. Freud believed their 
actions to be heretical, an indication that his own investment was beyond 
175 \TcGuire includes Erruna lung's correspondence with Freud in which she asks Freud not to tell 
lung, This is a breach of trust which began in 1911 whilst Freud and lung were still 'mutually' 
analysing each other. lung is believed to have discovered this correspondence and was exh-emely 
unhappy about it. Whilst their break is believed to be purely about theoretical disagreements, it is my 
contention that this \\'as an additional factor which has yet to be explored. It is interesting to note the 
changes which Freud makes in his address to lung. lung is consistent and always referred to Freud as 
Dear Professor Freud. Freud changed the way he addressed lung. He began with Dear Colleague, then 
it became Dear Friend and Colleague then moved to Dear Friend, Dear Dr lung then Dear Dr and in 
the end Dear \1 r President. 
176 \Vebster (1995) p390 
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professional. Fol1o\\'ers who 1l1ade the break from Freud did so because their 
integrity required theln to and Inany are regarded as having created ground breaking 
\\'()rk ('If their 0\\'11. As noted above, the Inovenlent functioned in such a way as to 
1l1ean that those bra\'e enough to go it alone were described by Freud as heretics, and 
\\'ere in etTcct, e~conlnlunicated fronl the Freudian cmnp 177 . 
.lung's approach, kno\\'n as analytical psychology, sits easily under the umbrella of 
psychodynmnic therapy, but is often referred to as analysis which adds to the 
l'onfusion of\\'ho is doing \\'hat. SOlne cOlltenlporary Jungian analysts call 
thelllSclyes analytical psychotherapists.17~Jung's choice of name, like Freud's, gave 
his ideas ~1 scientific edge \\'hich in nlany ways has lulled his followers into a false 
sense of security. As noted, .lung, unlike Freud, believed in religiousness as an 
inlportant aspect of psychotherapy: 
Jung also yiewed the unconscious as encompassing spiritual and transcendental areas of 
. 1-9 
meanmg. 
Recently Jung and subsequently Jungian therapy has been much criticized. Richard 
-:\oll's biography The Al~1'al1 Christ 180posits the idea that Jung and his ideas were 
S)lllpathetic to -:\azisnl and whether one believes in his hypotheses or not it has 
affected the dinner party status of Jungian therapy. The ideas discussed above about 
the influence of political correctness have left Jungians in a weak position, (for the 
nloment). The Jungians will not be back in vogue until another condemning 
biography of Freud is published, when the emphasis will shift. The notion that each 
therapy can function in isolation is discredited by the media influence which can 
s\\'ing the tide of popularity in just one article. However, for the faithful such media 
intervention is negligible. 
\lethods and techniques employed by analytical psychologists, psychodynalnic 
practitioners and psychoanalysts are an attempt to work out what the unconscious is 
trying to communicate, which they believe appear in a variety of ways, for example, 
IT \1 an\' of whom committed suicide: it may have been as many as 8 from his close followers. Was 
there a 'correlation between those who committed suicide and Judaism? 
178 Susie Orbach (1999) The Impossibility of Sex. Penguin. London. prefers this term. What therapists 
chose to call themselves is not insignificant. 
179 .\1cLeod, (1993) p28.Jung's overt religiousness has meant that he is not considered essential to this 
dissertation 
180 This book has been vehemently criticised for its exaggerations by Sonu Shamdasani himself a 
critic of J ung 
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thrl)ugh synlbols arising fronl frce association, dremns, fantasies, and parapraxes, 
slips IJ1' the tongue or pen. The client brings these into therapy, where the practitioner 
\"ill interpret and nlake inferences about their Ineanings. There is a current argument, 
which states that the interpretations which therapists Inake are barely related to the 
client and that the alleged findings only belong within the ilnagination of the 
therapist. I ~ 1 These therapists are so entrenched in their theories and traditions that 
their \york consists in looking for theoretical assunlptions which fit with what the 
client is saying. or cycn ho\\' they can fit what is being said into a theory. For 
exmnplc. the idca being that if you are in Jungian therapy you will have Jungian 
drei1111S ~lnd likc\yisc in psyc hoanalysis Freud's franlework is used. In Ellenberger the 
exploration of the ancestry of psychotherapy shows that in all traditions there is a 
1'ranlc\york \yhich is applied in healing which relies on suspension of belief and faith 
in the et11cacy of the treatlnent. This efficacy also relies on a presupposition of the 
conlnlunity's beliefin and upholding of the traditions espoused by the founder. 
Other techniques invo1\'e identifying resistances and defences such as projection, 
\"here one would attribute to others characteristics which are difficult to accept in 
oneself or denial, when there is a complete lack of awareness and preparedness to 
take responsibility. This abdication of responsibility Inay be identified in the 
nl0venlent's denial of what their function really is. Transference and counter-
transference are both regarded as valuable therapeutic tools of the psychodynamic 
trade. \yhich has not ahyays been the case. In the past the assumption has been that 
transference belonged only to the client, and counter transference something that 
only the therapist engaged in. It is now acknowledged that each person in the room 
can transfer or counter. 182 
The prescribed \\'ays of being in the psychodynamic tradition have historically 
included notions such as practitioners act as a blank screen for the client. Although 
now shown to be impossible, this fantasy has been desired by empiricists 183. The 
client Inay project any deeply held assUlnptions or fantasies on to the therapist who, 
IRI Feltham. C. (1999) Controversies in COlillselling and P5ychotherapy. Sage London. Chapter by 
£,\1. Thornton. This is the same Thornton who writes critically about Freud's cocaine episode. 
182 This is further evidence of the power amnesty mentioned earlier where the client and therapist are 
each regarded as having fallibility, . ' ' 
183 .'\otions of blank canvases and screens are of course senously under questIOn. Noam Chomsky 111 
an article in the Guardian 20th January 2001 bucked 'the empiricist tenet of the blank slate' 
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unlike the ancient tradition of the priest who actually has a screen 184, just has to act 
as a blank screen. This act is adopted in an atten1pt to prevent the therapist overtly 
rl'acti nt!- to the patient, thereby a \lowing the patient free reign or rein if Freud's 
notic1l1 of the id as an untan1ed wild anilnal is adhered to. The issue of whether any 
hlll11an I11ay be ret!-arlied, as a blank screen is contentious because at the very least 
blank screens still e\'oke a response. I expect that there are few contelnporary 
practitioners \\'ho sti 11 belic\'c this but would sit on the fence if asked to declare their 
bl'liefs about it, a fonn of 'lnethodological agnosticisn1' that poor relation of Berger's 
"n1ethodological atheisl11"1~5. This phenon1enon is discussed by Carrette who very 
kindly calls it "disciplinary an1nesia"IX(1. Such generosity overlooks the possibility of 
this ~lS an acti\'ity rather than, as Carrette would have it, an unconscious oversight. 
The psychoanalysis of such action would show that it is at least an activity in 
forgetting ~lS there is no ren1en1bering without first forgetting. 
Freudians also use the techniques described above but differ from the 
psychod} 11an1ic practitioner in their choice of environment and the manner in which 
the therapy is conducted. As in Catholic confession, Freudians also create a space in 
\\-hich the patient can be anonymous. They are renowned for having their 
patients iclients lying on a couch with the analyst seated behind and out of sight. This 
is in part intended to alleviate the discomfort of eye contact both for the client and 
the therapist. 187 For Freudians this is part of a ritual intended to create an 
en\-ironment in which the client can focus on those things, which freely come to 
lnind. Repressed emotions will be transferred and the process of allowing feelings an 
opportunity to come to consciousness and be interpreted, can in turn lead to 
understanding, and subsequently, to some kind of management of them. 
The absence of eye contact as a tool for altering the state of consciousness of 
someone in distress, as noted above, is not new. Religious traditions have encouraged 
it for a long time: the Catholic Church is but one example. Losing eye contact does 
184 In the Catholic Church in some parts of Spain men actually confess on their knees in front of the 
priest with their head bowed. 
185 Berger. P (1967) The Sacred Canopy Argues for methodological atheism where one brackets off 
religion 
186 Carrette. J.R. in Jonte-Pace.D and Parsons.W.B.(2001) Religion and P5ychology;Mapping the 
Terrain. COl1tempor(llY Dialogues Future Prospects. Routledge.London. p123 . . . 
187 Freud himself could not tolerate having people looking at him for the length of tIme theIr analysIs 
took, and so devised a way of minimising eye contact. He found that this was also useful for clients 
and their ability for free association was increased. 
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Inean the loss of a significant social cue: there are very few social occasions where 
one dCles not rely on eye contact. Although this has becon1e synonyn10us with 
Freudian analysis it \\'as not designed this way. Freud disliked spending so n1uch 
tiine being looked at and by dei:1ldt disco\'ered the increased efficacy of analysis 
\\hen he was out of sight. Freud c laiined that patients could n10re freely associate, 
\\ithout nonnal social cues. a significant part of the psychoanalytic process. 
Psych()analysis relies on an altered state of consciousness, which is easier to achieve 
without cye cont~lCt. 
The therapeutic encounter is rich in ritual which ever tradition is being practiced. 
Ho\\eyer. the Freudians arc n10re overt in this than others. The rituals of Freudian 
analysis have been particularly criticized by fen1inists such as Luce Irigary, herself a 
continenul psychoanalyst. as a set up which can be dis-en1powering to the client, 
pat1icularly if the client is feinale l ~~. She argues that the connotations of a woman 
lying in this sublnissiYe posture are entirely different to those of a male. l89 She also 
presupposes that lying do\\'n is experienced as a more vulnerable position than sitting 
\yhich 111ay not ahyays be the case. Also that one's vulnerability 111ay be further 
induced by the denial of eye contact is not always the case. Case studies have shown 
that eye contact is at tin1es difficult for the client. It is but one of the cues which body 
language betrays and gi\'es the client an opportunity to work without suggestion. The 
anal~ 11C experience is an encounter which has been designed intentionally as a space 
and tin1c \\-hich is devoid of normal social cues for the purpose of inducing a state 
\yhich \\'ould not othen\'ise be induced. As noted, the ren10val of eye contact in 
psychoanalysis is for the purpose of creating an environment which is conducive to 
free association. Psychotherapy continues in the tradition of healers of the soul who 
ha\e prescribed altered states of consciousness as part of the cure. Psychotherapy is 
not the secular practice that we are led to believe, one is not doing the shopping or 
having a drink down the pub but is setting aside specific time in a specific place with 
a specific person to engage in a task of inner exploration which relies on an altered 
state of consciousness. 
In addition. following the time honoured relationship between healer and patient, in 
psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy there is 111uch that is actively 
188 This argument is too general and easily falls when a vulnerable man has similar difficulties. 
189 Irigaray.L (1993) Sexes and Genealogies. Columbia University press, NY. Translated by 
Gillian.c.Gill. 
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\\ithheld by the pr~lctitioner. Withholding is believed to be an ilnportant part of the 
pnJl'l'SS to inducc trans terence. We do not ask personal questions of our therapist any 
1110re than \\l' wou ld our priest or 1ninister or other religious practitioners. Outsiders 
regard this so called technique as exploitative and argue that it gives the practitioner 
nl(lre PO\\(T than the c I icnt. This is a reductionistic notion of power and how it 
works, ~lS \\ithin the dynamics of psychotherapy it is Inore con1plex than this view 
~lSSU111es. Psychodynatnic practitioners, using a lnore integrative approach, do so to 
cre~lte a n10re c1npowcri ng en\'irom11ent for the client 190, one which is less aloof than 
psychoanalysts arc alleged to be. It Inay be of interest to note that Anna Freud knitted 
\\'hen she \\~lS analysing, son1ething which Luce Irigaray saw as a positive thing. This 
is ~ln indication of the highly subjective nature of the relationship between client and 
therapist and that clearly, one n1an's Ineat is another man's poison. 
The efficKY of working in such a detached way is always under question by those 
who belie\e that it only ser\'es to create and perpetuate hierarchy. Its real effect on 
the transference and counter-transference has yet to be fully doclunented. In lnany 
\\"ays all therapeutic relationships are role playing and one has to question whether 
the o\'ert nature of this role is ultilnately less destructive than those in other therapies 
\\-ho belieye themselyes to be less exploitative, and by virtue of this belief are 
perhaps experiencing self deception. Setting up a relationship which is from the 
outset a role playing activity is perhaps a safer way to begin rather than to lull one's 
self and one' s client into a false sense of security. 191 If one realises that the space and 
tin1e are sacred and that an altered state of consciousness is induced for therapeutic 
effect and that the activities which take place in the therapy session are peculiar to 
that space and that time it is easier to accept the religious parallels. The therapy room 
may. like many locations that were once only used for sacred activities, also be used 
for so called secular activities. However, this does not ilnpinge on the sacredness of 
the space. The process required for this transformation is merely the suspension of 
belief or disbelief. The idea that certain spaces at certain tilnes are believed to be 
efficacious has been part of religious traditions even before they were so called. For 
exarnple, the mythology of the Ancient Near East is rich with ideas about specific 
places which were believed to be sacred 192. We need not go so far as the Ancient 
190 Jacobs \1. (1986) The Presenting Past. Open University Press. Milton Keynes. 
191 \1 asson. 1.(1993) explores this covert abuse of power in more depth. 
191 \\'yatt. .'\. (2001) Space and Time in the Religious l([e of the! Ancient Near East. Sheffield 
Academic Press. Sheffield. England. 
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Nl"ar East: in our o\\'n back yard there are nlany such geographical features. For 
l'XaIllP k, the conflucnce of two rivers nlay be regarded as sacred and nlany wells are 
st i II used f(,)r healing. Both are pre Christian beliefs which have been assilnilated into 
the Christian tradition and are testinl0ny to that amnesia referred to above as they are 
not ~ll'kno\\'ledged as pagan. 
There is no such thing as a pure Freudian any l110re than a pure Hindu or a pure 
Christian. :\ccusations about purisnl arise in a specific context which is against 
fundanlcntalisnl. Christian Fundamentalisnl was a tenl1 originally used in the 1920's 
by anti-l11odernist religious groups \\'ho \\'ere against change. If classical Freudians 
~lre the fundanlentalist t~lction of psychodYl1atnic therapy which, in the current 
c lilllate of anti -fundanlentalisnl, can only be a bad thing, they are bound to be used as 
con\'enient scapegoats. 193 Although there are serious question marks over whether 
such a thing actually exist other than in theory, 'they' who ever they are, are still 
refened to in a derogatory \\'ay and are condemned for not moving with the times. It 
seems froln this that one of the 'fundatnental' I ()~outcOlnes of therapy, that of 
beconling 1110re tolerant is easier in theory than in practice. Tolerance of other ways 
of practice appears not to be a strong point for therapists. 195Their talk is similar to 
inter faith dialogue in so far as their action does not echo what they say. 
Psychodynanlic therapists operate on the basis that they have expert knowledge, and 
that the client's state prevents them from seeing themselves with clarity; that clients' 
difficulties ha,·e their roots in childhood experiences. Also, that there is true 
1110ti\'ation behind the actions of the client of which the client is not aware; and that 
the client will employ a range of survival techniques, such as defences to avoid what 
they really feel. Thus, by implication, the feelings that the client identifies are not the 
real ones. However, the therapist has access to those feelings of the client which are 
real and their expertise wi 11 help to uncover and make sense of them. 196 
193 There are times more in the past than now when to believe fundamentally in something was a sign 
of good character and perhaps even honour. So is fundamentalism always a bad thing? Or is it the case 
that the political climate is determining the climate for all else? 
I()~ In today's climate this word is more often associated with a form ofbigohy 
195 For more on this issue of tolerance and of compassion as outcomes in therapy see Epstein.M. 
(1998) Going to pieces withoutfalling apart: a Buddhist perspecti1'e o711I'iloleness. Thorsons. 
London. 
196 There is some debate about whether or not it matters about the truth of the client's narrative. There 
has been an upsurge in a movement which believes that therapy is responsible for the manufacture of 
'F aIse .\;1 emory Syndrome'. This group believes that therapists plants seeds of dO~lbt which they then 
cultivate, creating memories, which in fact do not exist. Notions of truth and falSIty are complex but 
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This has led to criticisn1 of the psychodynan1ic approach and accusations of the 
l)lnnipotencc of therapists. It raises concen1 about their detachn1ent and whether this 
is necessary to the therapeutic process, or as critics have alluded to it, is it just a 
power g~llne? l\ I asson, for cxan1ple, points out that the hierarchy of patient as inferior 
to the therapist is akin to the relationship one n1ight have with a priest or with 
roya lty. ll)~ ThtTapists arc pern1itted to ask any questions but the client/patient is not. 
Therapists Inay approach clients. Ho\\'('\'('r, the client n1ay not first approach the 
ther~lpist. The therapist decides on the an101mt and frequency of time that they will 
~dlo\\' the patient to spend \\'ith thcn1. This is a relationship which may begin with 
re\'erence fron1 the client patient to the practitioner but often ends in reverse with the 
therapist re\'cring the c licnt patient. During the process of an-iving at such a reversal 
the client patient \\'ill han:? been through l11any turbulent feelings about the therapist. 
This process echoes that of the priest and the novitiate where the novitiate, after 
n1uch struggle. ends up in a position of strength equal to the l11entor. 
The psychodynan1ic practitioner is responsible for creating separateness. This is 
achie\ed by particular ritualistic behaviour and is, according critics such as Masson, 
"essential for po\\'er"198. Masson gives an example of a friend whose therapist's 
office \vas three floors up but the reception was on the ground floor. Rather than call 
do\vn to him she came all the way down to collect him and they walked all the way 
back up in silence thereby creating an intil11idating atmosphere in which to begin 
exposing one's innel1110st fears. Were it not for the vulnerability of the client this 
could be seen as farcical. 1 99There is another way in which this may be viewed, and 
that is. that the client enters into a space which loses its profanity by virtue of this 
act. Masson's judgement about this, without having been present, is perhaps distorted 
and it may be possible that it was an eXaI11ple of basic good manners. Masson, 
although an analyst himself, has become more critical than 1110St of the process and 
he does not accept that there are other ways in which the relationship dynamics may 
be vie\\'ed. His is an entirely secular reading of therapy. He fails to see that there are 
there are always value judgements about the goodness of tmth versus the badness of falsity. Which 
ought to be questioned elsewhere. 
197 \1 asson.J .M.(1988) 
198 ibid P 14. 
199 L . 
OC.CIt. 
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as l11any therapies as there ~lre practitioners in the Saine way as for eXaInple, there are 
as l11<1ny Christianities as there are practitioners. 
In ther~lpy space and til11e are allocated for the purpose of worship that is, the 
\Y(lrship of the self by the self for the self. Paul Vitz~()() has written disparagingly of 
\yhat psychology has done, clail11ing that it has created a "cult of self worship" a 
culture of "seltisl11". HC)\\"e\"tT, he also seen1S to say that psychotherapy offers very 
little that is different to the great religions. His work is fron1 an entirely Christian 
perspectiYe, but he s('el11S 110t to realise that iCpsychology is nothing Inore than a 
religion then he n1ust praise psychology in the way that he praises Christianity. If 
Freud and Feuerbach \\"tTe conect and religion is a Inere projection ofluan, what 
d(leS it l11atter \\"hether the \\orship is inside or outside if ultin1ately the end is for the 
sd f: Vitz is all10ng n1any \\"ho take issue with psychotherapy. Feminists take issue 
\yith the patri~1rchal fran1ework within which it works and are therefore ilumediately 
suspicious of any assun1ptions and attitudes which con1e froln it201 . Irigary, 
111entioned aboye. is but one. However, Masson argues that even the feminists have 
not gone far enough in their conden1nation. Their objections lie with those very 
things \\'hich luake therapy other worldly. The way in which space and tilue are used 
is rendered hierarchicaL as is the fact that there is no everyday conversation and the 
client/patient is not expected to question the practitioner. They realise that the 
psychotherapeutic relationship is comparable with that of a novitiate and their Inentor 
but choose to see this as entirely negative. Psychotherapy is a conversion process 
\yhere one intentionally enters a place and a relationship with the expectation that 
one \yill change. and not haye the same views as when first having sought therapy. 
:'\0 one forces you into therapy, you make a decision and you do the work. 
There have been manv themes within this chapter which have parallels with 
religions: professional training, hierarchy, power, construction, sacred space, time 
and ritual to name a few but the parallels run luore deeply than these. 
All of the above exemplifies a tradition which functions as if it exists in a vacuum 
and yet it has been entirely constructed as part of a wider systeln which has particular 
use for such traditions. For example, in our culture to hear voices in ones head would 
200 Vitz.P.C.( 1977) Psn1]()/ogy as Religion: The Cult of Self Worship. Lion Publ~s!1ing. England. 
201 \1asson.J. \ I.( 1988) Against Therapy. Harper Collins. London Paper Back EditIOn (1993) In 
conversation with feminist scholars of religion and of psychotherapy I have encountered a good deal 
of criticism for being pro-Freud and been invited to justify my views on Freud. 
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be \\l)rthy of l11edication whilst another culture n1ay regard this as wisdOlll. The cure 
() r selU Is depends on what the wider group believe an unwell soul to be: l11ental health 
~llH.i ho\\' this is achieved is decided by the dOlllinant culture. Mental illness is not 
fixed what \vas once regarded as madness Inay no longer be so viewed. 2021f Inental 
i llness ~lnd its cure are constructed then so are the institutions, the ways of training, 
the buildings and the \vay that they arc used right down to the furniture, couch or 
chairs, tissues or not: each ofthesc has arisen fron1 expectations of the dOlninant 
culture and as such constructed for a particular purpose. This purpose 111ay not be 
obvillus, Ho\vever. our social. econolnic and political institutions are still in1111ersed 
in Judeo-Christian traditions such that cvcn the 1110St ardent atheist cannot deny 
kno\\ledge of Biblical prescriptions and cven the Lord's Prayer. Our architecture 
aisll reflects this and skyli nes are testilnony to this Christian legacy and yet the denial 
of such influence as intrinsic to who we are, is ongoing in psychotherapy. The words, 
~estures and expert knowledge of the psychodynmnic practitioner echo those of a 
reli~ious paradign1, In our o\vn culture this, even with such cultural and therefore 
religious diyersity, is a Christian n10del, which itself was based on the model of the 
Ron1an ci\-ic forun1. The structure of the psychodynamic tradition relies on 
adherence to the \\'ork of the "high priest' Freud who saw himself as responsible for 
relie\'ing the suffering of the n1asses. Psychodynmnic psychotherapy still relies on 
Freud to justify its existence as an elite church albeit with different orders. Freud's 
detem1ination to control what psychoanalysis was and would become, by choosing 
those \\'ho \\'ould do as he wanted as his successors, has been adhered to. He chose 
people \\'ho \\'oldd not risk heresy and thus excommunication and so his tradition is 
n1aintained. The front runners in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy 
today still reflect Freud's resistance to things religious. Below is an exploration of 
the strategies which each has developed to avoid acknowledging their activity as 
religious. 
202 An example of how madness and the treatments for it have evolved would be that of Viv,ian Elliot 
the \\-ife ofT.S. Elliot He had her 'sectioned' for what would now be regarded as PMT. TIllS was less 
than 100 years ago. 
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Chapter Three (ii): Contemporary Psychodynamic Psychotherapy. 
~~), \\herc does psychoanalysis and, therefore, subsequent psychodynamic psychotherapy 
belong'.) .-\s we shall scc, about this there is 1 ittle consensus. 
Tho:;c who l'onsider themseh'es to be serious actors in psychoanalytic affairs continue to 
di:;~1gxl't:' about the naturt' of the psychoanalytic enterprise, 2()] 
.-\lthough there is no consensus about where psychoanalysis and indeed 
psychotherapy belong there is consensus about where it does not belong. This gives 
us ~l starting point for dill1ination. The biggest area of resistance within 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy is to the n1etaphysical. With so much 
dis~lgreen1ent about \\hat psychoanalysis is, it would naturally follow that it would be 
difficult to loc~lte. To \\'hich discipline does it really belong? The majority of 
psychoanalysts \vould still clain1 that it has a place in the sciences. However, the 
an1biguous nature of the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic enterprise has been, 
since its conception, and continues to be the subject of debate. Both insiders and 
outsiders engage in this debate. However, the reason for psychoanalysts' resistance 
to the n1etaphysical sten1S froin Freud, whose criticism of religion is well known. To 
criticise religion has been part of what it is to be a Freudian. To accoinmodate 
religion requires criticism of Freud. Adam Phillips claims: 
\\"hen Freud insisted that psychoanalysis had nothing to do with ethical inquiry, was not in 
the business of moral-world making or of providing a new Weltanschauung, he was trying to 
dissociate himself from the Judaism of his forefathers, and trying to dissociate 
psychoanalysis from any connection with religion (or mysticism). If psychoanalysis had been 
compatible \\'ith traditional religious belief it would lose its scientific credibility and its 
apparent originality. But one is only absolutely original, of course, until one is found out. 204 
In this Phillips implies that psychoanalysis has now been 'found out'. Freud's need 
to be recognised as a scientist led him to deny things which psychoanalysis was 
concerned \\'ith which did not fit a scientific paradigin. For example, his 
uni\'ersalising all things religious as psychological disorder has, as we shall see, had 
significant repercussions. This stance, although no longer necessary, is difficult to 
reverse without appearing to reject Freud. Denying religion and the mystical has 
caused untold damage throughout the history of psychoanalysis, given their own 
adage "the past is always in the present". Such denial continues to cause difficulties 
203 Fisher.S, Greenberg.R.P. (1996) Freud Scientifically Reappraised: Testing the Theories and 
Therapy. Wiley and Sons,Inc. New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore. pI 
2fJ4 Phillips. A. (1994) On Flirtation ,Faber and Faber. London. p 138 
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It __ H' cnnteillporary psychotherapists. That their founder was detern1ined to dissociate 
hilllSd r and his \\'ork fron1 any forn1 of religion or mysticism remains problematic. 
That psychoanalysis has nothing to do with "ethical enquiry" or "luoral-world 
111aking" is of course untrue as, in Freud's own words, it is in the business of 
alkyiating suffering. Orbach clain1s it was Freud's intention that: 
psychoanalysis as a dinical practice is about transforming hysteria into ordinary human 
\\'hat could be 1110re n10ral \\'orld-n1aking than this? Suffering, in the shape of 
"ordinary hlllllan n1isery". is a reaction to those issues arising from ethics and morals 
prescribed by the cultures \\'hich we inhabit. Freud was aware that psychoanalysis 
had the potential to transfonn hun1an suffering, and believed that everyone could 
benefit f1'o111 it. Psychoanalysis was not exclusively for the ill, rather Freud believed 
that the hlullan condition \yas one of inherent sickness which was just a luatter of 
degree. Orbach's stress on the benefits of "clinical practice" comes more from her 
o\\'n need to n1aintai11 the professionalism of psychoanalytic psychotherapy (which is 
ho\v she describes her own practice) and she iluplies that the transfonnation which 
psychoanalysis or psychotherapy can facilitate is only available in a clinical setting. 
This has been sho\vn not to be the case because free association, one of the main 
tools of psychoanalysis, has different areas of application. The "Freudian pair,,206 
111ay be exclusi\'e to the psychotherapy encounter but the act of free association can 
happen at any time with therapeutic effects. The point about Orbach perpetuating the 
clinical aspect of psychoanalysis is itself moral-world making, in that, it is clinging 
to and promoting their alleged scientific status in an attempt to keep them securely 
out \\'ith the metaphysical realm. Both Orbach and Phillips draw different 
conclusions from Freud's beliefs. Phillips that psychoanalysis has been "found out" 
and is not the science which Freud advocated. Orbach on the other hand in stressing 
"clinical practice" maintains the scientific facade. If psychoanalysis has been 'found 
out '\\'hat have they been found to be? Phillips, Orbach, Bollas and Coltart each have 
tried to relocate psychoanalysis without, as yet, any real satisfaction. 
The dissociation from, and condemnation of, religious beliefs has been hannful to 
psychotherapy and a change of attitude by luany practitioners will be necessary 
205 Orbach.S.(l999) Towards Emotional Literacy. Women's Press. London. p231 . 
206 Bollas. C. (2002) Ideas in Psychoanalysis: Free Association. Icon Books. Cambndge. England. 
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betlwe religion becon1es acceptable. The han11 caused is that of the continued denial 
and repression of religion, a state which psychoanalysts clailn is psychopathological. 
The ~lttitude \\ithin the psychotherapeutic con1n1unity towards religion cannot be 
generalised but there still cxists a good deal of suspicion based on Freud's early 
c lain1s. The continued denial of the con1n10n ground of psychotherapy with religion, 
~lnd the resistance to engage with the Inystical aspects of their work is only now 
beginning to be addressed and the over elnphasis of scientific aspects of their work is 
under question. Thc potential loss of the scientific status of psychoanalysis and 
subsequently of psychodynan1ic psychotherapies continues to cause tension. 
Today the suspicion of religion held by practitioners is largely to do with religious 
institutions, rather than Freud's original presupposition of religious belief as 
pathological. Ho\vever, as \ve shall see, Freud's views remain an underlying 
n10tivation for the resistance of contelnporary psychotherapists to things religious. It 
would appear fron1 the n10st recent literature and from conversations with 
practitioners that son1e find the notion of spirituality accessible and are beginning to 
Inake space for this. That organised religion is still met with resistance is not only to 
do \vith Freud's vie\ys but echoes the wave of resistance in contemporary attitudes 
to\vards organised religion generally and Christianity specifically. It is often implied 
that to be religious is to be un-evolved, a belief not lost on Freudians. Psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy did not evolve in a vacuum and are products of their social, 
politicaL and economic environments and as such are tacitly infonned by each. 
That the psychotherapeutic community has been dOgInatic in its views about religion 
is not surprising and yet the idea of dogtnatism itself would be abhorrent to them. It 
has been their raison d' etre to question orthodoxy and doglna. In fact they have been 
described as anti culture in their persistence to counter these dominant cultures which 
the\' reaard as the source of many patients' problems. Freud, although using _ b 
religious analogies, albeit ironically, appeared unaware that he was creating a creed 
\\'hich people would come to adhere to in a similar way to those creeds upon which 
thev came to him to be released from. However, he was a very clever Inan, and in 
this view I think he is underestimated. Phillips has this to say: 
Despite Freud· s disclaimers, psychoanalysis has ~~ways ?e.en abo~t what it m2~~ns to get 
bogged dO\\J1 in tradition, whether personaL famIlIal, relIgIOUS or mtellectual . 
207 Phillips. (1994) 011 Flirtation. p 139 
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Psychoanalysts neC'd to look at the traditions in which they have becon1e "bogged 
d(l\\'n ". By \'irtuC' of being "bogged down" psychotherapists are blind to things which 
llthers \\'ith distance can see. Psychotherapists spend their til11e helping to sort out 
other people's difficulties and belie\'ing that they can see them with a kind of clarity 
\vhich the client cannot. It is part of the hm11an condition that, however l11uch we 
desire it. \\c wi 11 ne\'er See oursel\'C's as others do. 
Fisher and Greenberg ha\'e \\Titten on the an1biguity and polarisation of thought 
\\'ithin the psychoanalytic tradition. One of the n10st revisited questions is where 
psychoanalysis should be located. This continues because practitioners are human 
bein~s first and need to know that they belong. Freud until recently held enough 
PO\\'cT to keep the \\'aters l11uddied. Freud's prescription that psychoanalysis should 
bdon~ to the psychological sciences kept his followers committed to his ideal. In his 
fmllo11s recordin~ of 1939. already n1entioned above, he states this unequivocally. 
This has n1ade it difficult for Freudians to debate without seeming to topple Freud. 
HO\YeYeL the notion of \\'hat is scientific and the change in this since Freud (not least 
because of hin1) needs exploration beyond this dissertation. 208 The psychotherapist 
let alone the Freudian CalIDOt function without the psychoanalytic l110del as Freud 
had to. Psychoanalysis has become such an integral part of acadel11ic enquiry as well 
as con1mon currency that \\'e forget that it is there. 
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are now regarded as multidisciplinary and given 
this. it is ironic that its scientific aspects would have held such status for so long. 
There are contel11porary practitioners beginning to challenge, and therefore, 
deconstruct the scientific myth. For eXal11ple, Adam Phillips asks: 
Why is so much science needed?209 
He not only challenges their scientific status, but seeks to relocate psychoanalysis, 
for example: 
In the language schools that are called psychoanalytic training institutions ther~ are forlorn 
attempts to purify the dialect of the tribe, but psychoanalytic .writin~ (~nd practIce) of every. 
persuasion still sounds a bit like religion, a bit like metaphYSICS, a bIt lIke an~hr~pology, ~1~It 
like science. And a bit like what was still in the earlier days of psychoanalysIs, lIterature. 
208 There have been many comparisons of religion and physics and more recently between nuclear 
physics and spirituality 
~()() Phillips. (1994) On Flirtation. . .. 
210 Phillips.A. (2000). Promises Promises. Faber and Faber. pX111 
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.\s Phillips states, science has been one aspect of the psychoanalytic exercise and yet 
its PO\VCT is still \yielded today. To n1ake a happy synthesis of all of these bits would 
be no l11ean feat and as yet has not been possible. As Phillips states, the training 
analyst is undergoing a process of learning a new language. Psychoanalysis however, 
~lS he points out, uses 111any. The language of psychoanalysis is therefore a hybrid, (a 
notion \yhich I explore below). Psychoanalysis has not historically, as one lTIay 
expect. borrowcd its languagc exclusively fro111 anyone discipline. For example, 
given its clain1 as science, one n1ight assun1e that its language would be dominated 
by this. This is not the case. However, it does borrow a good deal from the 
hlll11anities, and in particular fron1 religion. 
\Yhen the training analyst is qualified they go forth and train their patients in their 
chosen language. This language can develop into different dialects ranging frOlTI 
Freudian to Lacanian. Such hybridisation is not, yet, welcome in psychoanalysis, 
although widely practised. Hybrids are often frowned upon. For example, someone 
who adopts a n1id-Atlantic drawl, a hybrid of British and American English, is 
regarded "'ith disdain and sOlTIewhat fraudulent. The issue which underlies this is 
ultin1ately to do \vith purisn1, a not too distant relation of fundamentalism which with 
its n10dem usage is politically incorrect and as such undesirable. We seem unable to 
see that our \vholesale condelTInation of fundamentalism is itself an act of 
fundamentalism. 
\\'hilst I am on the terrain of fundamentalislTI, it is apparent from various 
contemporary texts that this multidisciplinary subject appears to be relatively at 
home with all but its religious aspects. Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic 
practitioners have had to untangle their own beliefs from those prescribed by Freud. 
Freud v;as not only an atheist but held an anti religious stance, famously regarding it 
as a pathological state, an "obsessional neurosis,,211 which ought to be cured. Today 
psychoanalysis exists in a very different cultural context to that of its founder. This 
point must be taken into account for the sake of its development. 
At a recent seminar on "Psychoanalysis and Creativity" it was evident from the 
participants' confusion that psychoanalysis, as Orbach states, has yet to find a home. 
211 Freud. S. (1912-13) Totem and Taboo. This text is devoted to the pathological state that he believes 
religion is. 
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Rl)bin Hollo\yay, a conlposer, Christopher Bollas a psychoanalyst, Susan Hillier an 
artist and Blake Morrison a writer, were engaged in a debate about what free 
association 111eans within each of their fields. None was willing to situate 
psychoanalysis. Holloway argued that psychoanalysis could not privilege free 
~lssociation, as it is what \ye all do every day. He, in struggling to locate 
psychoanalysis, stated, "the art or science or whatever psychoanalysis is ... ,,212. 
Bollas countered Holloway on the exclusive type of free association in 
psychoanalysis by arguing that the ""Freudian Pair" engage in a type of free 
~lssociation \yhich differs fronl that of everyday life. Each had a view of what 
psychoanalysis and free association nleant, which was peculiar to the individual, a 
fact which nlakcs its location nlore difficult to find. Perhaps the answer lies in 
cchoing the subject. In so t~lr as psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are 
nlultidisciplinary it Inay be useful to allow 111ulti-homes and cease trying to pin it 
do\yn. 
It has taken a long time for Freudians to challenge Freud's views on religion and to 
counter thenl \yill take e\'en longer. The tradition that psychoanalysis has become has 
relied on its folIc-)\yers having a particular, ahnost evangelical, relationship to Freud, 
and the psychoanalytic moyement. Those practitioners, who have begun to explore 
the positiye aspects of religion, still do so with some trepidation, because implied in 
their challenge must be a rejection of Freud's views. This behaviour by practitioners 
is sinlilar to that of disciples. If they were scientists there would be no problem with 
such a challenge. in fact on the contrary it would be expected. 
Freud's anti religious views could not prevent his movement developing in a certain 
direction, as Phillips states: 
Psychoanalysis is the only religion in which you are not allowed to believe in GOd.
213 
In this he is of course incorrect. For example, Buddhism has no God and is still 
regarded by most as a religion (although some prefer to call it a philosophy). As 
discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation religion has been defined by many 
scholars in many ways. However, in applying Wittgenstein's idea of family 
resemblance it is easy to see the features, or family connections between religion and 
212 The seminar, 'Being Creative' was on the nature of 'Free Association'. 10103/02 Bmnel Gallery 
SOAS London. 
213 Phillips (1994) 
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psychotherapy. The paradox of psychoanalysis or psychotherapy as religion is that 
each has beconle that \\'hich it sought to usurp. Freud's condemnation of religion was 
protestation too Inuch. If as Phillips states: 
psychoanalysis is the only religion in which you are not allowed to believe in God 
This is a step in the right direction. Whilst Phillips is not yet welcoming this attribute 
his statelnent gi\'es little away about what he feels if psychoanalysis is such a 
religion. Freud and his fo11o\\'ers arc as overtly religiously faithful to their atheism as 
they are co\'ertly religiously faithful to their Freudianisn1. 
1 f one of Freud's patients had con1e to hinl with those attitudes which he himself 
displayed to\\'ards religion, Freud's notes would Inake interesting reading. We know 
little really, although there is nluch conjecture, about his early religious life and 
although brought up in a fan1ily of Jews his early care, as noted, was with a Catholic 
nanny. Freud clailned to be a non practising Jew and yet he sought out a Jewish wife 
and his children were brought up as Jews and none married a gentile. Freud argued 
that he \\as culturally a Jew, a distinction which is difficult to imagine without 
assllllling that he \yas a Zionist21 -+. Such a separation between culture and religion is 
impossible to n1ake, eyen if desirable. For exalTIple, those of us born and living in the 
\\est \yhether claiming to be atheists or not can, as noted above,215 recite the Lord's 
Pra yer and could not fail to be impressed by skylines punctuated by Christian 
archi tecture. 
From this \ye can at best hypothesise that the messages to Freud about religion were 
mixed and in his adulthood he was still confused by them. It would be reductionist to 
claim that Freud's attitude to religion arose merely from his desperation for success 
in the sciences: rather the real source of Freud's disdain for religion will remain 
obscure. Freud's views of other disciplines, for example, those named in Phillips 
above. \\ere not granted the same disdain and yet are equally un-scientific, in that all 
rely on subjectivity, the arch-enemy of science. Freud was often inspired by 
literature, in particular poetry. However, this inspiration did not lead hilTI to believe 
that psychoanalysis itself belonged to the arts. Some practitioners, in an attempt to 
214 Bakan. D. (1959) Bakan claims that Freud was an honorary member ofa Zionist group. But it does 
not follow that Freud was an active Zionist.p49 
215 
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acknowledge the atllbiguity of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, have had little 
difticulty in conlparing thenlSelycs with the arts. For exaluple: 
Thc.'Sl' days, when ."l' arl' not b~ing told tl~at psychoanalysis is not a science, we are, perhaps 
llllSUlVnslllgly, belllg told that It IS an art.- 16 
\\Thilst Phillips hinlsdf is not c0l11paring what he does to art he is aware that there is 
such cl1nlparison being l11ade elsewhere. Phillips and Sulloway, an10ng others, clailu 
that Freud hil11SC\f \yas confused as to what hc was and where he belonged. Freud 
during one of his l11any til11es of doubt, as noted, declared hin1self an "adventurer", 
and a "cl1nquistador", denying that he was a nlan of science at all. However, written 
evidence poi nts to the t~lct that Freud's personal confusion about what he was never 
preYented hinl frOlll continuing to c lainl psychoanalysis as a science. 
~ letaphysics, anthropology and literature have continued to have luore credibility in 
the psyc hotherapeutic conlnlunity, than has religion. More often than not when 
conlparison \\"ith religion is risked the connotations are negative. For eXaIuple, 
Phillips states: 
But ,,,hen psychoanalysts spend too much time with each other, they start believing in 
psychoanalysis. Thl'Y begin to talk knowingly, like members of a religious cult217 • 
Lest we are lulled into a sense of Phillips as happy with psychoanalysis as religion 
his use of the \yord "cult" illustrates that he sees this as negative and shows he 
belieycs that it can be dangerous for psychoanalysts to show such belief and this is 
important because psychoanalysis survives as a pseudo-science by this kind of 
denial. The fact that prior to their getting together this particular group had not 
already in\'ested in and cOlumitted to the belief system of psychoanalysis is over 
looked. Phillips' comparison of analysts to luembers of a religious cult is clearly not 
intended to be flattering rather it marginalizes them with its mocking, condescending 
tone. Cults are a whole area worthy of study but suffice it to say that when cult is 
used as an analogy it is rarely as a positive example2J8. According to Phillips, that 
psychoanalysis should be regarded as a cult was one of Freud's fears, a fear, which 
could be argued, has been transferred to his followers: 
It ,"as important to Freud that psychoanalysis should not become a cult of the irrational. 219 
216 Phillips. (2000) pl. 
217 Phillips. A. (1995) Terrors and Experts. Faber and Faber. pxvi 
218 Eileen Barker (BASR conference SOAS 2000) gave a paper which was the result of many years 
researching cults and noted that those who are anti and antagonistic towards cults behave in ways 
which are far worse than those that they accuse and condemn. 
219 Phillips.(1995) p 18. 
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Phillips although unhappy with the idea of psychoanalysis as either science or ali 
none the kss bdieY(,s that it should be: 
1 neated Sl1ll1('whl'rL' bl't\\el'n literature and science, psychoanalysis can begin to look like a 
le~itimate and intel1i~ible social practice - not so much a mystery for initiates but a skill that 
can be learned, with real rules and a body of knowledge. 220 
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are a "nlystery for initiates" and it is this which 
they need to enlphasise and deYdop. In addition Phillips fear of association with 
religion is inlplied in his denial of the nlystery and his clainl of "rules" and a secure 
"body (I f knowledge" sounds sonle\\"hat institutional and dogl11atic. Elsewhere 
Phillips suggests that psychoanalysis would be better placed in the field of 
pheno111ello l(1gy~~ 1. Ironically Phillips' resistance results in del110nstrating those 
qualities whie h he is dete1111ined to argue out of psychoanalysis. Christopher Bollas, 
a contel11porary of Phi llips, appears to enlbrace the 111ystery of psychoanalysis as the 
title (If his book; The J/ysteJ)' of Things would lead us to believe. He seems not to see 
l11ystery ~1S an obstacle. \\"hich Phillips clainls it could be. Bollas regards l11ystery as 
where the riches of the psychoanalytic encounter lie and sees it as essential to the 
transfol111atiYe process~~~. However, his attitude to religion and the spiritual is not 
included in his embrace of mystery. 
Orbach, like Phillips, in an attel11pt to demystify psychotherapy, claims: 
Psychoanalyti~JJractice has roots in neurology, psychiatry, psychology and philosophy, but a 
home in none. ~-.' 
.--\.1so like Phillips she is flexible about the home of psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy as elsewhere she claims it as an art form comparing it to sculpture. 224 
In fact each author who tries to define where psychoanalysis and psychotherapy 
belong. as part of this process, seem to change their minds. Echoing the nature of that 
\\-hich they are trying to define, a subject which has many homes and which is 
indefinable due to its subjective, dynamic nature. Each is selective in their reading of 
Freud as to \\-here the roots of psychoanalysis were. Phillips is less fearful of the 
subjective areas. Orbach in emphasising the clinical locates it more firmly in the 
medical sciences. 
no 'b'd 18 -- IIp 
221 Phillips.( 1994). 
222 Bollas.(2000) _ 
223 Orbach. S_ (1999) Towards Emotional Litr!mc)'_ Women's Press. London.p227 
22~ Orbach. S. (1999) The flllpossibili~)i of Sex. Penguin. London. 
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~either Orbach nor Phillips could be regarded as practitioners who embrace religion. 
HO\\l'\,er, there arc other contenlporary practitioners and theorists who appear nlore 
\\,1111 ng to nlo\'e beyond suspicion, the Inost enduring legacy of Freud, and 
i n\e~tigatc nlore fully the relationship which psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have 
\\'ith religion. Not seeing it as threatening, they are luore able to accept that there is 
Inuch about psychoanalysis and the language it uses to describe both the luoveluent 
and \\'hat they do, \\'hich o\'erlaps \\'ith religion. This applies to the institutional 
structure of psychoanalysis, \"hich parallels that of nlany religious institutions, as 
\\e 11 as th(' actual process of therapy \\'hich when deconstructed shows a sinlilar 
process to that of religious con"ersion. Neville SYll1ington is one such practitioner. 
SYlnington's The Blind l\1on Sees lists the criteria which he believes founders of 
religions go through. They are as follows, "blindness; awakening; struggle; 
enlightennlent; gathering of followers; the founding of an institution.,,225 It is not 
difficult to see this process in Freud although not necessarily in the order Sytnington 
posits. He nlakes a distinction between revealed religion and natural religion, 
concluding that psychoanalysis is indeed a natural religion but has yet to accept 
this~~('. His belief is that a natural religion has: 
the implicit \-ie\\ that the meaning of life is to be found in a reality which is beyond the 
ObI ~~7 tangl e--. 
Although he is correct in naluing psychoanalysis as a natural religion, if it is to be 
religion at all. his comparison does not account for the commitment and conformity 
shown b\" Freud's follo\\'ers which are more indicative of a revealed tradition. 
S)111ington in acknowledging that psychoanalysis would be richer by accepting this 
is taking the risk that others have not. Psychoanalysis whilst being in the business of 
conversion, or as Symington prefers to call it "awakening,,228, has not yet 
experienced its own awakening. 
As noted, although psychoanalysis has been described as a science since its 
conception it has had to struggle to maintain this place. For Freud the difficulties 
\'"ere peculiar to him, his time and place. Freud had enough credibility as a luan of 
the medical sciences to make his unorthodox ideas appear scientific enough to be 
225 Symington. N. (2004) The Blind Man Sees: Freud's Awakening and Other Essays. Karnac. 
London.p2 
226 ibid P 164 
~~7 I . 
-- OC.CIt. 
228 Ibid p2 
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~ll'l'epted by nlany as orthodox. However. his own suggestion that lay people could 
just as effectively becOIne psychoanalysts, as could nledical practitioners, opened 
psychoanalysis up to further criticisnl frolll the scientific world. This was a 
si~ni ticant shift for psyc hoanalysis and its practitioners now bridge many disciplines 
out \vith nledicine. There is, none the less, still a hierarchy which is supported by our 
cultural yie\VS of nledicine. \Vhilst l11any non nledical, contenlporary, psychoanalysts 
re~ard ,,-hat they do as science, for others, as denlonstrated above, the boundaries 
h~lYC beCCllne unclear. :--\s is often the case, the discrepancy between theory and 
practice is evident in psyc hothcrapy. In theory there are those who resist any notion 
of psyc hoanalysis as anything other than science. However, in conversation with 
practitioners. it appears that there is nluch ll10re acceptance of its mystery than theory 
\vollld le~ld us to belieye. 
In Freud's tillle it was de rigueur if one was a scientist to reject, or at least to be seen 
to reject. that \vhich \yas regarded as the opposition, religion. Thus Freud, as a 
nlode1l1ist. \vas not exceptional in his response to religion, and his original followers 
accepted that this \\'as indeed the case, and have perpetuated this idea in his name. 
(Those such as Carl Jung \\'ho questioned this were dismissed) Their determination 
\vas given illlpetus by their need to please the founder and honour his beliefs as well 
as their o\\'n need to be regarded with the status which science could afford them. 
Pm1 of this legacy has been that there have been followers who, like Freud, have 
resisted looking at the whole process, selecting areas which would fit their particular 
needs. and in so doing omitting aspects which do not sit comfortably with the 
scientific. 
Freud's anti -religiousness did not prevent him from using its signifiers. He often 
used religious language when other languages proved inadequate. So what did this 
lnean? Like religion psychoanalysis has become so much a part of our ilnplicit 
culture that one would be pushed to realise just how often we call upon its language 
in order to criticise it. Was this the case for Freud? Was it that religion (both Jewish 
and Christian) was such an implicit part of his culture that it was inevitable that he 
would borrow from it. not only to condemn it but to best describe what he regarded 
as its cure ~ psychoanalysis. Freud's critics suffer a similar dilemma in that they 
often use psychoanalytic language and method in an effort to unseat Freud. Richard 
Webster (1996) is a good example of the pot calling the kettle black! 
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Gi\'Cl1 Freud's idea that those things which we resist 1110st are the things which we 
\\'ant the 1110st it is difficult to believe that he regarded his reliance on religious 
bnguagc as sin1ply ironic. It is true that when Freud used religious language it was 
often \\'ith condescension or irony. However, there were til11es when Freud used it in 
a COl11plil11entary way. For cxan1ple, in his correspondence with lung he describes 
hill1Sdf ~lS l\ loses and lung as 1 oshua. 22l) Given his relationship with lung at this time 
such cOl11parison was intended as flattery. In this he is willing to override his 
abholTence of religion in t~l\'our of considering his own status as comparable to that 
of a l11essianic figure such as Moses. Freud's rej ection of religion lived in parallel to 
his borro\\'ing frol11 it which adds to the confusion for his followers. 
It \\'ould be foolish not to note that in psychoanalysis and psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, there is a continuing scientific debate which relies on their resistance 
to being allied to religion. Science and religion have long since been held with the 
saI11e polarity as day and night and yet it is their reliance on this polarity which 
111akes the other significantly different. Their dissonance only exists in the light of 
the other. It appears that if psychoanalysis and psychotherapy do not fit neatly into 
the scientific n10deL implied in this is that they 111USt belong to another model. If this 
other n10del is the arts then implied in this is the notion that psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy are anti science and as such regarded as subjective. Not necessarily an 
accurate appraisal, just an opportunity to note that there is a deficiency in the 
paradignls \\'hich are currently available and that without proof and objectivity it is 
difficult to hold a place in a scientific paradigm. The question of proof frequently 
arises in psychoanalysis as the nature of the psychotherapeutic encounter means that 
anecdotal information is what is available and does not count as it is too subjective, 
i. e. not repeatable. 
The fight to be recognised as science is still apparent but some are less strident than 
others. For example, the most striking change is in becoming open to the mysterious 
aspects of their work and Bollas is one example. Although not yet prepared to 
celebrate this, the fact that their resistance to it is softening is significant. It at least 
signals that psychoanalysis and psychotherapies are willing to challenge and revise 
229 McGuire.(1991).[I25 FJ pI33. 
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ideas \yhich where fundan1ental to their founder. It is a sign ofn1aturity that 
psychotherapists arc taking these steps. 
Christopher Bollas in his exploration of the n1ystery of psychoanalysis is less fearful 
of subjectivity than Inany. Note he does not call it n1ystical! Bollas approaches 
mystery by dra\\ing upon literary sources. Shakespeare, for eXaInple: 
... so \Ye'llliye, 
.\nd pray, and sing, and tell old tail's, ~1l1d laugh 
:\t t'-iklc:'d butterflies. and hear poor rogues 
Talk of l'Ourt I1e\\S; and \\l' 'II talk with them too-
\\'ho loses and \\ho wins, \\ho 's in, \\ho's out-
.-\nd take upon' s the mystery of things 
.-\s if \ye \\ere God's spies ... 
(King Lear, .\l't V, SL'l'I1l' 3 )~1(l 
Is his infc:rence that psychoanalysts are God's spies? 
Although Bo lIas is interested in the n1ystery of things he does not talk of religion, in 
bct the absence of religion fron1 the index of his book is glaringly obvious. Rather 
he n1akes a suggestion about spirit which is interesting, but, serves to highlight the 
absence of religion in his work: 
In another essay I suggest that under special circumstances the term 'spirit' should be 
introduced into psychoanalysis. even though there would be many objections to a term laden 
\Yith pre-psychoanalytic meanings. If, however, we understand spirit as the expressive 
moyement of an indiyidual 's idiom through the course of his or her life, we may say that 
eae h of us is a spirit. and that we have spiritual effects upon others - who will indeed carry us 
as such within themselyes. and we in tum will be inhabited by the spirits of others. Spirit is 
not the same as an intemal representation although it does, I think, come very close to what 
\\e mean by an intemal object: something deeper, more complex, beyond representation, yet 
J" 1 there. --' 
Here Bollas is sneaking religion in by the back door. His need to qualify his use of 
the word "spirit", by permitting its use only "under special circumstances", illustrates 
the degree of resistance which he anticipates from the psychoanalytic community to 
an] 1hing related to religion. It seems absurd that this should be regarded as a 
significant step but Bollas clearly believes that he taking a risk here. 
:\Jina Coltart compares psychoanalysis to Buddhism and is open to the influence of 
world religions on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. She appears to have worked 
through her own resistance to the idea that psychoanalysis itself has parallels with 
religious traditions. However, as we shall see, she still has her blind spots. She cites 
230 Bollas.(1999) Pre contents page. 
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an early psychoanalyst, \Vilfred Bion as one of her n1entors who was an advocate of 
1:11th: 
.\ term that would l'\.prl'SS appro\.imately \yhat I need to express is 'faith' - faith that there is 
an ultimate reality and truth - the unknown, unknowable, 'formless infinite '. This must be 
belieyed of en.'ry object of \\hich the personality can be aware ... 232 
Bion's USC cd' L1ith is qualified: 
To return to the act of faith. I found that Bion IIses this phrase and by it intends to signify the 
most highly desirable stance of the psychoanalyst. He says that the act of faith is peculiar to 
scientific procedure and must be distinguished from the religious meaning with which it is 
im t' s tc'd in common usage 233. '-
In reading Bion's c)\\"n \\'ords one would be forgiven if one had believed hin1 to be a 
theologian. Scientists need to kno\\' what the unknowable is and it is their constant 
pursuit to find this out. Bion in ad\'ocating that psychoanalysts lean1 "sitting with the 
not kno\Ying":-'4 is in\'iting then1 to do son1ething alien to nlost scientists. However, 
psychoanalysts are not scientist and Bion's idea has been adopted and has proved to 
be a yaluable analytic tool. Like the priest the psychoanalyst has no choice but to 
accept the 111ystery of things. Interestingly, as is lnost often the case, when trying to 
describe the intluential characters in psychotherapy religious analogies are sought. 
Coltart herself describes Bion: 
probably a mystic and a genius235. 
Freud also took risks by challenging the notion of what constituted science at the 
time: 
People did not believe in my facts and thought my theories unsavoury ... resistance was 
strong ... in the end I succeeded236 
Contemporary practitioners must do the SaIne and take risks - leaps of faith. 
As noted in chapter one Freud was a product of his time and his past. He, as we all 
are, \"as dri,"en not only by his individual circumstances but by the social, political, 
economic. and psychological climate of his time and his theories reflect his attitudes, 
born of these cumulative traditions. The difference in values between those of 
Freud's time and those of now are responsible for SOlne of the tension in 
psychoanalytic circles today. Freud's beliefs have to be seen as a reflection of, or a 
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b~ll'klash to, his 0\\,11 clinlatc. To l11akc the necessary challenges to Freud theorists 
nlust let go () f hinl enough to criticise effectively the very thing which has been their 
Inain source of inspiration - Freud. 
The negati\'c "ie\\'s \\'hich Freud had of religion litter his correspondence and his 
theories. As noted above his followers have continued in this vain. The current 
~\'~l111ples of psychoanalytic and psychodynanlic writings in which there is a 
s()ftening of previously held dognlatic attitudes towards religion, are in tune with 
post nlodern beliefs \\'hich attenlpt to counter dognlatisl11. Views held by 
psychoanalysts and psychod)llanlic psychotherapists about religion have until 
recel1tly. in the nlain, echoed those of their founder. However, the field is further 
conlplicated by accusations frol11 outsiders that psychotherapy itself is nothing Inore 
than a pseudo religion \\'hich serves to put the insider on the defensive and in so 
doing battle all the 1110re to be anything other than religious. Such accusations of 
bcing pseudo religious pose sinlilar difficulties to those arising from being accused 
of being pseudo scientific. These accusations, this condescension, has exacerbated 
the e\. isting resistance to religion, in giving psychotherapies a greater incentive to be 
an) 1hing other than associated with religion. 
Freud and his contemporaries have left today's psychoanalysts and psychodynamic 
psychotherapists in a difficult position. With tensions to resolve, or if not resolve, to 
nlanage, \\"hich must show on the one hand their allegiance to Freud, i.e. by showing 
that their o\\'n beliefs in some way reflect his, whilst at the same time evolving to 
accOlnmodate contemporary cultures. Freud, a product of modernity, a man at home 
\\-ith grand theories, meta-narratives, and a belief that science would overcome the 
questions which religion had failed to answer, is still present in psychoanalysis 
today. Contemporary psychodynamic practitioners have, in some way, to develop or 
interpret those theories of Freud, born of and as such steeped in modernity, in such a 
way as to reflect the current cultural climate in which psychotherapies exist. This at 
times entails a hybridisation of ideas from each era, which is problematic. To Inake 
matters worse in a post modem age, it is even inaccurate to use the word "era" as if 
they are describable, or definable. 
Whether psychoanalysis can or wants to claim a place in science is still an issue for 
theorists today. Those intent on arguing that psychoanalysis is best placed in science 
91 
nHlst find ways of e:\.panding the notion of what science is237 to nlake a viable clailTI. 
This requires being seen to be abreast of contelTIpOrary thought. 'Being seen to be' is 
a key issue, in that Freud's own need was 'being seen to be' - as opposed to 
produl'ing the proof requested of hinl, and continues to be requested of his followers 
t()lby. F('Il' e:\'~lnlplc, 1\ learns and Thorne, both person-centred practitioners, in the 
ll)SO's in\'ited psychodyn~l1nic practitioners to produce proof of their 
findings. 23\ They are no doubt sti 11 \\'aiting). 
The pro()f required to secure a place in science is not available fr0111 a subject where 
the- interaction oft\\'o hUlnan beings is not reproducible or objective. Finding ways of 
e:\.tending the boundaries of \\'hat is scientific to ways which acconlnl0date the 
subjectivity of the encounter \vhilst acknowledging the techniques as reproducible, 
are key aspects of the psychodynanlic enterprise. For example, Stephen Frosh claims 
that psychoanalysis is scie-ntific on the one hand, but acknowledges that it also 
"." .involves ~1 shift in feeling". Frosh clainls that the unconventionality of 
psychoanalysis lnay sen'e to illunlinate science rather than work against it as is often 
ar~ued: 
Psychoanalysis is 'a specialist science. a branch of psychology' dealing, it is true, with the 
"mental fiC' ld' but in so doing extending the reach of science, rather than betraying it. 239 
Rather than accept that psychoanalysis is not a science he continues to "extend" what 
constitutes science by claiming that the very core of much science, "objectivity", is a 
fonll of "b lindness": 
Gi\'C'n the emphasis on objectivity which is characteristic of science as it is usually 
conceived, on separating out the personal investment of the researcher from the collection 
and interpretation of data, the h'ansformative aspect of psychoanalysis is deeply problematic. 
It revC'rsC's all the usual argument by stating that scientific understanding of the 
psychoanalytic \'ariety is not possible without personal investment and that 'objectivity' is 
. , "4{) 
really a kmd ofblmdness.-
In Freud' s life he shifted significantly in his attitude to his work: 
Once Freud had promised himself a new science, it was interrogated and interrogated itself, 
for the truth claims it could make on behalf of its method. But towards the end of his 
life ... Freud was making very unscientific statements about the kinds ofreconshl.lctions of the 
past that would work in analysis, 'Constmctions in Analysis', he wrote in a paper of that title, 
making a significant concession to the fictive nature of the project, 'can be inaccurate but 
ffi
' , 741 su IClent,-
237 Frosh in Elliott (1999) p5 
238 ~earns and Thorne (1988) Person-centred COllnselling in Action. Sage. London 
239 Frosh in Elliott( 1999) p 13 
24() ibid. P 15 
241 ibid. p73 
92 
It: ~lS is often the case, the contelnporary practitioner uses the SaIne argUlnent which 
Freud used tiley nlay find it useful to acknowledge that the above shows that he was 
a l11an giyen to contraries. Freud's own anlbiguity about where he belonged has been 
del110nstrated abo\'e 2'+~. If the contenlporary theorist is able to adopt a position like 
this it opens up their options. 
This said Frosh2.+,i does regard dreanls as proof enough, as they "show,,244 the 
existence and dynatnisnl of the unconscious. He clainls they show a sUbjective truth 
peculiar to each indiyidual but none the less available to all. Until now it has been 
part of the scientific tradition to separate the act of cognition from that of feeling. 
Frosh states that there is a place for each. The idea that this was not the case is a 
cOl11plek anathenla. Ho\\' could one exist without the other? I have yet to encounter 
an cxanlple of how one can have cognition without accompanying feelings and vice 
\'cTS~l. The idea that cognition and feelings can be separated has been directly 
influenced by the tradition of \'aluing rational thought over our emotions.( This 
belongs to a tradition of politicizing which seeks to attribute gender to each. For 
exanlplc'. reason is nlasculine and emotion is feminine).Frosh is forward thinking but 
he still clings to the notion of being a scientist and like Freud seeks to change how 
science nlay be defined rather than accept that a paradigm already exists where 
psychotherapy could have a home. 
The clarity \\bich Freud sought the need for things to be either/or, a prerequisite of 
the modernist, no longer has a viable place in contemporary culture, which 
underyalues the dualities of the past in favour of acceptance of ambiguity. This 
marks a change in attitude toward the value of objectivity and subjectivity. 
Subj ecti\'ity \\'as of little positive value to the Inodernist but is essential in a post 
modem society. Freud's buying into a paradigm of objectivity posed difficulties even 
for him. for example, aspiring to the notion of practitioner as a blank screen while at 
the same time claiming that what really mattered was the relationship between client 
and practitioner. The personality of the practitioner, although iinpossible to leave out 
of the equation was, what he desired. Today this is much les~ the case. " J4' 
The idea of analytic neutrality is increasingly challenged or subject to redefimtlOn.- ' 
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ldl'as abl1ut objcctiYC knowledge, are increasingly viewed with suspicion: the 
"\1bjccti\'c knowcr"~~() is no longer in vogue. 
:\ckno\\ ledging the \,<.lIue of sUbjecti\'ity has been happening elsewhere in the 
acadelny, and is no\\' adopted by son1(, theorists of psychotherapy. The place of the 
self and thc influence of this on the acadetnic project is now accepted by n1any post 
n1l,den1 scholars of religion and psychotherapy. And dogn1atislTI, valued by 
n10dernity, is being eroded by a call for fluidity and reflexivity where reflexivity is a 
bi-product of subjecti\'ity. This, ho\\'C\'er, does not indicate an end to lTIode111ity, 
(only n10de111ity requires beginnings, n1iddles and ends) it does however indicate that 
there are ne\\' yalues which challenge the old. As noted, psychoanalysts are fond of 
saying the past is always in the present therefore the continued presence of modernity 
should not be surprising in this so called post lTIodern development. 2~7 
.--\s noted aboye, for Freud the objectivity of the practitioner was not in question. He 
adyocated that the practitioner ren1ain distant and aloof, in the name of 
professionalisn1, and in an atten1pt to engender transference between patient and 
practitioner. The notion of the practitioner as a blank screen upon which the patient 
could transfer their issues is increasingly under question, as is the belief that 
\\'ithholding is necessary for the success of the relationship. Sandor Ferenzci 
disagreed \\'ith Freud on these issues. Ferenzci brought to his work a hUlTIan touch. 
He used himself as a subject which allowed him to interact with his clients in a more 
natural \\'ay than the acting of other Freudians. For this he was punished. Freud 
disapproyed of F erenzci' s way of working and they eventually parted company over 
this. The difference between Freud and Ferenzci is captured below: 
By being Freud, of course, Freud was very 'present' in the analytic treatment; despite the 
reticence of his technique his patients were treated in a space which he had invented. Not 
surprisingly it soon became a contention among the early analysts how much they make their 
particular presence felt. Beginning with the work of Freud's greatest follower, Sandor 
Ferenzci. the issue of the analyst's self-disclosure in the treatment, the possible 'mutuality' of 
the psychoanalytic process, became the focus of intense debate. The Independent group in 
Britain and certain 'intersubsectivist' American analysts, have sustained the legacy of 
Ferenz~i's pioneering work, which sees the supposed authority of the analyst as part of the 
problem, and what the analyst wants in the tr~atme~t aS21~tegral to the process, and so 
something that has to be made avaIlable for dIscussIOn. 
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Thl' authority of the analyst relllains an area which other traditions find difficult to 
accept. The person-centred tradition regards its practice as n10re egalitarian than that 
of psychodynamic psychotherapy. It is difficult to know whether Ferenzci, in luoving 
to\\ards a sUbjecti\ist position, was the only one at the time, or if other practitioners 
were also practising in this \Yay but not yet writing about its importance. 
Fcrenlci's interest in sUbjecti\'ity caused his exile fron1 Freud's inner circle, which in 
turn n1ade hin1 appear as a bad boy of psychoanalysis. As noted above, his influence 
is still apparent in psychoanalysis today particularly in the USA. Ferenczi was ahead 
of his tin1e, and the approach \\'hich he adopted is now being described in 
conten1porary literature: 
Doubtle~~ the dinical impracticality of holding the position of objective knower as well as 
the int1uenct' of post modern epistemologies have led to the intersubjective and relational 
re\"i~ion~ in contemporary psychoanalytic thought. 2.+() 
F erenzci pre-en1pted \\hat are now regarded as post luodem values, values which 
conteluporary practitioners believe have actually caused this change rather than 
being s~ 111pton1atic and sYl11biotic. In particular his ideas on mutuality within the 
relationship haye been deyeloped. Today there are British psychoanalysts who, 
\vhilst not declaring an allegiance to Ferenzci, have adopted his use of the self in 
practice. That is to say, rather than actively denying their influence in the 
relationship. they are aware that there are two dynamic people each of whom has an 
effect on the other. Christopher Bollas uses the term the "Freudian pair,,250. Whilst 
this tenl1 sounds exclusi\'e to Freudians it luay be regarded as a generic term for the 
ackno\\ledgement of the work of two individuals in the room each impacting on the 
other. 
The current attitude to objectivity by Frosh is, as we have seen, that it is a form of 
"blindness,':~51. He also argues that one should reluain open to each position: 
To become disinvested in anyone position in this way, is close to the goal of mental freedom 
\\'hich Freud strove to formulate 252 . 
Ho\\'e\'er, such disinvesting may also have contributed to the increase in the 
hybridization of frameworks and the subsequent relaxation of purism. Current ideas 
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('In the place of sUbjectivity arc nlore than just disinvesting and Inore actively 
ignoring the use of the self. Disinvesting signifies a healthy choice to detach from an 
()ut-dated nlodel. It is no longer appropriate to invest in only one area but to remain 
open to all possibilities. Frosh nlakes the point that Freud had a goal of mental 
freedonl and yet freedonl for Freud was still in SOlne way bound, in that Freud's will 
\vas to fornllllate and the very idea of fornlltlation is a fonn of doglnatisln, which is 
no longer desirable. Dognlatisnl runs counter to the notion of freedom. The freedOln 
to renlain open to other positions is allied to post Inodenl epistemologies where there 
is no place for the fi:\ed
253
. Those old fantasies of .the psychoanalyst or 
psychotherapist as an objecti\'t~ knower or an aloof, blank screen actively 
withholding 1'rOl11 the client are now, largely, accepted as exactly the fantasies that 
they ahyays \VtTe. The inlpracticality of working in such a way along with the fact 
that it \vould run counter to cun-ent episten1010gies, advocating intersubjectivity, 
,,'ould signit\ an inability to evolve one's practice.254 
This said eyen "'hen ideas are out dated they can still have a good deal of power. For 
e:\anlple. the notion that it is possible or desirable to separate cognition and feeling 
belongs to a clinlate of either/or thinking and seeks to perpetuate the notion of 
e:\c1usivity. It does not encourage inter-subjective ideas, which are cun-ently 
desirable. Such ideas, whilst accepted in theory have a long way to go before 
practitioners reflect this fluidity by letting go of their need to belong to one realm or 
another. The discomfort of having a foot in two camps is difficult to come to tenns 
\vith and perhaps a new paradigm which could begin to embody both, one which is 
some\vhat henllaphroditic, to accommodate the wide ranging ideas from patriarchal 
to post feminist \vould be preferable to joining the religious one which already exists. 
It is encouraging that Adam Phillips asks "Why is so much science needed?,,255 
Freud was a maverick scientist who needed to exploit the status of science to make 
psychoanalysis known. He did this from his medical platfonn but he was a modernist 
not a particularist. He read widely and had little difficulty in combining theories from 
differing disciplines. In this he may be described as eclectic, a tenn which, ironically, 
has contemporary therapists up in anns. Phillips' question has been a long time 
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l'ollling ~lnd is a useful onc \\'hich he answers in part by clain1ing that psychoanalysis 
should ha\'c phenOlllcnological status, which reduces the burden of the scientific 
quC'stion. 
PsydlOanalysis is, in bet, a phenomenology of processes - repression, repetition, 
tr~1l1sference. memory, dreams - that cannot llL'gin without forgetting. There are in other 
\\l)rds t\\O ghosts in the machine: the unconscious, and the capacity to forget. 256 
Phillips is right to declare psychoanalysis as a phenOlnenology because phenOlTIena 
~lre notoriously difficult to pin down in that you cannot easily put theiTI in a wheel 
balTO\\'. The phcno111enon of psychoanalysis is n1uch greater than the SUITI of its parts 
\\'ould suggest. As Phi 11ips notes that psychoanalysis, and this ITIay be applied to 
psyc hotherapies as wd L is con1prised of processes. So that when we talk of the 
encounter it is a dynan1ic process which is constantly in Inotion. As Phillips states, 
we do ha\"e both the unconscious and our capacity to forget but there is more to the 
encountt'r than this. The transfo1l11ative nature of the relationship is as un-pin-
dc)\\'nable as the unconscious or the n1eITIOry, if indeed we can separate thein. 
Different approaches ha\"e different ways of describing this transfonnation but seem 
to agree that the quality of the relationship is what matters. Both Freud and Rogers 
c1ain1ed there is son1ething inexplicable that happens in the relationship which is not 
to do with skill or technique: an X factor which seenlS to make change happen. 
Recent psychodynamic researchers have named this "moments of meeting", and in 
the person-centred approach Mea1l1S and Thome have called it "relational 
depth"::!.5~.Clients themselves name it as an "epiphany" or "revelation" and at times 
··spiritual'·25s. 
Theorists today ha\"e to contend with tension arising from maintaining an allegiance 
to the founder and his work, and the need to develop and revise those theories of his, 
\\'hich as products of his time are clearly out of date. Attempting to remain in line 
\\"ith the dominant culture is no mean feat. The values of modernity are ever present, 
e\"en \\"hen a characteristic presence is created by their absence259 . New ideas are 
born of a need to counter the old, but without the old there would have been no need 
for this counter. Adam Phillips, like Freud, lTIay be regarded as a mode1l1ist as he is 
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()o. He has not constrained hi111selfby staying within the 
bounds of science but draws fron1 philosophy, literature, politics an10ngst others. 
Ho\\,('yer, \yhiist this affords Phillips the opportunity to be expansive it also l11akes 
hin1 ~l n1aY('rick and, as such, psychoanalysts are both in awe and suspicious of his 
\york. Phillips displays his belief in Freud and others whose ideas were fashioned by 
grand theories and a need to universalize. In fact although he mirrors them he also 
needs their l11istakes to develop his own ideas on things such as contingency, 
openness, and fluidity, all of which 111ay be regarded as backlashes to the constraints 
of 1110dellli ty. 
As noted aboye, the scientific question is revisited again and again by 
psychotherapists. Is psyc hoanalysis science or not? The question itself is a product of 
binary thinking \yhich although open to question appears to be inevitable. What 
really is their need to haye their work acknowledged as science? For many it appears 
to be n10re concenl at being placed in the alternative camp, than to do with a real 
concen1 to be scientific, because if not scientific what is left are the arts or religion 
and neither seelllS acceptable. Although Susie Orbach compares what she does as a 
psychotherapist to sculpting and poetry, a cOl11parison which is uncommon261 , her 
clail11 of being a "clinician" and her continued use of l11edicallanguage reserves her a 
scientific position. 
\Yhilst to be allied to the arts would be bad enough it seel11S that any religious 
connection raises eyen more resistance. This has its basis in Freud and an out dated 
notion of \vhat religion is or can be. In contemporary culture there exists the widest 
possible definitions of religions that there ever has been. Institutionalised religion, 
whilst still in decline, is not representative of people's loss of belief or faith. In fact 
in some parts of the USA there has been an upsurge in fundaI11entalist Christianity. In 
the UK people appear to be choosing spiritualities which cover such a wide spectrum 
of devotional activities as to render it almost impossible to define262 . However, 
spirituality has become a useful term to bridge the gap between institutionalized 
religion and secularism. 
260 Phillips did his first degree in English literature. 
261 Orbach. S. (1999) The Impossibility Of Sex. 
262 King. A.S. (1996) 'Spirituality:Transformation and Metamorphosis'. In Religion (1996) 26, 343-
351. Has a very good attempt at this. 
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Phillips returns to Freud again and again whon1 he uses as a way of reiterating that 
the relationship which psychoanalysis has with religion has its roots with Freud: 
Dcspitc the horror of the history that is contemporaneous with his invention of 
~~sy('hoanalysis, c\'il is simply not a word Freud was given to using. But it was, of course, 
l'ssential to his post-enlightenment project to find a way of talking about the unacceptable 
\\'ithout all ying it to the supernatural. ~()3 
Freud did allinanner of things to evade being allied with the supen1atural. Freud's 
Inedical background deluded his followers and hilllself into seeing psychoanalysis as 
a science as opposed to the illusion which it was. The illusion which Freud claimed 
religion \\"~lS is a closer ally to his o\\"n creation than he could see or was willing to 
ackno\\"ledge. His need to be at the forefront of his profession n1eant his rejecting 
religion and other allied subjects, otherwise risk being regarded as the dubious 
scientist which he had becon1e: or worse as supen1atural. Freud's psychoanalysis was 
not to be associated with the unexplainable, such as theology. And it has taken the 
likes of Synlington, Phillips, Bollas and Coltart a long tin1e since Freud's death to 
begin to e:\.plore their relationship with religion in a way which is 1110re than 
superficial. 
Freud's a\\'areness of people's suffering and his detennination that psychoanalysis 
\\"as a \\"ay of alle\'iating this was of course an opportunity for him to usurp what had 
traditionally been the task of the church. He was aware that suffering was often 
caused by persecution and that religion had played a large part in this persecution. It 
is clear from Freud's \york that he felt that evil was a human predisposition and not 
sOll1ething unexplainable. It is what hUlnans do as a result of their personal histories. 
He \\'as not prepared to write it off as something beyond our control. He was fearful 
of the unaccountability which claiming that something belongs to the supernatural, 
would create. 
Whilst Phillips hypothesizes on Freud's discOlnfort with the supernatural he like 
Freud, freely draws upon the language of the supernatural or religion when other 
language fails. For example, in a passage describing an experience of Marcel Proust 
he states: 
secular epiphanies like this reveal the past but one's personal history is an elusive God~()4. 
263 ibid. p59 
~(,4 Phillips (1994) P 15 
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\Vhilst l11aking sllre we know about the secularity of his stance he goes on to use 
'epiphanies' and God as it seen1S that secular language cannot convey his lueaning. 
Of course frol11 the point of \'iew of the atheistic all language is secular, luan-made, a 
projection of oursel\'es. Whether we attribute sacred or profane qualities to 
sOl11ething is up to us. Phillips n1akes a distinction between the sacred and the 
pro [11K' because it is \\'hat he needs to do for his own clarity for belonging. 
In a golden age \\'hen all had a religious aspect there were degrees of sacredness but 
one \\'ould ha\'e been hard pushed to find the purely secular. The secular is 
conln10nly used to refer to that which is profane, pro jail [{Ill (outside the teluple) and 
~1S such need not be applied to those n1any spiritualities which have no temple. It is 
increasingly IHis/used to describe anything which is not only not institutionally 
religious but \\'hich is acti\'ely not religious. People actively ascribe secularity to 
things as Phillips frequently does. The need for this IUUSt surely belong to a school of 
protesting too 111uch. 
In his e:'(planation of Proust Phillips states: 
But from a Freudian point of \'iew, discussion of coincidence is inevitably tainted with 
notions of the paranormal, or the kind of mystical animism that psychoanalysts tend to 
pathologize. 2b5 
In ackI10\vledging their need to pathologize Phillips is opening the way for other 
psychoanalysts and psychotherapists to sit with the unknown. Bollas and Coltart 
already appear to be at home with Bion's notion of "not knowing". He claimed that it 
\\as important for the patient that the practitioner tolerated not knowing and that 
psychotherapy required an act of faith: 
It may be wondered at what state of mind is welcome if desires and memories are not. A term 
that would express approximately what I need to express is 'faith' - faith that there is an 
unknown, unknowable, 'formless infinite'. This must be believed of every object of which 
h 1· b 266 t e persona lty can e aware ... 
Psychotherapists have to let go of their need to know and sitting in a state of 
suspension. Coleridge talked of the "willing suspension of disbelief,267, a concept 
which has been essential to the construction of the Freudian Empire. Freud said 
something similar with regard to the activity of listening268and claimed that listening 
265Phillips.( 1994) p 17 
266 Bion .. W, (1970) Attention and Intclprct{[tion.p31 Tavistock. London. in Coltart (1993) 
267 Coleridge. S.T. Biographia Literaria. Chapter XIV. 
268 Phillips.( 1994). 
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is diluted if one is hanging on to the last words of the patient/client resulting in 
attention being in one place rather than suspension. If a practitioner is unable to 
suspend their need to know they are not actually engaging in the process of analysis 
or free association, as their thoughts both conscious and unconscious are otherwise 
engaged. The state of not knowing n1ay be described, had it not been for Freud's anti 
supe1l1atural stance, as an altered state of consciousness, akin to meditation. 
Phillips not only echoes Coltarfs parallels between psychoanalysis and Buddhism, 
but dra\\"s his 0\\"11 parallels between psychoanalysis and Christianity. He states that 
psychoanalysis and religion are in the business oftu1l1ing pain into meaning. 
According to Theodore Zeldin "a life without pain is a life without meaning,,269. 
hnplied in this is the notion that the n10re pain one experiences the more meaningful 
the life. The type of pain which Zeldin and psychotherapist speak of is metaphorical, 
and as such is not con1parable with physical pain which is of a different quality. 
People experiencing psychological pain are often unable to identify it as such. They 
are in such a state of 'bad faith' that they would never believe themselves to be 
suffering. (On this basis are they suffering if they have found a way of blocking out, 
or splitting off, as psychoanalysis would have it?). 
:-\s \\"ith religions, psychotherapies and counselling have found differing ways of 
dealing \\"ith suffering. Each uses a normative model of what a good life is and 
thereafter prescribes how this may best be achieved. The pre reformation 'Good Life' 
\\"as a \,"orId apart from the notion of the post reformation 'Good Life' The first one 
was of contemplation and meditation and the second of productivity and 
reproduction. Phillips argues that psychoanalysis is committed to a notion of Eden 
albeit that this commitment is not prescribed overtly. 
The above demonstrates the confusion which Freud's attitudes to both religion and 
science have caused for contemporary practitioners. In the following chapter we shall 
see that this has not been peculiar to Freud. 
269 Zeldin. T . (1988) Conversation: How Talk Call Change Your L([e. Harvill Press. London. Quoting 
Dostoyevsky. 
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Chapter Four (i): The Construction of Carl Rogers 
As illustrated in the chapter on the construction of Freud biographies, although a 
useful source of info1111ation, are not always consistent. Carl Ransoln Rogers (1902-
1987) \\'as b0111 on January 8th in the Midwest of Alnerica. SOlne say he was b0111 in 
the suburb of Oak Park. others that he n10ved there when he was five. Oak Park was 
an e\.clusiye area of Chicago but was intentionally kept as a separate area (even 
\'oted against becon1ing part 0 r Chicago). Rogers was aware that his parents wanted 
to control \\'ho their children associated with and Oak Park seemed safe enough. This 
\\'as not to last and the Rogers fan1ily were removed to a farm on which the children 
\\'ould be kept m\'ay fron1 associating with people whom his parents deelned the 
\\Tong type. Rogers \yas t\\'el\'e by the tilne they moved to the farm which has been 
described as a hobby for his father who by now was a successful business man. His 
falnily Inay be described as upper lniddle class. His father with an engineering 
business. his 1110ther \\'orked in the home. He clailned that his parents were loving, 
but controlling and called then1 "In asters of subtle emotional control,,27o. Rogers was 
\"ery Clitical of his nl0ther and in particular her strict commitment to a religious life. 
Drinking alcohol \\'as not pati of the Rogers' family life271 , nor did they engage in a 
great deal of the common entertainment of the time. Rogers described hilTIself as a 
sickly child but appears to have been quite intelligent and bookish, but claims that 
because they moved around and he had attended different schools he was prevented 
from forging meaningful friendships. In his late adolescence and early adult life he 
deyeloped an ulcer which, significantly, abated when he left the family but was to 
arise in times of family conflict. 
As is the case with many siblings, each of the Rogers children viewed their up 
bringing differently272. Rogers was the fourth of six children. Their different views 
created conflict between them and as Carl Rogers began to write about his childhood 
experiences his siblings disagreed with his portrayal of their family life, claiming that 
he had been too harsh a critic and that their parents had provided them with a secure 
and loving up bringing. Rogers began his adult life believing that he would have a 
career in agriculture but changed from agriculture to history with the intention of 
270 Cohen.D. (1997) A Critical Biography of Carl Rogers Constable. London. p 21 
271 Ibid Cohen describes Rogers' daughters concern for her father's drink problems later in his life. 
17) 
- - Cohen (1997) p32-3 
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~tudying the history orChristianity. He graduated in 1922. It was in 1920 whilst he 
attended a con tCrence with a group of missionaries he realized that he did not want to 
be a t~lnner and the idea of a Ininisterial career was planted. It was not until 1922 
\\hen he \\t'nt to China that he clain1ed: 
;\ Iy intellectual horizon was being stretched all the time273. 
During this trip Rogers de\'c1oped a personal relationship to Christ which was unlike 
that of his parents. During this tilne he decided that he was called to the church. 
Before this trip Rogers had proposed to Helen Elliot. At first she was reluctant 
because of his con1n1ittnent to a Christian life. However, she did eventually accept 
and in 192-1- their life-long n1arriage began. It seen1S that this cOlnmitment from 
Hden ga\'e Rogers the necessary confidence to make the changes in his life which he 
had until then been unable to take. They set off for New York City, as Rogers had 
chosen to study for the n1inistry at Union Theological Seminary, a very liberal 
institution. Rogers' parents did not approve of his career choice. However, they did 
gi\'e the couple a substantial sun1 of n10ney as a wedding gift. This allowed Rogers 
and his ne\\' \\'ife to begin their n1arried life not only without fear of poverty, but with 
a nest egg. "'hich could last for their first three years. 
It \vas at Union that Rogers was introduced to encounter groups, the use of which he 
"'as to become famous for hilnself274. During these encounter groups Rogers had an 
opportunity to explore his faith, with the result that he gave up the ministry and 
tun1ed his attentions to psychology. He had already started attending some classes at 
Colun1bia Cni\'ersity which was just across Broadway from Union. Rogers' loss of 
faith is not something which we hear a great deal about and one could easily 
understand his choosing to go into the church as an option which avoided going into 
his father's business. Whatever the reason it did not take long before his faith was 
lost and his focus on psychology was established. He was bitter about his family's 
strict Protestantism and even as an old man referred to how unhappy this had Inade 
him. In his final years he began to acknowledge that he had actively ignored an 
important aspect of human existence, the mystical dimension. This aspect of Rogers' 
work has had a controversial impact on the development of person-centred 
counselling and in particular the work of Brian Thome who is one of its forelnost 
273 'b'd '17 1 1 ,p~ , 
27-t Kirschenbaum. & Land Henderson. (1990) The Carl Rogers Reader, pXl 
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advl)l'atcs in thc United Kingdonl. Elizabeth Sheerer when questioned about Rogers 
and his attitudc to thc spiritual replied: 
\\'L' lemlL'd early in the game not to talk about religion with Carl.. .That was a taboo subject 
bL'L'~111SL' it \\as unL'omfortable for him ... 275 -
\ V c can scc froln this that Rogers' own attitude to religion has had a lasting effect on 
his fo 11owcrs. 
The di fkrent changcs in career nlust have given Rogers a s01TIewhat bumpy start. 
Howcver, in psychology it seenlS he found his vocation. From the biographies, 
including Rogers' autobiographical work, we get a sense of how driven Rogers had 
becolne. He was a prolific writer and a con11nitted practitioner of counselling, a term 
which he popularised in an attenlpt to distance his work fr01TI that of other therapies 
because of his belief that they were either too prescriptive and or hierarchical. He 
believed that Freud's view ofhun1an nature was "too superficial".276Rogers claimed 
that he: 
soaked up the dynamic Freudian views of the staff, which included David Levy and Lawson 
LI.:mTey. and found them in great conflict with the rigorous, scientific, coldly objective, 
statistical point of vie\\' then prevalent at Teachers' College. 277 
He had also been introduced to Freud through Jessie Taft and Frederick Allen, both 
of\\-honl \vere followers of Otto Rank. Rank had been in Freud's inner circle but as 
\\-as often the case, on disagreeing with him, was excommunicated. Rogers' views on 
Freud and others, such as J.B.Watson the behaviourist, led him to develop his own 
f01111 of therapy \\'hich he called counselling. This he called 'client centred' 
counselling or therapy, but later the name was changed to person-centred 
counselling. One of the most fundamental beliefs held by Rogers was of the inherent 
goodness, which lies at the core of all human beings. This may not sound particularly 
revolutionary but in comparison with other therapies of his time, such as 
psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on exploring the dark and evil potential of human 
beings. it was revolutionary. He compared the human organism to other animals and 
concluded that we are as egalitarian as they are, given the right conditions. With such 
comparisons we can see that Rogers was willing to take risks. According to Thome, 
Rogers described himself: 
As the adventurer who thirsts for new terrain to conquer and new problems to overcome.
278 
275 Thome.(l992) p22-23 
276 Kirschenbaum and Land Hendersn. (1990)p407 
277 Rogers. C.R. (1967) On Becoming a Person: A Therapists View of Psychotherapy. Constable. 
London.p9 
)78 
- Thome (1992)pI6 
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This sounds fatniliar. 
R()~(TS relnained con1n1itted to his belief in the goodness of hmnan beings for his 
\\ho le Ii rc, and Inuch of his work was concerned with developing ways in which 
people tnay actually con1e to believe this ofthen1selves. Sadly Rogers did not display 
this cOlnpassionatc attitude toward his parents, whon1 he ren1ained angry towards 
until his old age. Such anger \volild, rrOn1 a psychodynan1ic interpretation, be enough 
to sustain his li rc long dri ve to invcnt theories and fon11s of practice designed to 
create conditions in \vhich warmth and genuine kindness were paraIll0unt for the 
~r()\vth of the individual. As noted above, Rogers parents' strict religious beliefs, and 
the way in \yhich these had in1pacted on his life, were a source of pain for Rogers, so 
n1uch so that he still alluded to this in a speech which he gave on his eightieth 
birthday. \\'ith the criticisn1 Rogers had l11ade of his lnother, whom he felt had been 
dctached and lacking in real wannth, it should COlne as no surprise, that his 
theoretical assun1ptions developed in the way that they did, especially with parents as 
judgelnental as his, \\'ho even when he was an adult caused him to react in such a 
\\'ay as to bring about his ulcer again. So nlllch so that in 1922 on returning frOln 
China he had to have surgery. The kind of Christianity which Rogers had 
e:\perienced on this trip \yas so far frOln that of his parents that he was in anticipation 
of their further reproach. They attempted to keep their son on a much more 
conselYative Christian path. His choice of Union Seminary was the cause of much 
distress for his parents \vho tried to bribe hiln to change his lnind. 
Rogers remained married to Helen until she died in 1978, when he was in his 
seyenties. He did nurse her but resented the fact that her immobility prevented him 
from travelling in the way that he loved. The period of Helen's illness was fraught 
\vith tensions for them. However, it appears that before she died they did manage to 
resolve this. One of Rogers' core theoretical ideals, unconditional positive regard, 
\\as very difficult for him to provide in this relationship at this stage. 
Whilst Rogers was a great advocate of therapy (in his writing Rogers inter-changed 
therapy and counselling) for others, he was a reluctant client himself. If the 
biographers are correct it seelns that he only sought help fron1 colleagues a couple of 
times in his career. During his years in Chicago, in particular during 1948-49, Rogers 
had a client who proved overwhelming and after this period he is described as having 
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a brcakdo\\'ll. It was at this tilne that he agreed to have therapy with Oliver Bown and 
\\'hich Rogers describes as his nlost difficult years279. In the lnain he, like Freud and 
(lthers, looked after his own self-developnlent. Later Natalie, his daughter, was 
C('lllCell1ed about his drinking and tried to encourage hinl to stop280. A problem with 
~llcohol \\'oldd be regarded in therapy as a sign that there were unresolved issues. 
The n10ving ~lbout referred to above was an interesting part of the Rogers' fatnily 
life, both in his childhood and after he nlarried. Whenever life challenged Rogers he 
"as inclined to n10ve on \\'ithout lnuch attenlpt at a resolution. Perhaps he would 
ha\c argued that the resolution canle fronl the nl0ve. They did however lnove on 
\\'ith tension still lingering. 
Rogers' career \\'as very full and quite varied. It ranged from, a real concern with 
education, to working in encounter groups, at times with some of America's top 
scientists. He also did sonle work for the Government, a step contrary to his belief in 
openness. as it \vas for the secret service. In one ambitious project, his scientific 
application of his theories to a group of schizophrenics in Wisconsin his core 
conditions failed281 . Ho\\,ever, as with Freud, the failure of his work did not prevent 
his fanle and notoliety. In his obituaries those studies, which had made him famous, 
\\~ere politely o,"erlooked. Rogers also spent a great deal of time with individual 
clients nlanv of \,~hom have become famous case studies. The 'Gloria' case is a 
particularly ,,"ell used example. 
Rogers' biographers claim: 
He was responsible for the spread of professional counselling and psychotherapy beyond 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis to all helping professions - psychology, social work, 
education, ministry, lay therapy and others. 282 
As with Freud there have been criticisms about Rogers' fidelity. For founders there is 
no allowance for the frailty which they advocate, celebrate and at tilnes applaud in 
other humans. Rogers was open about his infidelity, both to Helen and then, after her 
death, to the public. It seems that it was not until Rogers was in his seventies that he 
openly began to seek out other relationships. If Cohen
283 
is correct this was a very 
279 Cohen (1997) p138 
280 Ibid p223 
281 Ibid p167 
282 Kirschenbaum and Henderson (1990) The Carl Rogers Reader. pxi 
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l'hal kn~ing til11e for Rogers and it seen1S he n1ade rather a fool of himself. There was 
one WOl11an in particular, Bernice, with whon1 he becan1e besotted but who 
unCortunately did not return his affections. Helen was devastated by this but had no 
real power to do anything to change the situation. This does not n1ean that she 
passi\'cly accepted it. She atten1pted to talk hin1 out of this and his other 
relationships. but to no a\'ail. Rogers' followers are no less dedicated to him for his 
intidelity. Like Freud's followers it has taken son1e til11e for the new hierarchy to 
become established and it has taken two decades, since his death, for them to begin 
to really critically re\'ise his theories. With this brief resume of Rogers' life we can 
see son1e parallels \\'ith Freud. Rogers was set apart fr0111 his siblings because he was 
ilL sickly but bookish; he rejected the religious tradition of his family; he rejected 
e\.isting theories of the 111ind and he developed a con1pletely new approach to the 
talkin~ cure: and tinallY. his desire was to be recognised as a scientist. Unlike Freud 
~ . 
\\'ho \\'as in the n1edical sciences, Rogers was in the human sciences but none the less 
be lie\'ed that his \\'ork could be n1easured. The legacy of this desire is evident in the 
\\'ork of his followers. to whon1 we shall now tun1. 
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Chapter Four (ii) Person-centred Theories and Practice 
Like Freud, Carl Rogers' life and practice becan1e con1111itted to atheisn1 and as , 
noted, his o\'crt rcjection of religion has created a legacy full of tension and 
dissonance for his followers. 
P(Ts(,ln-centred counselling Inay be seen as ~l Protestant reformation of 
psychoanalytic Catholicisnl. Rogers and his followers tried to pare away all the 
hierarchical attitudes, the rituaL and other ways of practice which Rogers regarded as 
unnccessary accessories. Little did he realise that his lTIOVeluent would suffer the 
SaITIe sort of dc\'elopn1ental hiccups which had occurred with Freud and the 
psyc hoanalytic n10\"el11ent. 
Carl Rogers. the founder of Person-centred counselling, also created a movement 
\\'hich functions as a religion. Like Freud he had rejected his own faluily's religious 
tradition and because of his disapproval of things religious would have been 
disappro\'ing of the ways in which his approach has been developed. Rogers' 
intention \\'as to create son1ething of a diversion, a counter to the traditions of 
psychology and psychotherapy. This he did by dismissing those things which had 
been fundaluental to psychoanalysis and psychodynaIllic psychotherapy. He saw 
psychotherapy as dependent on things which belonged to a bygone era, things which 
he thought superfluous - in this he echoed other movements which were anti-
tradition. The traditions of psychoanalysis and its immediate descendents belonged to 
lTIodernity. in so far as they relied on grand narratives and hoped for universals. 
Rogers excluded those elements which had been the foundation of psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy. He rejected the iluportance of the past and was not concerned 
\\"ith the Freudian ideas of denial, repression, or the unconscious and its processes. 
His choice to ignore, or gi \c credit to, the influence of the past and his intent on 
stressing the here and now were very different to his psychoanalytic contemporaries. 
He was not concerned about whether the unconscious existed but whether or not its 
existence was relevant for the work of the client in their present life. Person-centred 
practitioners' concern with the here and now, and not the past, has meant that dreams 
and other things which psychodynalllic practitioners saw, and still see as indicators 
of unconscious communication, were and still are viewed with contempt. Rogers' 
school of thought may be compared to that of Janet and Adler, who believed that an 
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enlpirical approach to psychotherapy was the way forward. Rogers was the first 
practitioner to tapc his scssions and then transcribe thel1l, a process which is used as 
justitication that what thcy do is objective and therefore scientific. 
Although, Rogcrs \\'as a principal cxponent ofhUlllanistic psychology between 1960-
Slit is illlportant to renleillber that the forenl0st experiences in his career were first 
the church. then psychoanalysis, then behavioural psychology and it was his 
disenchantn1ent \\'ith thesc which led hinl to develop his own approach, which he 
originally nan1ed, Client Centred Therapy. In addition he was influenced by other 
theories popular in AnltTica during this period. For exanlple, he had read the works 
of :\listair Hardy and \\,illianl Jan1es~84 on religious experience. His first experiences 
\\'ith encounter groups, which ha\'c becol1le synonytllOUS with his name, were when 
he \\'as a seillinarian. The hUlllanistic psychology Inovelnent has been distinguished 
fron1 other branches of psychology because of its Anlerican roots: an interesting 
concept when the roots of n10st Anlericans are from else where. Thus the histories 
upon \\-hich the tradition dra\\-s n1ust be nl0re diverse than is acknowledged. The 
ideas cultiyated in hun1anistic psychology were drawn from European philosophies 
such as existentialisn1, fro111 which Rogers borrowed the idea of experiencing and 
bein~ in the \\-orld. In addition to this he adopted from phenomenology, the idea of 
suspending ones judgements/beliefs or 'bracketing off, or epoche, a concept taken 
from the \\'ork of Husserl. Here we can see more evidence of the presence of Europe 
in his work than is acknowledged. 
Throughout his career Rogers believed in the notion of non-directive work. He was 
keen on 'scientific rigour,285 and claimed to have devised Inethods of measuring 
aspects of the therapeutic process. As noted above, he was the first person to Inake 
tape recordings and transcribe therapy sessions and to devise a model for gauging the 
levels of empathy \\'hich the practitioner would need to develop for effective 
practice. Applying this model meant that Rogers had created a measurable and 
therefore empirical way of studying the encounter. Freud had written his own 
accounts of sessions which relied entirely on his recall and so Rogers was offering 
something which he alleged was more scientific, evidence based. In his early career 
Rogers seemed not to take into account the influence that recording would have on 
28.+ Cohen (1997) p46 . 
285 Kirschenbaum and Henderson. (1990) The Carl Rogers Reader pXl 
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hi~ rl'~lllts. Nor did he ~1Cknowlcdge the influence of the therapist's presence on the 
enCl1untcr. He wa~ not concerned with transference, which was a Inajor tool for 
psychoanalysi~ and psychotherapy. It is clain1ed that person-centred therapy was 
developed in response to the wider An1erican cultural nonns of , 
dis~·us.t l~f e\,pt'rts and authority figures, emphasis on methods rather than theory, emphasis 
~ln md1\'ldual's l1et'ds rather t~~an shared goals, a lack of interest in the past and a valuing of 
ll1dependence and autonomy. -' (l 
Rogers sa\\ therapy as a vehicle for social change, especially for Ininority groups. He 
belicved that therapy could bc egalitarian, and that clients would take charge of their 
0\\11 power not the therapist, which was the n10del that Rogers was detennined to 
change, He \\as reacting against the old model of the perceived authority of the 
practitioner \vhich had, until his work, been predoininant. The person-centred 
apprllach is ~lCcused of being light on theory,287 even though Rogers himself was a 
prolific ~\Titcr. It is certainly the case that there has been less written about Rogers 
and his \\'ork than of Freud. This is due in part to his having less time in the Inarket, 
but is also to do with his own prescriptions for the application of his theories. Whilst 
Freud can be found in aln10st any discipline, Rogers is Inore often found in the social 
sciences and education. 
Rogers. like Freud, developed his own Trinity which he believed were "necessary 
and sufficient" conditions which could enable persons to change their 'self-concept'. 
Rogers belie\'ed that if the therapist could provide the following conditions, the client 
would feel safe and confident enough to flourish. These three necessary and 
sufficient elements are known as the core conditions. They are firstly, empathy, 
\\'hich in this context is when the therapist can 'experience' what the client means 
from the client's frame of reference. (Bearing in mind that one can only ever infer 
\\'hat the client's frame of mind is). Congruence is also necessary, and requires that 
therapists are genuine, authentic, in their empathic responding, not simply role-
playing. Finally he believed that acceptance, which means adopting a position of 
non-judgementalism otherwise known as unconditional positive regard, would create 
an environment in which the client could grow. Whether these core conditions are 
actually possible is open to debate. However, for Rogers, it was necessary to try to 
work towards providing these elements, in order for the client to Inove forward. 
286 :v1acleod. J. (1993) Introduction to cO/fIl.\'e//illg.p 15 . 
287 \1eams and Thome (1988) They argue that other approaches misunderstand the theory ofth1s 
approach and as a result regard it as superficial. 
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The ~oa I () r the therapist in this approach, as with all others, is to facilitate a process 
('If l'han~e in the l'lient. a l'onYersion process where the result is that the client has a 
di rkrcnt world yie\y frol11 the onc which he or she began with. If anyone goes 
throu~h the therapeutic prol'CSS and still has the san1e world views it has not worked! 
The L1l'ilitation of the person-ccntred counsellor is one ofluinil11al intervention. The 
person-centred practitioner works frol11 the theory that within each hm11an being 
there is an "actualising tendcncy", a desire to reach a part ofthen1selves without 
"l'onditions of\yorth", \yhich are those layers of values adopted fr01U "significant 
others", as \ye ~ro\y up, for c:\amplc, parents, teachers, and other authority figures. In 
persl1n-centred therapy the client works toward a self-concept which is luore 
realistic/cl1ngruent. This n1ay be achieyed by virtue of experiencing the core 
conditions. n1entioned aboye, which, if present, can create a safe environment in 
which the client can explore areas of his or her life where they feel dissatisfied or 
incongruent. They also belicye that incongruence occurs because the person values 
then1sel"es through adopted Yalues, such as '} will love you if you are X'. This can 
lead to bdiefs such as, 'I an1 only worthy of love if I am what others want me to be', 
\\'hich in tum can lead the person to 'being for others,288 in order to be loved. The 
notion of 'Bad Faith', explored in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, is a 
c lose relation to \\'hat Rogers described. In that people cannot distinguish between 
their o\\'n thoughts and \'alues, and those adopted from others, and this leads to self 
deception and consequently behaviour which demonstrates their incongruence. 
The techniques used by person-centred counsellors in the facilitation of their clients' 
goals are supposed to be few but this is only a belief arising from their comparison 
\\'ith the techniques used by psychodynmuic practitioners. The person-centred 
counsellor uses as little active intervention as possible. One example, known as the 
minimal encourager, has gained them a reputation for what had been called nodding 
dog syndrome because when counsellors have newly c01upleted their training they 
are often overly dependent on such prescribed behaviour. Attention is given to the 
body language of both practitioner and the client which, if in harmony, will often be 
mirrored. Person-centred counsellors are accused of trying too hard to luirror the 
body language of their clients. They do this in an attempt to create rapport but it can 
result in a counter effect. Unlike psychoanalysis the person-centred practitioner 
288 Sartre, J.P. (2003) Being and Nothingness. Routledge Classics. London 
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depends on cyc contact son1etin1es to the detrin1ent of the client who is often 
elubarrassed and sccks to prCYCl1t eye contact. Further, unlike in psychodynmuic 
thcrapy. thc person-centred therapist does not luake interpretations of what the client 
says they reflect back by paraphrasing the words of the client. Then they are 
supposed to check out with the client the accuracy of their understanding. The 
criticisn1s of such tcchniques are that it can sound patronising, or like parroting. 
Questil1ning the client is on a need to know basis only and was son1ething which 
Freud had also found uscful. Testing out questions, such as; I was wondering ... ? Or 
it sllunds like ... ': These are tentatiyc enquiries, which allow the client to stay within 
their o\\"n frmue of refcrel1ce. Questions which distract the client from their train of 
thou~ht are to be ayoided. The therapist should not ask questions which are for their 
o\\"n interest and therefore nlust stay alert to what is for the benefit of the client and 
what is not. This nleans that the self-awareness of the therapist, i.e. knowing when an 
issue belon~s to thenl and not the client, is really iluportant as it forces the therapist 
to constantly ask (in\\"ardly) who the question is for. Questions which have the 
purpose of filling in data ha\"e the effect of arresting the flow and as such are 
unhelpful or counter productiYe to the process, although interesting to the therapist. 
This aspect of the process contradicts the notion, posited elsewhere, that the client is 
the expert in the encounter. If the practitioner has to hold back for the benefit of the 
client this is a form of control and presupposes some expertise. All of this behaviour 
is ritualistic and carried out in a space and tilue which requires that the client alter 
their state of consciousness. They speak to the practitioner in a fashion which they do 
not use in e\ery day liying. 
In 1110st psychotherapy and counselling, clients own the time allocated to them and as 
in psychoanalysis, they adhere as much as possible to the fifty luinute hour. Part of 
the therapeutic process is for the client to take responsibility for themselves and so if 
they are late for their session, they will only have the time reluaining in that hour. 
The therapy in person-centred counselling is not supposed to be directed by the 
practitioner but by the client, in so far as they go at their own pace, and not at the 
pace which the therapist feels they should. Clients are believed to have their own 
expertise. They know the issues and difficulties which they need to explore and may 
be trusted to do this when the time is right for them. The task of the therapist is to 
create a safe enough environment in which he or she facilitates this process. 
Supervision is an essential part of any practitioner's support systelu and is 
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CIKl111ragcd (by 1110St approaches) as a way of n10nitoring relationships and helping 
practitioncrs to sec 1110re clearly his or her role in the therapeutic encounter. 
Practitioners arc allocated an ad\'isor with wh01n he or she discusses cases and their 
handling ofthen1 in an atten1pt to prevent Inalpractice. It is still left to the supervisee 
\\'hat they chol1sC to bring up for discussion and therefore there is no way of knowing 
thc \\"hole story. Neither Freud nor Rogers had 'supervision' in the way that it is 
cxpected today and each agrced that good therapy relies on the quality of the 
relationship bet\\"een client and practitioner and not qualifications as such, to increase 
the qualifications of practitioners is not a guarantee of good practice. As with other 
f01l11S of therapy there is no \\"a)' of policing the lnorality of the practitioner and the 
client just takes a leap of Llith. 
In person-centred theory there is n1uch talk about trust, for eXaInple, to trust in the 
process is a person-centred n1antra. Trust in the client to go at their own pace: the 
counsellor should tnlst his or her intuition along with their felt sense or bodily 
sensations. Person-centred practitioners congratulate thelnselves on not being trapped 
by the hierarchical traditions which they accuse other therapies of relying on. This is 
of course illusory and has con1e to be problen1atic. Person-centred counselling is not 
\\"ithout traditions, it just understates their importance. That person-centred traditions 
renlain co\"el1 or subversi\"e is not the same as not having them289and does not mean 
that they are \\"ithout influence or power. The notion that clients have expertise of 
their o\\"n issues makes the person-centred approach distinct from others where the 
expertise of the practitioner is celebrated. In today's world of political correctness the 
\"ie\\"s held by this approach are highly acceptable. However, they are often accused 
of being nai\"e and over simplistic, particularly on their views on the nature of human 
beings. Their continued belief in Rogers' idea of the inherent goodness of human 
beings has been criticized again and again as a Pollyanna model of therapy, an 
accusation which Rogers refuted and countered well with his comparisons with other 
animals, as noted above. 
The possibility of actually carrying out the core conditions of empathy, congruence, 
and unconditional positive regard is much maligned by other approaches who regard 
this as somewhat utopian. Practitioners' claims of being congruent have at tilnes 
been used as an excuse for behaviour which may otherwise be regarded as 
289 If something is subverted there is an argument for its having more power. 
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inappropriatc. For exan1ple, Brian Thorne clain1ed to have felt incongruent with a 
dient becHlse he ",as denying his faith in the counselling relationship29o. It is 
difficult, if not ill1possible, even if it were desirable, to leave any part of ones self 
outside of the therapy roon1, and yet this is underlying Thorne's claim. It is not 
possible for Thorne, or anyone one else, to detach themselves, from sOlnething as 
integral as one's faith. His need to have his faith overtly in the relationship begs 
ditTerent questions. His c lain1 about his n10tivation would have best been explored in 
superYision~\)l. In the succession of psychotherapy it can be problematic for the 
leaders to receiyc supervision. Supervising the supervisor is difficult because one's 
response to a superior is loaded with en10tional charge. A response one can see arises 
not fron1 reason but their respective positions in the hierarchy. 
If applying Rogers' notion of necessary and sufficient conditions perhaps Thome is 
just challenging the reality of their sufficiency. Thome claimed not to be fully 
present \\'ith the client if he could not involve his faith292 . This is interesting on 
different levels. as it runs contrary to the need to know philosophy which person-
centred therapy advocates. It also acknowledges that there are parts to a person, a 
belief posited by Freud and which Rogers Inarginalised. Recently there has been 
\york by person-centred theorists on cOlnpartInentalizing293 but without any 
significant tribute to Freud and the unconscious. 
There is some confusion about how to interpret congruence. Thome's challenge to 
the doctrine of Rogers could throw open the flood gates to other challengers. Ifhis 
faith becomes necessary as well as the core conditions the doctrine has been 
breached. Thome has been open about his Christian commitment and has gone as far 
as to call himself a "reluctant prophet". He then goes on to prophesise in a less than 
reluctant \yay and thereafter refers to himself as a "counsellor/prophet,,294. Each 
person present brings something into the therapy room, some of which he or she will 
be conscious of and some not. Thome believes that he is losing something of himself 
2f)() \learns and Thorne (1988) 
29 I Supervision is increasingly part of the therapeutic contract. That the therapist themselves have 
somewhere to discuss issues which are raised by their work. 
292 \1earns and Thorne. (1988) It is worth noting that Thorne's approach to therapy has evolved and 
his most recent work reflects his ability to synthesise his faith. See Thorne (2004) 
293 Professor Dave Mearns. University of Strathclyde . . 
294 Thorne. B. (1994) The COllnsellor as Prophet.The Frank Lake Memorial Lecture. ClImcal 
Theology Association .. Lingdale Papers, 21. 
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without having his faith in the roon1. In1agine the chaos if every therapist wanted to 
havc c\,crything about thel11selves which they believed to be significant, consciously 
in the process. For exan1ple, ones politics, or eating philosophy or sexuality are all in 
the roon1 but need not be 111ade conscious. The client does not need to know this , 
unless htT process would benefit fron1 it and if the practitioner n1akes such a decision 
i.e. the client \VOllld benefit then they go against the alleged expel1ise of the client by 
n1~lking a decision on their behalf. This raises issues of power to make decisions, to 
\\ithhold or not to withhold, in what is clain1ed to be an egalitarian relationship. 
The difficulties \vhich can arise fron1 a prescribed set of criteria were further 
del110nstrated by Tho111e in his confession that, he was being fully congruent when he 
spent the night with a client. He argued that she would have been stuck or indeed 
regressed had he not taken this action~95. This, one n1ay only guess, had nothing to do 
with the fact that. in his own words: 
[S]he IS conmlonly regarded as an attractive even beautiful woman and it was therefore not 
surprising that I quickly became aware of my own sexual responsiveness296 . 
A.ccording to Tho111e his action was for the benefit of the client, as if it was an act of 
benevolence or even altruisIn. Even if they both clailn to have gained from the 
experience it is never deemed appropriate for a practitioner of any approach to 
transgress the sexual boundary. Codes of Ethics and practice297 are clear, there 
should be no sexual contact either during or after the therapy has tenninated. Easily 
stated, but difficult to execute because how does one define sexual contact?298 
Tho111e Inay ha\'e argued for congruence here but he took this action at the expense 
of one of the other fundamentals of person-centred counselling, that the client is the 
expert. one may interpret as infantalising the client by taking responsibility for her. 
He claimed to know what was best for her. Yet another ethical prescription in this 
tradition particularly is that the practitioner is not responsible for clients but to them. 
The first allo\\'s the client to abdicate responsibility for thelnseives, the second allows 
them to take responsibility for themselves by Inaking their own decisions. Thome is 
not the only practitioner to transgress an ethical boundary, nor do I imagine he will 
be the last, but his actions have given us luuch to consider about the difficulties of 
~95 Thorne, B,(199l) The Spiritual Dimensions of Counselling and Psychotherapy. Whurr. London 
296 ibid p89 
297 These are supplied by BAPC and BACP ., , 
298 In a Recent paper Dr Jeremy Carrette has explored the difficu.lties :hat d~1~n111~ any relatIOnshIp 
poses. Conference Paper. Department of Theology, Glasgow UmversIty, 27 Apn12001. 
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i ntl'rprding the person-centred doctrine for behaviour in such a sUbjective encounter. 
Thorne clain1s that he is a I1w\'erick who has constantly struggled against this tide of 
dogn1atisl11 in an attempt to reillain true to hin1self. At what cost to others? 
:\k\. Hc)\\'ard, a critic of psychotherapy and counselling states: 
Counsellnrs quirt' often try to distance themselves both from judgement and advice giving, 
hut to perct'i\'L', think and feel at all involn's judgement and evaluation, and to counsel at all 
inyoh"t's ~1 Judgement that the client has something to counsel about. 1l)') 
Ho\\'ard is \'ery clear about the subjective nature of the work of counselling and 
Thornc has deillonstrated the di fficulties which arise when trying to adhere to a strict 
(dogn1atic) theoretical frmllc \\'ork. In addition practitioners have been willing to 
delude then1sel\'cs into thinking that prescribed behaviour is possible. The naive 
illusion of objectivity and equality are still prevalent regardless of how often their 
futility is sho\\'n. 
The theoretical assun1ptions of any approach IUUSt remain open to debate, in that, 
one-din1ensional theory does not transfer easily, if at all, into three dimensional 
practice. The question of equality in the person-centred relationship is clearly very 
optin1istic. It is argued by other traditions that by virtue of seeking help the client is 
al\,a\"s the more vulnerable person in the room. This is often the case, but not 
al\\'ays, for e\.aIuple, the case of a client who for legal reasons (or at least in an 
attempt to luanipulate the law) comes for counselling. There is a significant 
di fference in coming for counselling and doing counselling. Someone may come for 
hours of therapy or counselling without doing the work. This is not as exceptional as 
one may think. La\\'yers increasingly recommend counselling as a tactic for more 
lenient sentencing. So there are exceptions to the notion that the client is always the 
most ,"ulnerable. 
That it is part of the therapist's role to maintain professional boundaries also 
becomes questionable. The power imbalance may not be as clear as it appears. The 
therapist may keep the time and prescribe the location. However, one can see the 
complexity, in the many variations in relationships which luay arise. What luay at 
first look straight forward on paper can take on a host of other characteristics when 
put into practice. Statements which appear benign can disguise a more malign nature 
299 Howard.A.( 1996) Challenges to Counselling and Psychotherapy. Macmillan London. p84 
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which ends up rendering thenl as dangerous as any of those explicit exploitations 
which person-ccntred counsellors accuse other traditions of. Each tradition may 
e~pl(lit and be e~ploited: the difference lies in whether or not these are overt or 
The raison d' etre of the person-centred approach was as a backlash to those 
approaches \yhich \YtTe dOlllinant in Rogers' early career, and whose stnlcture he 
belieycd to be too controlling and hierarchical. Rogers' goal was to create a model 
which ,yas opposed to this and has thus appeared to be cOlnpletely in opposition. 
Ho\yeyer. it could be argued that he and his subsequent followers have lulled 
then1seh'es and their clients into a false sense of security with their sOlnewhat naive 
idealisnl. The core conditions nlay seenl plausible when viewed in isolation, on 
paper. Ho\ve\"eL con1plications arise when an attempt is made to put them into 
practice where it is easy for one core condition to negate another, as the example 
fron1 Brian Thome den10nstrates: congruence ends up usurping, countering, the 
notion that e:\pertise belongs to the client. The disjunction between theory and 
practice is not peculiar to therapy. Orthodoxy and orthopraxy are different by virtue 
of their respectiYe intentionalities, they are different genres a useful comparison is 
the book and the film of the book. 
Carl Rogers kne\\' that his work was out of kilter or at times at odds with the rest of 
soc let\': 
Carl Rogers often used to comment that his way of being and working, ran counter to the 
mechanistic ethos of technological society, which thrives on efficiency, quick answers and 
300 the role of the expert. 
He belie,'ed that society could be improved if humans could change their way of 
bein£ in the world. He proposed non-judgmentalism as a way of conflict resolution 
for individuals, institutions and ultimately global. He knew that the availability of so 
many technologies, designed to give quick fixes, was at odds with his person-centred 
approach which he believed provided an opportunity for people to slow down and 
take the necessary time to explore their difficult lives. He did not want to prescribe a 
way of being, and suggested that the individual find his or her own way. This has 
proved difficult for his discipleship. Rogers and Freud made similar clailns, which 
implied that if people were doing what they were doing then they were not doing 
300 Thome. (1991) p 174 
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\"hat they were doing. The Buddha actually got there a long tilTIe before either of 
these tnen: that people should be doing their own thing and not copying what 
Sl)nleOne else is doing. 
Person-centred practitioners accuse psychodynanlic practitioners of exploitation and 
ditisnl, due to the long periods oftinle which they reCOlTIlTIend their clients cOlTImit 
t() therapy-~Ol. Ironically, although Rogers wanted to counter the quick fix culture, his 
approach has conle to be regarded by other therapies as just this. This is illustrative 
of the hierarchical nature of the therapeutic COlTIlTIUnity where one approach believes 
it is better than another. For sonle tinle is equated with quality, as is depth, and quick 
fi~es are regarded as superficial. This attitude to time and the way in which it is 
valued requires further e~ploratiOly~()2. Theory does not exist in a vacuum any more 
than practice, although it is sonletinles perceived this way by its adherents. 
The debate oyer the benefits, or not, of lengthy and frequent therapy still continue to 
be unclear because of the cOlTIplexities of measuring benefits. Whilst these 
approaches continue to differ on this subject, they do, as did Rogers and Freud, share 
the belief that the relationship is fundamental: 
Gradually I have come to the conclusion that one learning which applies to all of these is that 
of the quality of the personal relationship which matters most. 303 
If this is the case it is a wonder that each still invests in conflict which appears futile. 
\Yhat is their motivation for continuing to compete for supremacy? Yet there are 
other issues. relati\-e to the beliefs of depth and superficiality, for example, the 
creation of dependency, and financial exploitation, which remain areas of contention. 
Once quality was equated with frequent visits over a long duration, now this is 
challenged. As noted above because someone attends many sessions it does not 
follow that they are doing more work. One person could conceivably do more work 
in one session than another may do in many. However, the value of time and depth 
are relati\'e and are wrapped up in respective traditions. The psychodynamic 
301 Feltham. C. (1999) This work is illustrative of the contemporary debates. 
302 Recently some therapists have been dabbling with the idea that 'Time Li~nited' counselling is 
actually more beneficial than those therapies where time is open end~d. Col~n Feltham (1999) argues 
that shorter term treatments are being imposed because of the finanCIal reqUIrements of health 
legislation. And so short term counselling has arrive~ due to econ~mic factors, particularly in ~he USA 
\\'here insurance companies foot the bill. Thus, emotIOnal econormes are controlled by finanCIal 
econormes. 
303 Rogers and Steven (1967) Person to Person, Real people press .USA. p89 
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approach tnay argue that it has a longer genealogy than the person-centred approach 
but the satne argutnent that quality versus quantity luay be applied here. 
The signiticance of the above is that Rogers' movement, like Freud's, echoes a 
I'd igious institution. So nluch so that, as noted, psychodynamic practitioners are 
compared to ROl11an Catholics, and person-centred practitioners have become the 
Protestant re-fornlers. The psychodynanlic tradition has all the pOlUp and 
circunlstancc, creating an illusion of depth and nleaning whereas the person-centred, 
in actiydy renl0ying the ponlp, allowing less traditional baggage and consequently 
accused of lacking lustre. Practitioners of both psychodynamic and person-centred 
the-rapy se-e-nl blind to the fact that their values have been derived from religious 
traditions, but cye-n \yhen sonle do acknowledge the resemblance to religion it is 
often \yith irony. The fact that Freud and Rogers rejected their family's religion 
added to their detell1lination that they were creating movements which were 
scientific but also, and perhaps more importantly, atheistic. Religion for both Freud 
and Roge-rs "as problen1atic, son1ething to be cured. And yet their respective 
n10Yenlents could not have functioned without religious values or an ecclesiastical 
stnlcture. Brian Thome, mentioned above, was (at least a decade ago) tussling with 
the role of his o\yn faith and how he could make more use of it in his work. Thome 
has deyeloped his ideas on how to include his faith and, as noted, now writes on his 
role as a "reluctant prophet", a reluctance which soon becomes almost 
. . ,0,,+ 
Imperceptlye. -
The critics of person-centred therapy appear less concerned about its social role than 
about that of psychodynamic psychotherapy. In the main, person-centred therapy is 
regarded as somewhat benign compared to psychodynamic therapy. As an exception 
to this, Jeffrey Masson,305 a major critic of all talking therapies, argues that one of 
the biggest areas of contention in person-centred counselling is their alleged 
genuineness. He believes that the therapist can only ever act out the core conditions 
and that this is a f01111 of self deception which while it appears as benevolence, is 
actually malevolent in effect. Masson goes as far as calling Rogers a "benevolent 
despot,,306 and uses this amazing parallel: 
~(J.t Thome. B. (1994) 
305 Masson. (1988) 
306 Ibid p229 
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[I']n dr~l\\ an illl':\<1ct but illuminating analogy from political life benevolent despotism may 
make a bl'tkr polity than a malign Hitlerian one but it remains a despotism and is built 
nccl'ssarily on tht' same bedrock.307 
Thl' dl'cl'ption to which Masson is reacting is that of the therapist's congruence. He 
bel il'\l's that thl' therapist is nc\"Cr real because if they were real they would be 
exactly as thl'Y arc in any other situation in life. Given that reality is entirely 
subjl'ctiYe and contingent on all else his view is somewhat silnplistic and reductive. 
\ Llsson ilnp lies that one way 0 r being is n10re real than another, a view which does 
not ~1('con1n10date thl' notion that we each have n1any realities. 
\ bsson belil'\'es that therapy is at its 1110St dangerous when bad faith is extreme. It 
c()uld be argued that we are all acting all of the ti1ne and that this acting is itself 
genuine. \\'ho dictates \\'hat acting or genuineness are? For example, when we are 
\\ith friends. with fatnily, \\"ith colleagues, with whom so ever we encounter, we 
change our \\ay of being to acconl1nodate the other person in some way, and in so 
doing 1nay be accused of acting. Given that acting is such an integral part of who we 
are. it is surprising that it is so condemned. This goes back to congruence. We desire 
congruence because of its connotations of authenticity, truth, ultimately reflecting 
our desire for absolutes. 
\\,hilst suspicion of experts has its roots in the 19th century, it is alive and kicking in 
contemporary theory and practice. Suspicion, fear, and intimidation are manifested in 
the criticism of psychodynamic practice. Psychodynamic practitioners have an 
extensiye and old body of literature, history, training, medical contact, all of which 
they belie\'e substantiates and validates their claims to superiority and authenticity, 
claims \\'hich person-centred practitioners use as justification for their criticisms. 
The \\"ay in which the person-centred approach has denied their expertise has becOlne 
problematic. According to Masson, this denial just means it is covert, and in this, 
more dangerous than others. Their expertise is in facilitating the client's growth with 
their use of core conditions and consists in their self awareness and their ability to 
draw upon very few overt techniques, as each is supposed to be worn like an 
invisible gown. This is an example of an approach saying one thing which sounds 
politically correct but doing something else which is not.
308 
307 ibid p229 
308 Bond.T. (1993) Standards and Ethics in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Sage. London. 
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Abo\'e, I ha,(' us('d Brian Thorne as an excunple of how openness can go wrong, but 
\\onder, in reality, how openness is tested?JOl) For exatnple, how open could an ex 
prisontT who is now a practitioner be and still have a practice? When clients ask 
therapists questions how genuine are their replies? Brian Thorne arguably took this 
to the c:\tren1e. He used genuineness as an excuse to carry out what may, from the 
one dilnensional ,iew of the page, be described as an abuse of a client. Given 
Thorne's high profile in person-centred counselling, it is conceivable that others can 
and will uSe his c:\anlple to justify their own wayward behaviour. Many followers 
~1re so in awe of their leader that they copy even their n10st undesirable habits as was 
den10nstrated by Freud's followers snl0king the same cigars as Freud. 
\\~hen Rogers de, eloped person-centred counselling his intention was to strip 
psychotherapy of those things which he believed unnecessary and, subsequently, in 
person-centred counselling rituals are believed to be minimal. Rogers prescribed a 
t~1ce to face encounter. \,here the chairs are facing each other and of equal height; 
this, designed to create an en\'ironment of equality in which practitioner and client 
n1ay be fully together and present in the session. The time is set, as is the location 
and the \yay in which the rOOln is laid out. The therapist keeps control of the time, 
and is responsible for the location and the layout of the room. From this position of 
percei\Oed power the therapist tries to create an atmosphere which is conducive for 
the client's self-exploration. Given the above, any notion of equality between client 
and therapist must be questioned. It is superficial to think that such a veneer can 
create equality. The message is, we are equal but it is my room, my furniture, and lny 
time that you the client require and are, at times, purchasing. Can equality be bought? 
Some would argue that it is the payment which levels the playing field in so far as 
each has something that the other needs: supply and demand bring equality to the 
relationship. 
Being fully with the client requires that the therapist maintain eye contact, and be 
aware of their own body language as well as that of the client. Each therapist has 
their own rituals when meeting the client, for starting off and rounding off the 
session and will have an environment, which they perceive as conducive to self 
309 Thorne took the risk in being very open about his actions and has paid the price for such 
confessions. 
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d('\'elopn1ent. Ho\\' the client perceives all of this will be specific to theln at a given 
titne and St~1g(' in the relationship. The above has illustrated SOlne of what Rogers 
described and ad\'ocated for his followers: his atten1pts to distance his work froln 
those patriarchal theories, of which he was so condescending. Below we shall see 
that Rogers \\'as successful in his atten1pts to change the appearance of therapy. 
Ho\\'e\'cr. rather than elilninate those things to which he was reacting, he just gave 
then1 a different disguise. His theories and Inethods have become doctrinal and as 
such ha\'e created difficulties with parallel thelnes to those of Freud's followers. Let 
llS now turn to \\'hat conten1porary practitioners are doing with his work. 
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Chapter Five: Rogers' Legacy 
Below is an exploration of how contemporary person-centred therapists have 
responded to Rogers. As with Freud, lnany of Rogers' followers are thinking people 
thelnsdYes and intent on building on the foundations which Rogers created: the 
death of the founder giyes license for change. As we have noted, Rogers was 
admnant that the core conditions were necessary and sufficient, and that nothing else 
was required. Eugene Gendlin, a conten1porary of Rogers, dabbled with the notion of 
adding \yhat he called '"focusing". He believed that this could enable the client to 
locate feelings which were on 'the edge of their awareness'. Brian Thome also 
belieyes that "tende111ess" could be added to Rogers' 'Trinity'. At a conference (in 
the lTniYtTsity of Stirling, Scotland,1990) three years after Rogers' death in 1987, the 
follo\yers of Gendlin and his ideas on focusing were gathering strength and 
confidence and eyen purists such as Bozarth and Temaner Brodley, who had been 
Yehen1ently against any additions, were not challenging them in the way that they 
previously had. Although the tension has not yet been fully resolved between 
experientialists and purists, it may be that in time the reactions caused by the loss of 
the founder and the need to hang on to the, albeit illusory, authenticity of the 
tradition, \"ill abate. The position of top dog in the person-centred tradition has as yet 
to be established: in the UK Thome is certainly still a contender. The most recent 
eyidence of this came at the BAPe conference (The University of Strathclyde 1999) 
\\~here he behaved, and was treated, as if he was the new messiah, father figure of the 
person-centred approach. 
Thome has noted that at the conference in Stirling the purists acted like parents 
accepting of experientialists; 
The purists seemed to adopt a parental role rather than a judgmental role as iftheY}1ad come 
h -h 'I ~IO to accept that the Gendlin supporters, were, after all members of t e same lam! y. 
Implied in Thome's observation is the notion of parents as non-judgmental, which is 
somewhat naiVe given that person-centred counsellors spend their working lives 
trying to facilitate the repair of what they call conditions of worth, those conditions 
imposed upon people by their parents and significant others. The criticism of 
idealism, which is what the person-centred approach are accused of, seems 
310 Thorne.(1992) Carl Rogers. Sage London, p95 
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appropriate in this regard. The division between purists and experientialists is 
described in ten11S of orthodoxy versus heresy: additions to Rogers' original work are 
re~arded as "heretical":; I I . Freud also used this ten11 to describe dissenters from his 
ps~·choanal~'sis. 
So wt' hayt' Rogers with an interesting history. He COl11es to psychotherapy through 
his rt'j ection of the church, then as a revolt against the hierarchical structures of the 
psychoanalytic and behaviourist 111odels, which don1inated in his early career, he 
dt'vdoped his o\vn theory and practice. His scientific studies of therapy sessions and 
his ciainls to objectivity ha\'t.~ raised questions about how one actually determines 
what good therapy is. There are also questions about expertise, as surely people will 
c hoost' a therapist. at least in part, because of their skills expertise. Why would 
clients pay nl0ney to \vork with someone who denied their skill? 
There is slnugness at til11es bordering on arrogance within the person-centred 
tradition, \"hich is due in pali to the notion that they are somehow higher up the 
evolutionary chain. That letting go of attachment to egocentric things such as 
expertise, and relinquishing power, usurps the psychodynamics. The fact that the 
practitioner has the power to allow this is over looked. Covert power is further 
explored by Tim Bond312 who claims that even the layout of the therapy room 
cOl1lmunicates expectations. For example, the presence of a box of tissues whilst 
practicaL even thoughtful, does not Inean the therapist has an allergy or a cold, but 
implies that the therapist is looking after the client and in addition that it is okay, or 
even expected, that the client will be upset. 
There are a number of issues around training, for example, how can it be effectively 
monitored or quality controlled? Tim Bond implies that therapy is a klondyke, a free 
for all. Many people who become attracted to the caring professions do so because 
they themselves need to be cared for. The wounded healer is more than evident. 
Training is an area of contention, as there are areas which are inadequately 
addressed. It seems there is little, if any, training which covers what to do if you 
become sexually attracted to a client or vice versa, other than the rule of abstinence 
311 Ibid 
312 Bond.T. (1993) Standards and Ethics For Counselling In Action. Sage. London see also Peter 
Rutter (1989).Sex in the Forbidden Zone. Aquarian. London 
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and denial. Ethics, the area which Bond specialises in, has as yet only skilTIlTIed these 
issul's, issues such as fin~l11cial and en10tional exploitation, which appear to be 
con11non cOlnpiaints, ha\'l' also had insufficient exten1al research. All of this gives 
thl' appearance of a rather n1undane, secular activity but as is often the case what you 
SCI.' is not \Vh~lt you get. 
The person-centred approach, like thc psychodynanlic approach, arose frOlTI the 
psychl' of SOlneone \\'ho had rejected the religion of his father as well as his chosen 
tradition (which \\'as Inuch Inore l'vangelical that that of his parents). Rogers was, 
like Freud, dctennined to bl'COnle scientific, a leader in the field of psychology. 
HO\\'e\'CT, what actually happened was that he gathered around him, not colleagues 
who rej l'ct his findings and who function as equals alongside of him, but disciples 
\\'ho beconle dependent on his doctrines with faith and loyalty in him and his 
theories, \\'hich does not reflect a scientific COn11TIUnity. As noted above, those who 
have, since Rogers' death, begun to develop his work have been accused of heresy, 
not because what they are doing is particularly controversial but because 
developnlent is disrespectful to Rogers. The divisions in the person-centred approach 
are pa11 of a process \\'hich happens with the death of a founder of a religious 
1110\,enlenr' 13. There are those purists, as Thome described above, who are 
detem1ined 110t to blemish the work of the founder and those who are willing to begin 
to challenge the doctrines and who in so doing become regarded by the former group 
as dissenters. Those adopting a more eclectic, post lTIodem approach, such as Thome 
who is using religious language and insights wherever he sees this as appropriate, 
may perhaps be described as being more congruent. The omission of religion has not 
meant that it has not existed but its noticeable absence has served to highlight the bad 
faith of psychotherapy. The psychodynamic and the person-centred approach have 
actively prevented an exploration of religiousness other than in the negative. 
Although such denial, an area so close to their hearts, is now beginning to surface, it 
may be too kind a description as it presupposes an unconscious motivation and not 
the activity which it has been. 
313 It is worth noting that there is both intra and inter squabbling as well as USA/Europe~n divisions. 
Even in my own training, which was described as a dialogue between the psychodynamIC and ~he 
person-centred approaches, there was a definite east west division in so far a~ Glasgow has a hiher 
proportion of person-centred counsellors and Edinburgh more psychodynamIC. 
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Let us turn no\\' to c lain1s being n1ade by conten1porary practitioners of the person-
centred approach: \\'hat they say that is new, in what ways they overlap and borrow 
froln other traditions, and what their areas of disagreelnent are, both within their own 
tradition and \vith other traditions. This exposes the ways in which they see 
then1sdves as having developed and ways in which they have developed but do not 
articulate. particularly since the death of Carl Rogers. In addition this uncovers 
allusions to rdigion which, although present when the Rogers was alive, were 
e\.cludcd until very lak in his life when he began to talk about the mystical. Their 
shutting out the n1ystical has had a lasting effect on contemporary practitioners of 
perscl11-centred therapy and their attitudes to religion have followed a similar path to 
those of the psychodynan1ic tradition, in so far as they have been functioning in ways 
\vhich, by virtue of their position as insiders, have prevented them from seeing the 
bigger picture. Rogers \\'as the first therapist to publish a methodology for effective 
counselling-~ 1-+ and \vas deten11ined, like Freud, to be view as an empiricist. To have a 
structured n1ethod. \\'hich Rogers believed could be repeated, was the way to make a 
science of psychotherapy. He, like Freud, left behind a struggle in which his 
follo\\'ers are still engaged. 
There are different camps developing within the person-centred approach and the 
\Yay in \\'hich they address the founder may be significant. For example, in Brazier 
the contributors refer to Rogers as Rogers315 whilst Mearns and Thome each refer to 
hin1 as Carl316 . This familiarity or intimacy gives them an advantage, in that having 
had direct contact with the founder has an influential effect on the reverence shown 
to\vards them and their work. Proximity to the founder is often a prerequisite for the 
next in line and the effects of this have yet to be fully recognised. 
The current literature illustrates those developments which are forging new frontiers 
as in the title of Mearns and Thome (2000). Some are brave and far reaching, others 
more tentative. For some there has been a change in attitude to religion. For exmnple, 
Thome, as noted, is most explicit about his. This development is more significant 
seen in the light of Rogers own rejection of religion. Thome goes as far as to clailn 
31~ Ellenberger. ( 1970) p863 
315 Brazier(l993) . . . . 
316 Mearns and Thome (2000) Person-centred Therapy.·New FrontIers 111 Theory and Practlce. Sage 
London. 
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that God" 17 is central to the therapeutic relationship. This is a Inajor declaration from 
a pl'rson-centred practitioner because whilst Rogers acknowledged the spiritual and 
the 111ystical in his later \York, he had previously spent a good deal of his life denying 
its e\. istence. Thorne is here relocating religiousness, n10ving it from outside the 
periphery, Inaking it the chiasn1us of the therapeutic encounter. Rogers' work had 
this. ho\Ye\'er he and subsequent person-centred practitioners suffered from a need to 
~llly theillsel\'es \\'ith the sciences and resisted or denied any notion of the religious 
for fear of not being taken seriously as scientists. 
Since Rogcrs' death there ha\'c been n1any developn1ents of his work SOlne of which 
n1ay ha\'l' gone against his hopes but others which echo what he aspired to. Rogers 
\\'as against any notion of Rogerianisn13 I 8 , and yet this is what has happened. It is a 
con1n10n patte111 and has occurred in other traditions: Marx was not a Marxist; Jesus 
\vas not a Christian~ the Buddha was not a Buddhist; and Freud was not a Freudian. 
Rogcrianisn1 is \\'hat Rogers' followers have done and are still doing with his work. 
Rogers belieyed that ifpeople were adopting his work as dogma then they were not 
doing what he had advocated, which was to develop their uniqueness. As noted, 
SOll1e de\'elopn1ents of his work have already given rise to internal strife, causing 
tension bet\yeen those \\'ho believe that Rogers would have wanted developments 
and those \\'ho think his work is not only being developed, but that his core ideas are 
being contaminated. 
Although contemporary person-centred practitioners make claims which may only 
differ fron1 Rogers in their emphasis and as such do not seem like a significant 
deyelopmenL this is none the less a necessary part of the distancing process which 
often occurs after the death of the founder. Those people who begin to develop the 
original theories can create breakaway groups which function as denominations. 
Carl Rogers believed that for the client to make any progress the therapist would 
have to be real in their presence. One of his famous core conditions is congruence. 
Congruence in this context means to be genuine or authentic and requires the 
practitioners to have an acute sense of them selves. The concept of authenticity is a 
complex, and controversial claim, as it is difficult to quantify and/or substantiate. 
317 Mearns and Thome (2000)p61 
318 Thome.(1992) 
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Howcycr, it is none the less regarded as a quality which is paramount to the success 
() f thc person-c(,ntred therapeutic encounter and is reminiscent of a 'to thine own self 
bc truc' philosophy. Authenticity requires the practitioner to have a level of self 
a\yarcness which takcs tinle and effort to achieve, especially in a world which is 
j . l ' I .. Ill) 
l nYCll 1y lnaut lentlclty.- Rogers expected that the practitioner would develop this 
quality. 
Ho\Y('Ycr, although today' s practitioners are no less comlTIitted to the notion of 
authenticity than previous practitioners, they seek to expand it, as David Brazier 
statcs: 
In suc h ~1l1 authentic mutual encounter, there may be moments in which the therapist almost 
relinquishes his proft-ssional role and encounters the client in every personal and profoundly 
human \\<.1y .. ~\ccording to Yalom, such 'critical incidents' often become turning points in 
therapy. He belie\"es that they are seldom mentioned in the psychiatric literature out of 
shame, or out of fear of censorship; they are also seldom discussed with trainees because they 
do not fit the "doctrine' or because one is afraid of exaggerations.32o 
In this Brazier n1akes seyeral claims, the first that the therapeutic encounter aims to 
be authentic and mutual \\'hereas the original notion of authenticity was designed to 
apply to the practitioner. However, Brazier extends it to include the client. By using 
this paliicular e~an1ple, Brazier raises another issue because Irvin Yalom, referred to 
in the quotation above, is a practitioner whose familiar discourse is that of psychiatry 
and therefore of the lTIedicallTIodel. As such, he is associated with a hierarchical 
lTIodel \\'hich does not sit comfortably with the person-centred approach. The notion 
of authenticity was not something which Freud emphasised, or which until recently, 
psychodynamic practitioners were particularly concerned with321 • These words from 
Yalom are indicative of' cross pollination', the beginnings of inter-denominational 
dialogue. To synthesise ideas from one tradition with another is a challenge to the 
\\-ork of the founder. Finally he raises the issue of censorship and acknowledges, 
albeit in in\'eI1ed commas, that there is a 'doctrine' which should be adhered to. 
319 To be incongruent is expected in our culture. Ifpeople ask how you are they expect that you will 
say fine regardless of how you actually feel. If your reply is other than they expect they are often 
unsure of what to do with it. Market forces rely on the in.authentic, for example, not everyone can buy 
a real Rolex watch but many can buy the fake. Fakes of anything may be found and sinc.e most :vant 
to be seen to own the label they buy the fake. The need for the real is desperate. People III practIces up 
and down the country have come to seek out the authentic, 'real self, fundamental self. 
320 Brazier.(1993 ) p34 . ..,' 
321 In psychodynamic practice there has been what ~ know~ as ~he rule of abstIllen~~ whIch IS an. act 
of withholding feelings and information from the clIent. TIllS wIll be explored latel III the chaptel. 
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YaklIn. as an integrati\'l~ practitioner has bon-owed (perhaps unconsciously) frOln the 
pcrson-centrcd tradition, and in turn, the person-centred tradition have reappropriated 
a concept \vhich thcy regard as their own anyway.l22. This may SeelTI like a sOlnewhat 
trivial obscrvation. Howcver. in the light of continuing arglunents about the dangers 
of cckcticisn1'\2-~ purisn1 and contan1ination, this is a good exanlple of the futility of 
such tcrn1S. In'in Yalon1 is just as n1uch at ease talking of authenticity as he is talking 
about transference and counter-transference, those essentials of the psychodynatnic 
tradition.-i2 -+ Brazier has inadvcrtently given us an exanlple of how a synthesis of 
ideas froln different and apparently opposing traditions can be successful and even 
enlightening and not, as is often clain1ed, necessarily destructive and threatening: an 
interdenolninational approach. 
Thc cbin1 that the therapeutic encounter is authentic and that authenticity is Inutual is 
optin1istic. Given that the encounter relies on the client being in a state of 
incongruence, (othenvise they would not be in therapy), it is unlikely that 
authenticity is n1utual. It is possible that the client Inay be authentic in their 
incongruence but this is a sonlewhat advanced notion. The idea of authenticity as 
necessary is. it \vould seenl, part of the Inyth building required by each tradition to 
create pockets of superiority, by introducing something which is exclusive to them 
and inaccessible to other traditions. My questions about this concept are not about 
whether it is possible for the person-centred practitioner to achieve this state of 
authenticity, but \\'hat do they gain from making such a claim, and why do they 
desire it? It appears to be a 'will to truth' claim. 
\Ieanls and Thome325 claim that authenticity is essential for therapy to work and are 
a\\'are of the complexity of such a notion. However, what each person means by 
authentic is woolly. In the context of therapy it is a truth claim which ilnplies that 
other therapists are engaged in an act, an untruthful parody, of a hUlnan encounter 
and that person-centred practitioners have the true way. If authenticity is about 
knowing thy self and about honesty MeanlS and Thome acknowledge how difficult 
322 As if the notion of authenticity originated with Rogers and the person-centred tradition. 
323 Brazier. (1993) p2 74 , ' 
32-l Yalom. 1. (1989) Low! 's Executioner {[lid Other Tales of Ps),ciIotherap,y. PengUIn. London. In t~11~ 
he gives examples of the role of transference and countertransference ~hlch are personal aI~d explICIt. 
325 Mearns and Thome (2000) Person-centred Therapy:New Frontzen; 111 The01Y and Practice. Sage 
London. 
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thcsc ~lrc to achic\,('. Thcy note that whilst authenticity is an essential ingredient for 
healthy relating it is a difficult way of being in contenlporary society: 
Jutlwntil'ity (a prerequisite for mental health) becomes dangerous, and to tmst others to be 
respol1,s,\\(', let alone empathic, can seem at best foolhardy and at worst psychologically 
lethal. --( 
This is their \'ic\\' of what it costs to be genuine or authentic out with the therapeutic 
encounter in our society today. They discuss how feelings per se, in today's world 
~lr(' an inappropriate currcncy, stating that business still holds finnly to a "Let's leave 
"~ 
fee lings out of this ",'- type of culture. This nlakes congruence or authenticity very 
difficult for people who li\'e in the so called real world which itself has been socially, 
politically, and econolnically constructed. It thus begs the question of whose reality 
are \\'e talking about. The therapeutic encounter is designed to be very different to 
e\'eryday situations and is a space and tinle which allows the development of an 
altered state of consciousness which is different to every day life. 
The idea that authenticit.y Inay be switched off and on, when in the real world or 
othenyise, surely nleans that it is a form of acting in the same way that person~ 
centred practitioners say that psychodynamic practice is. The question is, what is the 
purpose of nlaking such a claim? I have already suggested that the person-centred 
tradition is Inaking a tnlth claim, the purpose of which is to set itself apart from other 
traditions. They do this in the same way as different church denominations do, to 
con\'ince themsel\'es that they have chosen the right way. Their authenticity claim 
sets them apart from other therapeutic traditions which in their view are not being 
authentic. 
The claim of authenticity is but one of many which are difficult to prove. We are 
in\'olved here in the world of human interaction and encounter within which there are 
likely to be as many variables as there are people engaging in this world. So this next 
claim. that '"empathy dissolves alienation,,328 although also too general, is at least 
corroboration that practitioners of this approach have such faith, strong beliefs in its 
basic premises that its practitioners continue to make them. This claim is Inade by 
Greet Vanaerschoe29 and whilst there may be some truth to this clailn in SOlne cases 
326 \Iearns and Thorne (2000) p4 
327 ibid. p75 
328 Brazier,(1993) p56 
329 Vanaerschot is a practitioner working at the University of Leuven in Belgium and one of the 
contributors to Brazier (1993). 
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thc fact that thc rcscarch was founded on Rogers' failed experinlents where people 
belicycd to hayc schizophrenia did not respond to empathy, did not dissolve 
alienation, does not bode well for its universal application. This study, has been used 
by \' anaerschot with a fervour which does not belong in the sciences. If practitioners 
of the person-centred approach continue to nlake the clailTI of being scientists they 
cannot also build their OW\1 theories on lnaterial that is known to be flawed and not 
raise questions about their nlotivation for doing so. Scientists do not have a problem 
\yith rejecting flawed Inaterial, in fact they live for it even when, as they often are, 
standing on the shoulders of giants, they identify areas where there is room for 
il11prOYelllent. 
It Inay \yell be possible to dissol\'e alienation by sustained empathy, as Rogers 
suggested. Howcyer, empathy can also create a type of alienation. There are in fact 
fc\\ people. especially in the early stages of therapy, who can easily receive empathy. 
The therapist \yho is finely tuned will understand this and, without naming it, will 
accon11110date the reaction by becoming different in the sessions. This leads to the 
hct that there are n1ultiple ways of being empathic, so to make the claim that 
"en1pathy dissolyes alienation" is too general and ideologically loaded. This said it 
al1110st does not matter whether empathy dissolves alienation or not. What matters 
here are the circumstances which warrant such a claim. It seems to me to be 
underpinned by a similar motivation to the authenticity claim, in that it also 
highlights a them and us dichotomy. That person-centred practitioners have empathy 
at the core of their practice sets thelTI apart from other traditions which they believe 
do not use empathy in the same systematic way. But it says more than this because 
Vanaerschot is willing to use information which is known to be flawed and as such 
demonstrates blind faith by an unwillingness to reject the findings of the founder. 
h . d d33o . The therapeutic encounter, what ever the approac ,IS con ucte In an 
environment which is intentionally alien. This is one of the reasons for therapy's 
profitability in that it claims to be different from any of our other relationships. It is 
330 We must not forget that it is conducted, however many claims there may be to non directiveness. 
The raising of an eyebrow can direct. So it is naive to assume that because there are not words 
directing that there is no direction being given. 
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not just a chat. it is not friendship, it is not advice or guidance: therapy is lTIOre 
definab le by \\'hat it is not than what it is. JJ I 
Brazier nlakes a silllilar clainl that "therapy is an altruistic activity,,332. To someone 
who is scept ical of the \'ery ex istence of altruism this clailll seems even lTIOre 
challenging than those of authenticity~ and the ability to dissolve alienation. What 
does he nlean by altruistic? Is it an act of unselfish regard or of devotion to the 
\\·elt~ll·e of another?-'-"~ Neither is deenled appropriate or desirable in the context of 
psychotherapy. In the person-centred tradition such intervention runs counter to 
beliefs such as the client's autononlY, that the practitioner is responsible to the client, 
notfor the clienr~·q. Each is regarded as paratTIount both ethically and for the efficacy 
of the therapy. 
The clainl of altruisnl~ unwittingly, flags a hierarchy of responsibility which 
attIibutes pc)\\'er to the practitioner. By virtue of claiming that altruism is within their 
power they are also lTIaking a clailTI that it is theirs to give. Even if this suggestion is 
only that the client can learn within the therapeutic encounter, to become altruistic he 
still illlplies that the therapist is acting as a mentor. Added to this is the issue of 
beneyolence. the \"ery idea of which has sent critics of psychotherapy such as 
:'lasson into raptures335 . The process of therapy is one of a novitiate to a priest or Zen 
master to pupil, \\'here a good deal is leanled at a level which is beyond articulation. 
\\Thether practitioners in the person-centred tradition like it or not mentoring is an 
acti,"e part of the therapeutic encounter their ideal of non-directiveness336 is exactly 
that, an ideal. Clients often comment on how they can hear the therapist in them 
33 I Professor Liz Bondi, of the University of Edinburgh and a team of researchers (9111101 University 
of Abertay. Cosca research conference) revealed the results of their work and have so far concluded 
that counselling cannot be defined by what it is but is made clearer by saying what it is not. 
332 Brazier.(l993) p75 
333 New Penguin English Dictionary. 
"4 
.J.J :vIeams and Thome (2000) 
335 Jeffrey Masson has been one of psychotherapy's biggest critics. He claims that there is a 
malevolent aspect to benevolence which is particularly the case in person-centred counselling which 
keeps its power covert. .Masson is himself somewhat despotic in his attitude to psychotherapy. 
Fundamentalism relies on blind spots and Masson has them just like the rest of us. 
336 In a documentary entitled "Our Deepest Desires" (BBC ONE 30 October 2002) a study was carried 
out at New Castle University by Professor Robert Winston in which young men were asked to, 
blindly, smell their girlfriends' t-shirts which had been put into jars. Every single time the man 
identified the smell of his own girlfriend. This was a demonstration of the power of smell and our lack 
of consciousness to the influence it is having on us. 
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sd\'cs. Thcy begin to adopt the languagc and the values which practitioners cannot 
pre\'cnt bcing prcscnt in the rOOlTI. There are studies which clailTI that 80% of 
conlnlunication is non \·crbaIJJ7 . If this is the case, or anything like this figure, then 
practitioners ha\'e c\'en less control than they think about what they cOlnmunicate to 
thc client at least until they lean1 that they are sti 11 COlTIlTIUnicating in the silences 
and in tnany other ways with their body language, breathing, even their smells. 
In this tradition to o\'ertly look after or direct a client is regarded as ultimately 
diselnpO\\'ering for thc client \\'ho is encouraged to take responsibility for them 
sd\'cs. In this Brazier raises an issue about the authenticity of the tradition, as 
person-centred practitioners ha\'e condelTIned other traditions for disempowering 
clients through infantilising then1, by creating relationships which rely on parenting 
and therefc)l'e dependency. What they say they do and what they do, appear from this 
to be at odds. There is conflict within the tradition on this as Brazier himself states: 
It seems that the authors cannot discard the belief that the therapist must intervene in some 
\\ay. at some point, to set the client in an appropriate direction. This presupposition can only 
lead to the conclusion that ignores one ofthe fundamental premises of the person-centred 
approach i.e. that it is the client who knows best what hurts, what direction to go, and that the 
client has vast resources for renewal. 338 
The abo\'e are indeed fundamental presuppositions of the person-centred tradition 
\\'hich Brazier contradicts in his claim about the altruistic nature of therapy. Many 
practitioners make claims about the way in which they regard the client as the expert 
and that the client is trusted to go at their own pace339 . To make a declaration of 
therapy as altruistic, counters too many person centred conditions. The notion of any 
thing as altruistic is dubious and this may be said particularly of person-centred 
counse11ing'\'+(j. Brazier's motivation for claiming that they are altruistic has 
connotations more reminiscent of a pastoral tradition than of a psychological 
tradition. 
\Vhy do they need altruism? What is the underlying motivation for this declaration? 
On further reading of Brazier's work it would SeelTI to me that it is saying sOlTIething 
of his own personal quest, as he begins to grapple with the place of the spiritual in 
the therapeutic encounter. Continual reference to the therapeutic encounter is to be 
337 On an NLP training course the facilitator, Michael Spence, was using the work of American Life 
Coach Tony Robbins. 
338 Brazier (1993 ).p97. 
339 I hear this almost daily in the agency where I work. . 
341) Rachaels.1. (1993) Elements of Moral Philosoph.y.McGraw-Hlll, Inc. 
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l'\.pcctcd in such \\Titing and the repetition of it does prOluote it as exclusive or 
sacred. 
Brazier's attitude to spirituality and religion has parallels with Rogers', prior to his 
death. He is tentatiYely engaging with the n1ystical part of the tradition by cOluparing 
his o\\'n tradition \yith spiritual traditions. Although he acknowledges the "wisdom of 
the \\'()rld' s spiritual traditions "J'+ I he does this in the context of such a cOluparison 
haying "'a certain noYdty,,·'.f2. He also notes that: 
In p~1ssing, \\t' should note ~h~t religious faith provides an example of a well developed 
yt'rsion of such a repertoirt','-l', 
"In passing"! In psychotherapy when son1ething is luentioned prefixed by 'in 
p~lssing' the practitioner \yould be ale11ed that sOluething is significant. Brazier, like 
other therapists, has little choice but to draw upon religious analogies. He believes 
hilllselfto be open luinded about religion yet he qualifies his comments in such a 
\\ay ~lS to n1ake it clear that he remains at a distance from it. Rather like someone 
con1n1enting on ho\\' they do not mind gay people; "I even have gay friends", 
con1pletely obli\'ious to the fact that in this 'even' they are making a value 
judgen1ent. The person-centred notion of unconditional positive regard appears to 
ha\'e its limits' e\'en' for Brazier. He does however make a claim for the "enigmatic 
nature of the subject" in reference to his own work, which implies that he realises 
that there are still areas of mystery as yet to be explained. 
Brazier is concerned with authenticity, altruism and discusses, albeit, 'in passing' the 
similarities between the world's spiritual traditions and his own enigmatic tradition. 
Ho\\'e\'er. he does so in ways which are so tentative as to induce suspicion about his 
moti\'ation. There appears to be some of that fear which he referred to in the 'Yalolu' 
quotation above. In another paper Brazier is less tentative. He does take a leap and 
challenges the notion that the core conditions are necessary and sufficient and he 
ffi ' ,,344 S 1 . k argues that they are "not necessarily necessary but always su lClent . uc 1 ns s 
may seem minimal, of little consequence, but to challenge the very core of Rogers' 
doctrine is a significant rejection which makes a stateluent about Brazier as a 
3-l1 ibid p75 
,-l) . 
, - Op.CIt. 
)-l, ibid. p80 
3-l-l Brazier.(1993)p 97 
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contender for the leadership. There are different ways to stand on the shoulders of 
giants: one \yay is crushing. 
l\ tany practitioners arc concerned with ways in which they can use person-centred 
practice in cCllnbination with other practices. For exan1ple, Expressive therapy is 
being deycloped by Natalie Rogers, Carl's daughter; psychodrama and body work; 
focusing: guiding out: n1ulti-n1edia approaches; fatTIily therapy; cross-cultural 
therapies. \Yhilst these changes n1ay be regarded as developments they may also be 
regarded as heresy in that if Rogers' belief that the core conditions were necessary 
and sufficient then n10st of these developnlents in some way contradict this. Of 
course one could ahyays argue that each is being done in a non directive way whilst 
still using the core conditions. Howcyer, given the above notions about what is 
perceiyed as directiYe, this is unlikely.3.+5 
Len Holdstock n1akes an interesting contribution to person-centred theory as he 
adyocates a shift fronl \vhat he calls the "individuocentric,,346 world (which was that 
of Rogers). to one in \vhich individuals no longer regard themselves as separate from 
society but each is inextricably bound. He regards the individual and society as one 
body. \vhich is a post nlodem concept, and in this it seems that Holdstock is 
son1ething of a lone player for the person-centred tradition, which has functioned in a 
sin1ilar \yay to psychodynamic psychotherapy, in so far as they have maintained an 
illusion of isolation from political involvement. 
Rogers regarded himself as a human scientist and argued for the scientific validity of 
his \\-ork. and his followers defend him in this with a sense of dogmatism which 
Rogers himself would have objected to, at least theoretically. Brazier compares 
Rogers' contribution to that of Einstein. 347 Finally an issue which is not peculiar to 
person-centred practitioners but which is an issue for therapists per se is eclecticislTI 
and whether this can be regarded as an identity crisis for the person-centred therapist. 
To practice in an eclectic way is frowned upon by most traditions, even though at 
some level practitioners realise that the notion of purism is only a fantasy. 
Practitioners can, at some level, perhaps a level beyond their consciousness, allow 
345 This is a mine field of contention. Even the psychodynamic tradition have argued that they can 
with hold in a way which embodies the core conditions. Any thing can be argued. 
34() Brazier (1993) p229 
347 Ibid p12 
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thL'n1SdYes to suspend their beliefs about pUriSlTI. This suspension is indicative that 
t~ll'ts arC' secondary to their relationship with Rogers and his comlTIunity, a 
relationship beyond that \yhich happens in science. 
\learns and Tholl1e (2000) ha\'c an entirely different tone to that of Brazier et al. 
They are \yi lling and 1110re confident in their challenges to outsiders and are clearly 
tired of the \yay in \\'hich their tradition is and has been perceived by other 
approaches. They c lain1 that they have an extremely cOlnplex and superior approach 
which is not articulated in Brazier. Thus in these things at least, there have been 
significant de\'doplnents \\'hich n1ust in part conle from an increase in confidence 
and a perhaps nlaturity \\'hich has taken tilTIe to establish. 
\ leall1S and Tholl1e nlake the clainl that there is "ahnost universal respect,,348 for 
Rogers. They nlay belieye this to be the case within the tradition, although there is 
eyidence of dissent \\'ithin each text which I have drawn from. However, out with the 
tradition he and his approach are not without critics. Masson, mentioned earlier, is 
but one and they thenlseh'es highlight areas of criticism as did Brazier. Their 
nl0tivation for nlaking this claim seems to be somewhat evangelical. Rogers is dead, 
so he does not need to ha\'e universal respect to validate him. Although in Rogers' 
nanle this acts as a reminder that they have him to be thankful for. 
~Ieams and Thome are at times inconsistent. For example, they talk of universal 
respect for Rogers on the one hand, and of the harsh criticisms made of their tradition 
on the other as if they are separate: 
[There is the, .. ] denigratory and sculTilous myth that person-centred therapists merely nod, 
and reflect the last words of their client and can only be trusted with the concerns of middle 
class clients. :140 
In the same way as the Protestants stripped away the ritual associated with 
Catholicism Rogers did the same with person-centred therapy in an attempted 
backlash against the psychoanalytic tradition. He saw the rituals of psychoanalysis as 
unnecessary props which he felt did little for the client but much to maintain a 
patriarchal tradition which should be jettisoned. Person-centred practitioners are still 
expected to work with far fewer props than psychodynamic practitioners. This said 
34~ . \;learns and Thorne(2000) pIX 
349 0 . Mearns and Thome (200 )pIX 
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thos~ practitioners \\'ho \\'ant to use additions, such as expressive therapy, may be 
accused of using di tTcrent props. 
l\ karns and Thorne are ready and up to the challenge of what they have described as 
the "superficiality 111yth,,350, \\'hich has arisen, in part, as a response to their lack of 
props. Props such as couches, dreanls, interpretation, or withholding, are not options 
CCll' the person-centred practitioner. However, this does not necessarily ilnply that the 
sinlplicity of their rituals, and they do have thenl, is superficial. On this subject 
\ leanls and Thorne are intent on setting the record straight. They state: 
... clearly ~_nl d unequinKally our belief in the power, profundity, and subtle elegance of the 
1 " approac 1 - - . 
Their response to practitioners such as Rollo May, who has accused person-centred 
practitioners of being na"i\'e, and of being "'wilfully blind to the 'shadow' side of 
, -, 
hunlan nature "-'.)-: 
\Ye are increasingly \\eary of being told that all good therapist, whatever their tradition, offer 
their clients the core conditions before embarking on the business of the therapeutic 
enterprise ... F, ... such statements clearly indicate a failure to understand the conditions as 
the attitudinal expression of a belief system about human nature and development, and about 
the healing qualities of the relationship ... They also fail to recognise that the relationship is 
the therJpy and not preparation for it. 354 
Their pride and commitment and their need to state this is nothing short of a lnission 
statenlent. Rollo May is but one practitioner who has made such accusations, there 
are others nlore vehement. Such a will to be heard is a significant development for 
the person-centred approach and the quotations above are examples of their raised 
\"oices. In the past they have been much less vocal in their challenges to critics and 
others claiming authority. Now they clearly articulate their criticisms of other 
traditions as well as in defending their own. This is not to say that they have not been 
critical at all in the past, only that now their criticism has been stepped up a notch 
and is clearly coming from a base of confidence, which has taken time to cultivate. 
It is as if after Rogers' death there needed to be a time for consolidation, and perhaps 
of regrouping, followed by a time in which the new front runners would make their 
350 ibid .p25 
351 'b'd I 1 .px 
352 ibid p62 
353 ibid .p85 
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presencc kIt. It Inay be that Brazier, Mearns and Thorne are the new self elected 
i.H.iY(lcates of person-centred counselling, in the UK, and until others within the 
tradition challengc thenl their views will appear to be representative of the approach. 
They hayc giyen the tradition, in the short tenll, a new foundation and a new 
confidence \yith their willingness to fight back against those who would be regarded 
as at the top of the hicrarchy. 
The quotation aboye also denl0nstrates a vehenlence which is rarely heard in this 
tradition becausc of their policy on unconditional positive regard. For the person-
centred practitioner to speak of their utter disenchanttnent with other approaches is a 
rej ection of one of their core conditions, unconditional positive regard. Each tradition 
seenlS to inlply that they haye sonlething to offer which is exclusive to them and at 
the Salne tinle that each therapy is just a different route to the same goal, a point 
nlade routinely about \Yorld religions. However, with the increasing 
conlnlodification oftherapy-~55 their product lnust become more exclusive to theln. 
The practitioners in person-centred tradition have through Rogers engaged in an 
e~tren1e fornl of othering, trying to establish what they do as quite distinct. Rogers 
and "\ 1ean1s and Thome haye gone as far as to clailn superiority over psychodynamic 
psychotherapy. So gone is the 'different routes to the Saine God' attitude that they 
haye pretended has existed. Blurring of boundaries between traditions, as we have 
seen although pre\"alent in'practice, is not acceptable in theory. Each tradition is 
intent on maintaining its identity, thus a them and us attitude is maintained as a way 
of averting an identity crisis which is believed to arise if synthesising traditions. As 
noted abo\"e, purism is still desirable and as we shall see below there is concern for 
those practitioners who claim to be integrative or, even worse, eclectic. 356 Rogers 
himself cannot be described as a purist given his own admission to soaking up the 
Freudian views which were present at Columbia. 
\;1 earns and Thome are most affronted that Freud is regarded by some as the source 
of a person-centred concept and state: ". 
Ellingham has suggested that congruence is a concept fashio~ed esse~tIally from a FreudIan 
perspective and therefore out of harmony with a process - onented VIew of therapy. 
(Ellingham, 1999)357 
355 Ho\\arcL( 1996) In this work he believes that counselling and psychotherapy are rapidly becoming 
commodities" 
356 In Brazier (1993) there is a chapter by Hutterer on this very subject. 
357 ibid. p86 
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Ellinghan1 is a practitioncr who, it seen1S, has no right to trespass on the hallowed 
ground of th~ person-centred tradition. Although above we saw how Mearns and 
Thorne drc\\' froln the \\'ork of Irvin Yalon1, and how they frequently use 
practitioners, \\'ho are not necessarily person-centred, to support their argulnents of 
Inisunderstanding, \\'hen others engage in the saIne process of cross pollination it is 
threatening to then1, certainly when it challenges the notion that congruence is 
pCl'uliar to the person-centred tradition. As noted, Phillips also talks about 
psychoanalysis as a process, so it would seen1 that trespassing is inevitable. 
This kind of defence through attack is an interesting one. John Shlien a person-
centred practitioner has attacked the tilne honoured notion of transference, a concept 
which has been resisted by n1any person-centred counsellors, but which is one of the 
pillars of their greatest ri "als, the psychodynatnic tradition. Shlien claims: 
Transference is a fiction inyented and maintained by therapists, in order to protect themselves 
from the consequences of their behaviour. :158 
This is an attack on the "ery foundations of psychoanalysis and much psychotherapy. 
\,'ot only does it question the existence of transference, claiming that it is nothing 
n10re than fiction, but he uses it to attack the credibility of practitioners by stating 
that they need it to cover their own ineptitude, an ineptitude, which may have 
n1aleyolent consequences, as Masson would also claim. Implied in this is the 
supeliority of the person-centred approach for which he believes such tools are 
unnecessary and in fact a hindrance and that person-centred practitioners do not 
require the crutches \\'hich others have come to rely on. Such arguments are more 
than reminiscent of those between church denominations who when vying for 
suprelnacy, disregard their own tenets. 
This process of arguing and counter arguing is necessary for the development of each 
tradition "without contraries there is no progress,,359. With each attack there is a 
closer analysis of the subject which hopefully allows each to get to know their 
subj ect more. However, one of the issues arising in this dissertation is the inability of 
each approach to have the tolerance which is, arguably, fundamental to their 
approach. As is the case between many churches and indeed faiths, the attention to 
358 Brazier.( 1993 )p35 
:159 Blake. W. The Marriage. 
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qualitics sllch as cOlnpassion and tolerance seel11 all too superficial. So for the 
person-centred to trust in the process of the psychodynaIllic tradition to go at their 
o\\n p~lCc and to usc \yhat eycr their own potentialities happen to be, in this case the 
tcc hniques of transferencc and counter-transference, is as yet, not possible. Rogers 
has sct goals \yhich are outwith the capabi lities of person-centred practitioners. His 
core conditions are difficult to apply in any context even where people are trained 
with the c\.pectation that such qualities are necessary. The psychodynamic tradition 
appear to ha\'c set thenlSelycs less challenging goals and as such look ll10re 
successful. 
Each approach is continually dcyeloping ways of arguing for the supremacy of their 
tradition and whilst this is in S0111e way adnlirable, it begs ll1any questions about 
purisnl and fundanlentalisnl, when it could be argued that they all come frOl11 the 
sanle creator. and as such haye nl0re COllll11on denominators than each is willing to 
ackno\Yledge. 
~o one person can be representative of an approach any more than one religious 
bclieyer is representatiYe of the whole tradition. However, those who publish are 
nl0re influential by yirtue of reaching a wider audience. Where Shlien, above, is a 
se\'ere critic of transference there are SOll1e within the person-centred tradition who 
are less critical. Germain Lietaer for example, acknowledges the existence of 
transference \"hilst showing that it is of little relevance to the person-centred 
practitioner: 
\\' orking through of transference is not thought of as a nuclear process, as the 'pure gold', in 
l ' d h 360 C lent centre t erapy. 
Lietaer would not be considered pro transference but demonstrates that Shlien's 
stance is extreme and it is therefore unsafe to take one person's word as 
representati\'e. Lietaer is less defensive or lllore able to practice unconditional 
positi\'e regard. 
~1eams and Thome claim: 
The person-centred approach is an entirely different therapeutic system from the , 
psychodynamic and gestalt models which operate at a more superficial relational level. ,,61 
360 ibid p3S. Lietaer also refers to this approach as Client centred which was the ?rigi~lal ~a~le which 
Rogers ga\'e to his approach before revising it to person-centred. Client centred IS obJectlfymg and 
person is not.. 
361 \;learns and Thorne,(2000) p46 
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This is a hlscinating criticisnl as the person-centred tradition is the one ITIOSt often 
~ll'Cllscd of superficiality. It does not belong to the Depth Psychology group, a group 
\"ho have rc"elkd in the status which the nletaphor of "depth' has afforded theln . 
. -\ccusations sllch as this are due in part to person-centred claims of only working 
\"ith \"hat is here and no\\'o In addition its unwillingness to work with unconscious 
proccsses renders it. according to others, lacking in depth. Another possible aspect is 
that person-centred counselling is often shorter tern1 than psychodynamic and as tiITIe 
is cquated, albeit Inistakenly \"ith depth, the accusation of superficiality has been 
applied. In the light of this the conllnents fron1 Meallls and Tho111e are more dramatic 
than thcy look. These person-centred practitioners are willing to standing up and 
tight back against other established schools and going as far as implying that they are 
deluded in their beliefs. Such an overt denlonstration of disregard for their core 
condition of unconditional positive regard is new. 
\ 1eallls cbinls: 
The 'responsibility dynamic' (Mearns, 1997a) within the person-centred approach delineates 
the appropriateness of the person-centred therapist/trainer being responsible to her client or 
trainee and the inappropriteness of the therapist/ trainer being responsible for her 
c lient!trainee~«~. 
:-\.S Inentioned above. the same rules apply in the therapeutic encounter where any 
notion of inequality is discouraged and where parenting is clearly frowned upon. 
Parenting. and n10thering in particular, are frowned upon in person-centred 
counselling. again demonstrating parallels with the Catholic church which is 
perceived to be parental(the priest is addressed as Father) and to keep control at all 
tilTIes. Other traditions in psychotherapy are less dogmatic about this and are 
chastised by person-centred practitioners for this. For example, in Mearns and 
Thome there is an audible note of condescension when they state: 
However in other therapeutic traditions, a more parental role is accepted and even 
363 
expected. 
This criticism of the parental role is aimed directly at psychoanalysis as Rogers 
belie\'ed it was notorious for creating dependency. This note of condescension is 
nothing compared to the contempt towards the psychodynamic stance on boundaries: 
The psychodynamic world is, rightly, more scared about boundaries than person-centred 
practitioners. 
362 ibid. p46 
363 ibid .p46 
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This is criticisn1 indeed and one could easily hear such a sentiment coming from the 
Protestant church of Catholic priests. That the psychodynamic practitioner has more 
reason to be fearful about boundaries than the person-centred practitioner turns 
conll11only held assun1ptions on their head, as person-centred practitioners have 
historically been the 1110St likely to be challenged about their use of boundaries. As 
\"lth the superficiality l11yth Mea111s and Thorne have risen to the challenge over 
boundaries and dedicate a good deal of their new work to codes of ethics, which they 
belie"c to be biased in favour of psychodynamic practitioners. In that, existing 
legislation does not allow crossing the physical boundary. Touching is not an option, 
and one 111ay be struck off for it. This is an accepted, but not always adhered to, rule 
for the psychodynan1ic practitioner whose tradition advocates both a rule of 
abstinence. \"hich is the no physical contact rule, and has a recommendation of 
actiye1y withholding personal infol111ation from the client. Each rule is set in the 
nan1e of therapeutic success but as Mearns and Thome have shown, does not 
necessarily guarantee the safety of the client if, as they also argue, withholding may 
be just as problen1atic. 
The person-centred approach has no such rules internally and in practice has a 
different attitude to touch, as illustrated by the example of Thome. There are so 
11lany paradoxes in the therapy world as to make it a daunting process to try to keep 
abreast and it seems that with each challenge there unfolds a myriad of further 
challenges. In the person-centred tradition they make claims about the minimal 
interyention of the practitioner, then counters this by arguing for the appropriateness 
of touch \"hich must be regarded as an intervention. 
In therapy, paradox is the norm. Mearns and Thome imply that the reason for having 
such rules is more for the protection of the practitioner than the client. That person-
centred practitioners share the same governing bodies, for example, the British 
Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP), and their Scottish equivalent 
COSCA, as psychodynamic practitioners is problematic. Each of these agencies 
includes a rule of abstinence in their code of ethics, codes which have been adopted 
from a psychodynamic model and as such renders them inappropriate for the person-
centred practitioner. In the way that ethical codes in other faith communities have 
rules which are specific, so do these traditions of psychotherapy. 
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Tl1l're is therefore a dikn1111a for the person-centred practitioner in carrying out their 
task, when they belic\'e that at tin1es to be fully human to the client lTIay rely on 
I11aking physical contact with then1 or disclosing personal material. Rogers was 
~lgainst the professionalisation of counselling. He, like Freud, believed that there are 
~lS I11any charlatans with qualifications as there are without. What he appears to have 
I11eant \yas that you can l1eyC'1" legislate for the n10rality of practitioners: there will 
always bc pcople who oYcrstcp the mark whatever the lTIark is. Underpinning this 
tension is the hierarchy which still thrives in therapy and the fact that Freud still 
driycs gOYell1ing bodies is a source of protest for those who have little affinity or are 
anti- Freud. 
~ leall1s and Tholl1e, as n1entioned above, argue that it can be just as detrimental to 
withhold fron1 a client as it can be to touch a client. However, there is no legislation 
which says you n1ay be struck off for withholding. This is a bUll1ing contemporary 
issue bet\yccn these t\yO approaches. So lTIuch so, that Mearns and Thome state: 
In L1Ct: 
There is a greater gulf of understanding between person-centred and psychodynamic 
orientations on this matter than any other. 3h4 
This issue is so divisi\'e between the approaches that it is almost impossible to sustain a 
dialogue upon it. 365 
This is an interfaith impasse. 
Each of these approaches has a view of the other which is somewhat distorted. Their 
infonnation is often based on their understandings of what outdated texts say that 
they do. rather than what practitioners actually do. For example, person-centred 
practitioners still hold that: 
[FJrom a classical psychodynamic perspective it is critical that the humanity of the therap~st 
is hidden from the client and in the person-centred orientation it is crucial that her humamty 
366 be seen. 
It is questionable that such a thing as a classical anything exists other than in an 
epistolary way. The notion that practitioners of any approach really adhere to their 
book is unlikely. None the less person-centred practitioners find some solace in 
maintaining this myth in the same way that psychodynamic practitioners do with the 
superficiality myth mentioned above. 
3!J-t ibid .p46 
365 ibid .p46 
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\\'h11st therc Inay hayc bccn son1e foundation to Rollo May's accusation (above) of 
pcrson-ccntred naiycty it is possible to view it in another way. For eXainple, that the 
pcrson-ccntred tradition are optin1istic and hopeful in ways which are not echoed by 
the psychodynatnic tradition. The person-centred tradition still hold to Rogers' 
original supposition of the inherent goodness of the human being and this is what 
inspires and n10tiYates their practice. If this is viewed in the light of their respective 
social and political enyironn1ents one can understand that experience of and attitude 
to eyil \\'CHIld be different. The don1inance of Jews in the early Freudian camp 
perhaps Inakes this understandable367 . Rogers in the USA was quite a distance from 
the rise of National Socialisn1 with its culn1ination in the horrors of Nazi Germany 
and as such \yas perhaps protected to such a degree as to allow him to be more 
for~iyin~ ofhun1an failure. 
~ '-
A spiritual din1ension, as 111entioned above, was to develop in the later part of 
Rogers' career and conten1porary person-centred practitioners have recently taken up 
"'here they believe he left off. Rogers' work in this was very much in its infancy 
\\'hen he died, but Brian Thorne hopes to develop it in a way which he believes 
Rogers \\'ould have anyway. Mearns and Thome discuss the fact that each individual 
COlnes to counselling with their own beliefs. For some this may be existential, as in 
the case of \Iearns, and for others they may have a clear commitment to a religious 
tradition as does Thome: Mearns notes: 
Carl had plenty of disciples - but he also had people around him who enjoyed the tussle of 
ideas - pity I can't meet him now368 . 
Rogers claimed: 
I hate to have "disciples", students who have moulded themselves meticulously into the 
pattern that they feel I wish369 . 
Rogers like Freud liked to influence the way he was received by people but did not 
haye the power to prevent a discipleship developing. Such a statement makes Rogers 
sound as if he was not intent on having power. However, by lnaking the statement at 
all he demonstrates his attempt to control his followers. 
367 Freud was intent that psychoanalysis should not become a Jewish Ghetto and it was for this reason 
that he wanted Carl lung to be his next in line. 
368 \;teams and Thorne (2000).p 172 
369 Rogers .C.R. (1980) Being Carl Rogers Houghton Mifflin. Boston. New York.p19 
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Thorne, \\'ho has been a devout Rogerian, believes hilTIselfto be one of the wayward, 
nIa\'erick, counse 110rs of this tradition. He clailTIs to have had a revelatory experience 
\vhen he \"as si\. years old and his religious conviction has stayed strong since then. 
He clainIs th~lt this c\.perience has set hilTI apart frOlTI others and his allegiance to the 
dUlrch has been an ongoing challenge for hinI. His last publications have been 
attenlpts to reconcile his faith and his counselling. As noted above, Thome has since 
( 1991 ) had a nunIber of publications in which he addresses the issue of faith in 
counsdling and uses hinIsdf as the case study370. He is devoted to Julian of Norwich 
and has \"cekly "isits to her shrine. His views about God in counselling have 
c hanged since his earlier c\.periences of personal turbulence, when he was unable to 
~1Ckno\Vkdge his faith in the counselling encounter. From this we can deduce that 
Thorne has al\"ays looked beyond hinlself for a source of inspiration, going against 
Rogers' prescriptions about disciples and religion which, as noted, were taboo for 
Rogers. 
)'lea111S nlakes the distinction between tusslers and disciples implying that disciples 
are not people of ideas. This is indicative of a fear of being associated with religious 
fen·or. Ho\\eyeL it is sOlTIehow acceptable if the fervor is named as secular. Mearns' 
attitude belongs to \"ider issues of maintaining divisions whilst appearing to be open 
and tolerant of others \vhose views are different. Such bipolarizing is a process of 
othering \\'hich relies on the use of extremes. Bipolarising tusslers and disciples 
fo11o\\'s in the tradition of either/or which ultimately seeks to keep an exclusive zone. 
There has been little advantage in promoting similarity which serves to dilute the 
e\.clusi\·ity. There appears no way round this. Psychotherapists do have to rely on 
language \\'hich implies religiosity, spirituality and mysticism. However, they do not 
really accept this for fear that if they do they would have to relinquish their ties, 
tenuous though they are, to science. This process also follows in that tradition of 
binaries \\'hich declares, if not science then religion, with no middle ground. When 
something is familiar, and in some ways regarded as not in need of repair, it can be 
comforting and problematic at the same time. For example, one's discomfort zone 
370 Thorne. B.( 1999) Julian of Norwich: Counsellorfor Our Age Guild Lecture. ~o.265. This has been 
published as Chapter 17 of Person-celltred Counselling and Christian Spiritlla/zty By Thorne. B. 
(1998). Whurr. pp 1 05-116. Also Thorne.B.(2002) The Mystical P01I'CI' of Pers~l: -Centred Therapy: 
Hope Beyond Despair. Whurr. London and Philidelphia. Thorne.B.(2003) h~f1l11tely Beloved: The 
Challenge of Divine Intimacy. The Saturn Theological lectures. Dartman, Longman and Todd .. 
London 
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can beconle one's con1fort zone by virtue of fan1iliarity, thus lnaking it Inore 
unc0111fortablc to change than to stick with the fatniliar. 
~ karns describes hilllself as an atheist, and Thon1e as a Christian. 
Brian t'~Plrl'sses himself in terms of his Christian faith while Dave's language is entirely 
s t' (' lila r. .' 
I think that such diyisions are ultilnately unhelpful. Language is man made and as 
such is both secular and religious at the satne tilne. In fact, it is not language which is 
religious or secular but the way in which language is used: "let the use detennines 
the 111eaning". The need to divide is a recurring then1e in both the person-centred 
tradition and the psychodynan1ic tradition. Each needs to polarize in an either/or way 
\vhich is so c()}1trary to \\'hat they advocate for their clients for whom they would 
c lain1 there is always a n1iddle \\'ay.372 
\ Vith the \york of Thon1e, and to a lesser extent, Brazier the idea of the spiritual or 
111ystical aspect \Yithin the therapeutic encounter is gradually sneaking back. Rogers' 
dec larations about his n1issing the importance of the mystical, although taking SOlne 
tinle to be re\isited, is now being addressed by a few mavericks who recognize its 
in1portance. EYen Mearns, who is intent on secularising therapy notes: 
I USc the term 'meeting at relational depth' (Mearns 1996,1997a) as secular language to 
describe a po\\erful phenomenon. It is identical to Buber's notion of the 'I-Thou' relationship 
(193~) c\'cl1 though Buber himself could not imagine that possibility within a therapeutic 
relationship.373 
Here the atheist cannot use the words of the religious man but neither can the 
religious man conceive that they are talking of the same phenomenon. Buber, a 
J e\\'ish mystical philosopher with whom Rogers had a dialogue374 about this very 
phenomenon, had in the end to agree to disagree with Rogers. Neither Rogers nor 
Buber \\'as able to move beyond their own paradigm and see, as Mearns claims, that 
'it' was identical. Thome with his Christian theological background as well as a 
person-centred training, has no such difficulties. He believes that what happens in 
these times which Mearns calls relational depth is that God is present: 
'71 -' '-'learns and Thorne (2000)pSS . 
372 Phillips (1994 )draws on the work of a feminist psychoanalysis Coltart, whose work IS very 
influenced by Buddhism and this middle way is more prevalent. 
'73 -' \learns and Thome (2000) pS6 
37-l Kirschenbaum.H. and Land Henderson.V. (1990) (Eds) Carl Rogers Dialogues. Constable. London 
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God, it \\ould seem, is a relationship and cannot exist except as an interrelated unity.375 
The n10st in1portant aspect of all therapy is the relationship and Thorne seems to be 
sayin~ that for hin1 when therapy is at its best God is present. Thome is open to the 
111ystical din1ension where as Meanls naInes it as an existential experience which has 
no dilllellSion beyond the here and now. 
O'Hara, a person-centred practitioner, describes her own encounters: 
It isn't the technique, it isn't the therapist, it isn't the training. It isn't the new wonder drug, it 
isn't tht' diagnosis. It is the clients' own inborn capacity for self-healing, and it is the meeting 
oft\\o or more sn\'t~rt'ign or sacred Ts' meeting as 'we' to engage with the significant 
questions of existence (O'Hara, 1995.30)376. 
Such clainls are yery close to those of Bollas' descriptions of what he calls the 
nOlnnenal encounter in psychoanalysis. O'Hara it seems is very clear about what 'it' 
is not. She dra\ys on Rogers' original concept that the client has inherent healing 
po\yer and. against all odds, is able to Inove forward in development, but she also 
uses the SaIne notion as Buber's 'I-Thou' quoted by Mearns above. The healing 
PO\YcT of the client is of course dependent on the right conditions for growth and 
these conditions require another human being in the same space who is capable of 
creating an enyironment in which the client feels safe enough to explore and develop 
thenlselyes \yithout judgment. These are more easily defined by what they are not. 
There is still much fear and confusion in this area. As is seen in O'Hara the spiritual 
and the so called secular collide. (And yet, as is apparent in the recent works of 
person-centred practitioners, there is still a good deal of work to be covered in this 
area). 
Although the person-centred tradition has begun to acknowledge the possibility of 
the presence of spirituality within the therapeutic encounter, not all see it as a 
necessary development. However, they could learn from other disciplines, such as 
religious studies, where in the past to study a tradition and exclude its theology was 
common, where it is now recognized as unacceptable to leave anything out. As we 
have seen above, the psychodynamic tradition has also been reluctant to engage in 
this exploration. 
375 .'v1earns and Thome (2000).p61 
376 ibid .p75 
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The intluence of their respective founders has had a significant effect on the attitudes 
of contelnporary practitioners to spirituality. In the case of Rogers he was beginning 
tl) n1~lkl' spacl' for the Inystical, but this was not always the case. In fact he spent 
111uch tilne in his early years rejecting religion, a legacy which his disciples have 
found difficult to shake off. Freud on the other hand was always anti religion; a 
pathological state fron1 which to be cured . 
. -\.bov(\ we have exp lored son1e of the criticisn1 about the person-centred tradition 
and son1(, person-centred criticisn1s of other outside practice. There is however, also 
criticisn1 of insiders who are not n1eeting the criteria for good practice and who are 
criticized ahnost as vehen1ently as outsiders. Mean1S and Thome have fierce words 
indeed for those practitioners who have failed to grasp the complexity of the core 
conditions: 
Sadly. those \\"ho falsely conceptualise the core conditions as techniques to be deployed are 
perhaps the most culpable deceivers, for their shallowness leads to prostitution of a life 
nl . 'f ~77 e 1anclllg gl t.' 
These judgtnents recall the condelnnation of deviants in the Old Testament and in 
addition \\'hen ~Ieams and Thome talk about the "uncontaminated" it sounds even 
l110re fundamentalise 78 . The idea of contamination has parallels in the debate about 
ec lecticisn1 and that which is regarded as ilnpure or unclean: tenus with a long 
religious history. The source of the prescriptions for segregation in religion and the 
idea that if not segregated things beCOlne unclean, is a mystery and the debate about 
eclecticism \'ersus purism appears equally obscure to psychotherapists. 
:\iIeams and Thome have noted the flaws of their colleagues, both inside and outside 
their tradition and are aware of the ways in which their theories have been 
misconceived and underestimated: 
... e\'en those who call themselves 'person-centred' had an incredibly superficial view of the 
approach. seeing it as comprising only of the three therapeutic conditions of empathy, 
unconditional positive regard, and congruence.
379 
The underestimation to which they refer is reductionism and relies on selection, so 
one Inay see why it may pave the way to fundamentalism, in that those people who 
do not stray from what they believe to be original at least believe that they keep the 
377 ibid .p88 
378 ibid .p90 
379 ibid p26 
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ori~inal e\.pressions of the tradition in evidence. However, others may believe that 
this is itself a way of distorting the process or systeln. The core conditions were the 
doctrine of Rogers and as such not open for developlnentldistortion. 
The aboyc c\.atl1ples of contell1porary work in the person-centred tradition indicate a 
kind of con1ing of agc, a n1aturity and confidence which allows the work of the 
foundcr to be challenged as well as developed. Although this challenge is still often 
tcntati\'c it is present none the less. Person-centred practitioners are no longer willing 
to accept criticisn1 without a fight and now have thought through responses for such 
criticisn1s. 
A.s ~ ica1l1S and Tho1l1e and YalOll1 den10nstrate above, the interplay between 
traditions is 1110re con1n10n than each would like to think and the gap between them is 
eyer closing. \\'hat once 111ay have been regarded as their fundamental differences, 
, 
Jre no longer as clear. That is, the practice of each of these traditions is often at 
variance to what their theory clailns. Their adoption of the values of other traditions 
seen1S to take place by son1e process of oSlnosis Inaking them less at odds than each 
belien:s. This den10nstrates the discrepancy between theory and practice. 
Those practitioners \\'ho have contributed to the texts mentioned above may be 
regarded as re\"isionists. They are all revisiting the original theories of Rogers and 
making suggestions for improvelnent. Or, as Mearns and Thome they have tried to 
reconte:xtualise the core conditions in order to counter the over simplistic and 
reductionist way in which they are regurgitated in most texts used in person-centred 
training. ~o\v. \learns and Thome would no doubt argue that this is a necessary part 
of Inaking an approach accessible, i.e. reducing the theory to a set of criteria. 
Ho\\"e\'er, this can prove counterproductive if the theory becomes so far removed 
from that which it was intended as to render it false. 
In the above we have discussed what contemporary practitioners of person-centred 
counselling are doing with the work of Rogers. Like Freud, Rogers' followers have 
had difficulty in coming of age where religion is concen1ed because it was such a 
taboo subj ect for their founder. Some have begun to take the risk and declare that 
they can see a place for the spiritual in psychotherapy but as yet these voices are still 
very much in the minority. Rogers' followers respond to him, as Freud's followers 
responded to Freud, not with reasoned evaluation but a passionate concern for 
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pr("ltccting Rogcrs and his work and nlaintaining the fa<;ade of being what he 
prescribed thcy should be, scientists. The acknowledgnlent of the ilnportance of the 
religiL1usness ot'both clients and counsellors is a lnajor step forward. However, we 
ha\'c yet to hear thenl declare the necessity of taking account of religiousness, 
spirituality and the sacred, both for their practice and for their existence in a post-
secular WL1rld. \Vhat they do is entirely underpinned by the religious. 
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Chapter Six: Post-Secular Psychotherapy. 
Religious studies 111ay seenl like the least likely area where the much needed rescue 
packag(' for psychotherapy nlay be found. However, if religious studies is brave and 
includes in its repertoire post-secular philosophy there could be a way forward. First, 
a son1('\\hat reductionist \vord on the post-secular. Post-secular philosophy cannot be 
described in a nutshell any nlore than other philosophies can but it posits the idea of 
a r('tunl to God \vithout church. Given that the problem which psychotherapists have 
had \vith r(' ligion has been. in the nlain, institutionalised religion it is possible that 
\vithout the institutional trappings religion 111ay be Inore accessible to them. For 
('xalllple. Phillip Blond. an advocate of post-secular philosophy claims: 
... these secular minds are only now beginning to perceive that all is not as it should be, that 
\\"hat \yas promised to them - self liberation through the limitation of the world to human 
faculties - might after all be a form of self-mutilation. 380 
Blond sees the \vorld through the eyes of a forward thinking theologian, who has 
observed the challenges of the secular, and is willing to risk the criticism of 
institutional religions by offering a further possibility for the already unchurched. He 
states: 
.-\b\ays and e\·eryday those trapped in such worlds practice the violence of denial. They deny 
that only one world or order might precede them; tlu·ough turning away from the 
transcendent they yiolate that which is present alongside and before them, and with 
intoxicating compulsion of ressentiment they complete it all with the refusal of a future, 
taking being-towards-death (sein zum tove) as the definitive mark of the only subjectivity to 
381 come. 
Blond above is referring to secularists, and psychotherapists may be included in this 
as they ha\·e been actively unchurched by virtue of their founders' vehemence 
to\\·ards religion. In psychoanalysis, psychodynamic psychotherapy and person-
centred counselling to rej ect religion has become such an integral part of their 
functioning, their tacit knowledge that unless they step outside their skin they cannot 
see that what they do is religious. 
Blond is a leader in the contemporary movement of post-secularists to reclaim God, 
albeit a very Christian God. However, in order to reclaim God one lnust first have 
lost God. Losing God is one thing, as is misplacing God. However, denying God 
invoh·es intent, which is different, in so far as it is active not passive. Freud belongs 
to the latter category of those who were detennined to denounce God by actively 
380 Blond.P. (ED) (1998) Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology. Routledge. 
London. pI 
381 Ibid p3 
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denying God. Freud's theory that belief in God was a sickness created a 111ajor 
problen1 Cor psychotherapeutic cOn1tllunities to come, although in post modernity it 
s('el11S a disen1bodied God is, as we shall see, all the rage. On the one hand Freud's 
belieC in such a wide spread sickness, whilst giving work to psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy, also 111ade religion a taboo for practitioners. This also applies to the 
fo11o\\('rs of Rogers who have also ren1ained faithful to him by, until very recently, 
not courting religion. 
The post-secularist intention is to "recover a world before and beyond the secular"JX2. 
Although secular is ascribed such n1eanings as before and beyond church, and 
historically refers to an autonon10US world free fr0111 the dominance of religious 
institutions, in con1n10n parlance the word secular has become allied to atheism. 
Hc)\\e\cT, in order to ha\e a concept of atheism, theisl11 had to exist and as such is 
al\\ays paI1 of the genealogy of any argul11ent which is about pre, or post religion. As 
Foucault concluded, e\erything should be viewed in the context of the power created 
by its indi\idual genealogy383 and if the genealogy is as important as the thing itself 
it is surely essential to pay attention to each in equall11easure. There is no pre-
history. only histories which make histories. Freud believed that the answers to life's 
difficulties lay in our past and in finding the origin of our motivations we would have 
a greater understanding of our present. However, with this model, he would also 
have been interested in the origin of our origin. Although Freud would not have 
anY1hing to do with the divine Regina Schwartz claims: 
Because of his faith in the explanatory power of science, this secular Freud is paradoxically 
compatible with the onto-theological h'adition, with its search for origins, for meaning and 
'8 .. purpose, for truth," 
Phillip Rieff claims: 
Regardless of how far he ranged outside the recognised boundaries of experimental science 
Freud was anxious to preserve the image of himself as a solid scientist rather than a freelance 
explorer poking around on the savage hinterlands of the civilized mind.
385 
For Freud to be religious was to be uncivilised, unsophisticated, however, as is often 
the case with Freud such beliefs did not prevent him from forging intimate 
friendships with men of faith. This said, to be Freudian or indeed Rogerian, and 
382 Ibid pxIii 
383 Phoca.S.andWright.R.(1999) Introducing Posrj'enzinism Icon Books. London.p94 
384 Schwartz. R. in Ward (1998) p281 ... 
385 Footnote 4 on p302 of chapter 11- Schwartz in W~rd (~998).Schwa~ts IS quotmg from, RIeff. P. 
(1959) Frr!lId: The mind of the Moralist. Chicago UmversIty press. ChIcago. p23 
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11('lil~YC in God has been problen1atic as this in their founders' tenns was an 
indication oL at the Ycry least weakness, but in the n1ain an illness and therefore not , 
a position fron1 which to conduct science. The legacy of Freud's ideas on religion is 
that anyone \yith allegiance to hin1 n1llst collude with his denial of God. Resistance to 
acccpt any notion of God is con1n10nplace in psychotherapy across the board. In this 
Freud is ccrtainly aliyc and kicking3xCl • His act of denial or, as Blond would have it, 
"sdf-n1utilation", has created untold resistance. Ironic really when his ideology relies 
on thc notion that the exploration of signs of resistance is what will lead to ones 
in1pro\'ed health. One could argue that for the followers of Rogers at least he left the 
possibility of the Inystical. However, this caIne so late in Rogers own career that the 
dan1agc had already been done and n1any Rogerians were already committed to 
atheisn1. 
As \\c hayc seen aboyc, there are son1e therapists fr01n both traditions now willing to 
'in1pro\'e their health' by beginning to court things religious. As noted above, Coltart 
cxplorcs rcligious parallels between Buddhism and psychoanalysis and declares the 
cssential role of "faith" in the psychoanalytic process: 
Ho\\ eyer much \\'e gain confidence, refine our techniques, decide more creatively when and 
hO\y and what to interpret, each hour with each patient is also in its own wayan act of faith, 
faith in ourselyt's, in the process, and faith in the secret, unknown, unthinkable things in our 
patients \yhich, in the space which is the analysis, are slouching towards the time when their 
hour comes round at last. 387 
Is this a sign that the unchurched are embracing faith and the unknown in a way 
\\hich is meaningful or is it yet more lip service to join the contemporary rush on 
things spiritual? To state that "slouching toward the time when their hour comes 
round at last", implies a slow, linear view of healing, one where there is a beginning, 
middle. and an end, and if one is lucky somewhere on the line, a view of 'Eden'. 
Eden, as Adam Phillips notes, again albeit ironically, is a moral imperative of 
psychoanalysis388 and subsequent psychotherapies. That is, that each practitioner has 
their own agenda, motivated by a cultural nonn which holds the ilnage of a 
possibility of an 'Eden' type of future, fuelled by a fantasy of "golden ages" of the 
past. That the past is always in the present and influencing the future is nonnative in 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. Coltart is saying more than just that faith is 
386 The aforementioned Time magazine survey was off the mark. 
387 Coltart (1993 )p3 
388 Phillips( 1994) 
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l1l'l'l'SSary. shl' is l'lllbracing the "secret unknown ... " and begins to relinquish a need 
to l)bjl'cti t\ this. Blond would arguc that the objectification of the unknown is 
desirable and that truth, beauty and goodness are shared universal objects. 389Rogers 
whilst haying no notion that his person-centred therapy has a destination none the 
less clainls that the indiyidual has, what he calls, the actualising tendency which is 
deYl'l0pIllent in a forward Illotion, not far ren10ved fron1 the Eden of the 
psychodynanlic tradition. 
Coltart has a way of bringing together different paradigills which is quite 
rcyolutiol1ary. For c\.atllpk. shc ciain1s: 
Tht' whole of our subject, psychoanalysis, can be, and often is, attacked on the grounds that it 
is unscientific and cannot be supported by any scientific evidence. The most that can be 
l' !aimed for it that it is prohable, and what we use is not rigorous scientific investigation, but 
the act of faith, supported by rational and imaginative conjectures, themselves inevitably 
conditioned by our learning and our experience. 39o 
In this Coltat1 transcends Freud by over-shooting the notion of science, and its 
associations \yith secularisn1, which others, such as Phillips appear to cling to, and 
she dec lares her belief that a combination of paradigms which have until recently 
been held in opposition can be synthesised successfully. Could this be seen as a 
retUTI1 to God in a \yay that can be compared to the post-secularists? We shall see. 
Coltart has deyeloped her own ideas with her own genealogy which, as noted, include 
the \yorks of earlier psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion who although keen to keep 
psychoanalysis in the scientific camp, was aware of their work on the soul: 
... Psychoanalysis helps the spirit, or souL .. to continue ... we help the soul or psyche to be 
born. and even help it to continue to develop after it is born. 391 
Here a psychoanalyst claims responsibility for the conversion, rebirth, or reinvention 
of the soul and the possibility of a new life through psychoanalysis. To usurp religion 
in this way practitioners have had to adopt some of their, so called, enemy's tactics. 
?\ot exactly earth shattering news. However, the ease with which Bion uses the 
language of religion is testimony to his lack of fear. This fear which many of his time 
389 Blond.P. (2003) In a paper given to the Art Society of University of Edinburgh 29104/03 he argued 
that continued subjectivisation needs to be countered or redressed. He explor~d the wor~ of the . 
Impressionists and concluded that they began this process which modem art IS trapped 111. That art IS 
anything that we want it to be. Blond disagrees. 
390 Coltart (1993)p 96-7 
391 Coltart.( 1993 )96-7 
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had and sonle still have of being regarded as too luystical and therefore too 
connected with the enenlY, religion. Bion demonstrates that to describe the analytic 
process requires the concepts and the language of religion. In this he is not alone: as 
noted aboye Freud frequently borrowed the language of religion and relied on heroic 
religious figures to illustrate his own views. For example, he cOlupared hinlselfto 
\\ loses, .Tung and Joshua. 
For psychotherapists to rClnain scientific is a huge hoax, an exercise in delusion or 
acute disciplinary aInnesia as Carrette would have it. Adanl Phillips, in a recent 
debate, conlnlented that it was Freud's bias that kept psychoanalysis in the scientific 
arena \yhen actually it is an are
lJ2
. Phillips blames Freud, but Freud could not have 
achieyed this alone: he relied on others to support, and perpetuate his ideas and they 
continue to do this effecti\'ely and Phillips hiluselfis but one example. Those closest 
to Freud had nlore of an excuse because the climate in which they worked was less 
open to anlbiguity. Although Freud hinlself did not have a problem with ambiguity 
subjectiyity \yas and still can be a significant taboo on the basis that one cannot be a 
real scientist and be subjective. Today, this lie, although exposed, is still difficult to 
relinquish, and the idea of what science is continually reassessed. 
Coltart giyes an example of what she and other contemporary psychoanalysts call 
"not kno\\'ing'. She, like Bollas, acknowledges a dimension to which we do not have 
access. and that we must learn to accept this. The fact that we cannot see it, measure 
it, and repeat the observation does not mean that it does not exist or is not of value. 
And although this may mean that we cannot call it science, this does not render it 
redundant: 
Perhaps I may end here by saying that patients with such symptoms, and silent patients, teach 
us most vividly and memorably that there is always in our work a dimension that is beyond 
393 words. 
This dimension, silent, beyond words, can communicate that which words cannot. 
Such experiences, are cultivated by the mystic who would not be regarded as ill. That 
there are no words does not mean that nothing is being communicated, that it is 
possible to experience silence as deafening is testimony to this. There is a good deal 
392 Start the Week Broadcast on BBC Radio 4.25111/02 9am Adam Phillips, Anne Oakley, Andrew 
\1arr ... 
393 Coltart (1993) p96-7 
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ilnplil'd in silence which is useful and indeed, as psychoanalysts argue, lTIOre 
ilnportant. Blond c1aill1S: 
Ill, truth, hO\\t'\'l'l."' .the i.ll\'isibk is not separable from the visible; in fact (and here I get a head 
ot mysdt), the nSIble IS but a dimension of invisibility and the very clarity of the visible 
world rests UpOll the adumbrations of this higher discernible. 394 
Blond could just as easily and effectively replace "invisible" with silence and visible 
\"ith dialogue. For each is an aspect of the other and the qualities of each lTIake space 
for sOlnething beyond. 
Co Itart goes on to state that n1ystery resides in all of us and analysts are in the 
business of h\'ing with lTIystery. Mystery is clearly finding a place in psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy but lest we becon1e lulled into a false sense of security we must 
question the \\'ay in which it is being used. It lTIay be that becoming open to mystery 
is a good thing and a sign that the resistance of psychotherapists is dilTIinishing but it 
does not ho\\'e\'er in1ply an openness to everything lTIysterious. Bollas' The Myste/~I' 
of Things is testin10ny to his selectiveness of mysteries. 
Coltar1' s \\'ork differs from that of fellow analyst Bollas, whose The Mystery of 
Things lulls us into a false sense of security by implying an openness, which, 
incidentally, the book fails to live up to. Bollas, like Phillips clings to secular 
lTI\'steries and he still resists the otherworldly. Neither has yet made a place for God 
in their \york: their indices are testilTIOny to this. However, the absence of God or 
religion may actually increase their presence as well as illustrating their continued 
protestations. 
Whilst Coltart is willing to look at the parallels between religion and psychotherapy 
she also points out the differences and states categorically that psychoanalysis and 
psychodynamic psychotherapy are "non religious,,395. This because they are based on 
centuries of rational thought dating back to Descartes, an idea, contested by Joel 
KoveL an American psychoanalyst who clailTIS that one of the main differences 
between psychology and psychoanalysis, and therefore psychodynamic 
psychotherapy is: . 
\Vhilst psychoanalysis wandered into the real~ of the ex~l:lded, psychology remamed firmly 
within the bounds of Cartesianism, with its claims to pOSItIve, measurable 
Y)-l Blond. (1998) p25 
395 Coltart (1993) p 165 
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knO\\kdge ... mean"hik psychoanalysis staked its claim on the dark inmleasurable side of 
things: the rc?lm or dreams, systematically false reasonings, obscure passions and neurotic 
I · ,<)(> l'ompu SlOns' . 
Koyl'l at least ac kno\\' ledges their less than scientific genealogy. However, he still 
bcli('y('s in son1e for111 of psychoanalytic truth and that psychoanalysis is engaged in 
a battle \\'ith no less than ciyilisation itself: 
rkyond ~ny particular truth, therefore, disclosed by psychoanalysis - the clinical theory, the 
mSlghts mto dreaming and child mentalhfe, and so forth - there is a truth of psychoanalysis 
as ~l whole: the ullcoYt'ring of "hat had been repressed by 'civilisation' itsele97 
Reli~ions c lain1 that they haye the truth, and in fact that Kovel makes a claim for a 
psychoanalytic truth presupposes hon10geneity, a unified group that may be known 
as a psychoanalytic con1n1unity by virtue of their conformity to such a tnlth. 
Altholl~h there are fe\\' \\'ho l11ake this clain1 overtly, it is often implied. Kovel joins 
the n1inority in taking this step in what surely lnust be the right direction, the 
direction of deconstructing the layers of his community's defence and resistance to 
accusations of religiousness. Above, in taking on civilisation itself, Kovel is 
follo\\'ing in the founder's footsteps as Freud, in Civilisation and its Discontents, 
l11ade a sil11ilar attel11pt to generalise about civilisation. At least Freud, being a 
product of n10demity, was expected to make broad generalisations in the tradition of 
uniyersalising. Kovel has no such excuse, and yet he is undeterred. 
Phillips argues that psychoanalysis is a phenOlnenology,398 and an "ideology of 
childhood",~99. Whilst Phillips is moving away frOln the scientific illusion he is, as 
yet. unable to talk about psychotherapy as religious in any positive sense. A sign that 
Freud's legacy is more difficult to shake off than we imagine, even for the most 
e\'olyed of analysts is the fact that the complete rejection of the founder's beliefs is 
not possible - yet. 
Writers and practitioners have talked of psychotherapy as religion but have fallen 
short of embracing their parallels. For eXaInple, Mark Epstein who also writes on the 
similarities between Buddhism and psychotherapy claims that psychotherapy falls 
396Kove l. J. In Elliott .A. and Frosh. S. (1995) p206 
397 Ibid .p206 
398 Phillips (1994) 
399 Phillips. A. (2002) Equals. Faber and Faber. London. p 150 
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short of thc c\.pectations of Buddhisn1'"wo. Such willingness to look at these 
sllnilaritics is nc\\', as for years anyone on the inside who talked of such things found 
thclnsdycs criticised for being too Inystical. We should, therefore not take this 
lightly. That Epstein has taken the risk ofn1aking such cOlnparisons is useful for 
anY()I1C conccrned about the covert goings on in psychotherapies. In a recent 
publication fron1 the Freud nluseunl there is evidence of this continuing resistance by 
Dayid Black, hinlsdf a practitioner who addresses the issue of the accusations of 
religiousness but \\'ho ultinlately believes it to be a convenient analogy, and without 
rcal substancc-+01 . 
In today's clilnatc of political correctness it is difficult to criticise anything without 
appearing to unden11ine it. As Blond states: 
The lowc?st has become the highest, and equality names itself as the only value which cannot 
be deYJllledw~ 
In psychotherapy equality is problelnatic because whilst everything is, on the surface, 
regarded as being of \'alue there is tension between the conscious and the 
unconscious lnaterial of the client. In psychoanalysis and psychodynamic 
psychotherapy there is more emphasis on the value of things which remain in the 
dark. things \\'hich are not yet conscious but are none the less believed to have 
po\\'erfullnotiYation. This is the paradox that the Inysterious unknown is of such 
high \'alue and yet has been denied, particularly when it is an aspect of the movement 
and not the client, because of its imlueasurability. However, if the movement was the 
client things \\'ollld be different. The exclusion of the mysterious from 
psyc hotherapeutic theory and practice, that they have actively shut it out, was, as 
noted, something which Rogers came to regret ignoring. His attitude, although late in 
its de\'elopment. has left a door to the spiritual ajar for his followers. 
Blond believes that turning away from the mysterious, and transcendent, as 
psychotherapy does is an act of violence. However, Blond assures us that all is not 
lost: 
.)(10 Epstein, \1, (1998) Going To Pieces Without Falling Apart: A Buddhist Perspective On Wholeness. 
Thorsons. London. 
401 Black. D. in Ward. I. (2000'1) (Ed) Is Psychoan{[/vsis Another R~lig~on?: Contell1pormy Essays On 
Spirit, Faith al1d Morali(1' in Psychoal1a/1'sis Freud Museums p~bhcatlOns. London p8 
41)2 Blond. P. (ED) (1998) Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Phzlosophy and Theology. Routledge. 
London.p2 
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This h~)\\l'\'er, is not to say that that which remains unaddressed does not address US.403 
Given that the lnajor objective ofpsychodynmTIic psychotherapy is in addressing that 
which is other-wise believed to be unaddressable, or rather, unearthing denial and 
resistance, it is therefore all the n10re interesting that practitioners continue to engage 
in perpetuating a nl0venlent which has, since its founder, denied or resisted 
addressing its own religiousness. Psychoanalysis is not what it claims! 
Coltart, although a forward thinking psychoanalyst, where the religious question is 
concellled, still has reservations which have their roots in her own attachment to 
Freud and the cunlulati\'e tradition of psychoanalysis, a sort of devotionalism. 
Coltal1's views on spirituality belong to a lTIodernist version of psychoanalysis and 
not to the post lTIodelll activity which some claim that it is. She seems not to view 
spirituality as an individual's response to their cumulative traditions, but rather, in 
the conte~t of an orthodo~, institutionalised tradition. That someone has a cumulative 
tradition does not nlean that it is located either geographically or institutionally and 
yet this is \"hat she seenlS to ilTIply. For example, Coltart is critical of any notion that 
psychotherapy can provide an avenue for transcendence but does not define what she 
nleans b\' this: 
... psychotherapy does not aim at 'self transcendence', and there may be a sad confusion of 
concepts when, say, detachment leads to a kind of neurotic spiritual inflation, or a certain 
depth of awareness leads to a mistaken and cmdely omnipotent notion that one is nearing 
1· h h "t,404 en Ig tenment, or even as 1 . 
Coltart gi\'es the psychoanalytic game away. She is right. Very little attention has 
been paid to paying attention, because as she claims it verges on the religious. Her 
rejection of the notion that psychotherapy could have a transcendent element signals 
a lack of understanding of the vast possibilities which post modernity andpost-
secularism have created for transcendence. In the same way that she views 
spirituality as being part of an institutionalised tradition: she holds a modernist view 
of transcendence. In the statement below she declares: 
In all our vast literature, very little attention has been paid to attention. In clinical discussion, 
public or private debate, one finds the same neglect .. I ~hi~k. this.may ~e to do :vith its being 
so taken for granted - it must be there as the essentIalmvlslble mgredlent - thIS seems to ?e a 
sort of given. Or perhaps we have not yet developed any kind of language to speak about It. 
h 1·· 40~ Or perhaps it verges on t e re IglOUS. -
403 Ibid .p3 
41)4 Coltart. (1993)p 168 
4(j5 Ibid p 180. 
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That there is an unidentifiable "it", "the essential invisible ingredient" needs further 
c:\position. That "it verges on the religious" is enough to make them deny it. This is 
indicatiyc that cyen things which are not overtly religious, but may "verge" on it, are 
resisted as if a threat. Coltati herself is unable to see that their lack of a suitable 
language to speak of their own' it' indicates an affinity with religion which is more 
than illusory. 11 is worth quoting Blond again who states: 
In truth, hO\yt'\'('r. the invisible is not separable from the visible; in fact (and here I get a head 
of myself), the yisiblt' is but a dimension of invisibility and the very clarity of the visible 
\\nrld rests upon the adumbrations of this higher discernible. 406 
Although Blond n1akes use of a binary systelTI to lTIake his point there is something at 
work in the inyisible in psychotherapy. For example, silence and the unseen have a 
poweL \\'hich any practitioner would testify, underpins them. 
Coltart in another act of lulling us into a false sense of her acceptance of religion, 
states: 
I belit'\,t' being a good therapist is a vocation; it did not surprise me to discover that some 
conmmnities. \\'ho offer holistic care for extremely disturbed patients have been nicknamed 
h" k ' ,W7 'psyc Iatnc mon s. . 
\\~hilst the nickname "psychiatric monks" does not come as a surprise to her there is 
a sense of iron\' in her response. Although Coltart uses numerous analogies, she does 
not see that this is itself a form of resistance, denial, that if religious analogies are not 
only possible but necessary this may in fact be more than symbolic. The frequency 
\\'ith \\'hich analogies are used is alarming, and says more than she, among others, is 
willing, or is able to comprehend. We all have our limits and we visit these more 
easily when, as insiders, our own interests are being served. 
Coltart commenting on the subject of attentiveness is complimentary about people 
\\'ho work in religious fields and claims: 
Certainly some of those who attend to it and write abo~t it with ~larity are foun? in the. 
religious fields. And there is little more calculated to stIr up anXIety and defenSIveness 111 
your average analyst than any hint of religion
408 
406 Blond. P. (ED) (1998) p25 
~1)7 Coltart pI 79. 
~()>; Ibid p 180. 
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She adlnires the religious scholar and yet her awareness of the hostility of 
psychotherapists towards religion does not n1ake her dig for reasons behind such 
defensiyeness. Thus, whilst being aware of the very defensive responses which 
religion brings up in therapists her own insider position prevents her from seeing 
beyond this. She cannot see that it l11ay also cause her to have limitations. When a 
client cotnes to an analyst with such obvious resistance the Inost likely inference 
would be that they hayc sonlething to uncover, sOll1ething to explore. It is no 
coincidence that Freud believed psychoanalysis to be the archaeology of the mind. 
He also belicyell that the stronger the protest the n10re worthy the exposition, but 
olnitted seeing this about his own attitude to religion. 
C()ltart \\"hilst beginning to get beneath psychotherapy and its motivations, as an 
insider. is unable to get beneath the givens. Each field has areas, which are tacit, 
nonnatiYe. seelHingly unayoidably accepted and it may be the task of the outsider409 
to attelnpt to get beneath. There is a great diversity of people who train to be 
psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, yet it is a profession dominated by so called 
atheists. or secularists \\"ho none the less appear to be called by this profession by 
yirtue of its claims to being overtly secular. Psychotherapy as a profession has all the 
trappings of a religion, although not acknowledged, and as Phillips notes, without the 
obyious do\\"nside of a God. However, in post modernity, and indeed inpost-secular 
philosophy, the presence of God in any traditional sense is not a prerequisite for 
religion. :-:0 one. it seems, is asking whether the resistance and denial itself may be 
God or that God is in the testing, or rather, as Blond and the Radical orthodoxy group 
\\"ould have it, God is the testing. 
Coltart talks of the discomfort which analysts have with religion and claims that the 
reason behind this is that it is a "cOlnpeting system".410 
\Iany analysts come from secular backgrounds and are still inclined to hold.Fre~ld's own 
view - that all religion is neurosis - which betrays their discomfort and anXIety 111 the face of 
what they may regard as a competing system which tlu"eatens them
411 
Whilst Coltart is able to see the way which other practitioners have responded to 
religion and why, she is unable to see her own prejudices. That Coltart is on her own 
409 There are people who are both insiders and outsiders at the same time. People like myself who 
bridge the gap. 
410 Coltart.(1993)p 184 
411 Ibid p184. 
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path, nf Buddhisn1, is one thing, which whilst giving her insight into the parallels of 
these traditions at the san1e till1e distorts her understanding. That psychoanalysis is 
n10re than just like a religion ren1ains out with her cOlnprehension. Her Buddhism 
\\'hilst allo\ying her the privilege of tolerance is limiting as are her other traditions: 
psychoanalysis with its genealogy belongs to a wider context of Judeo-Christian 
traditions. :\s psychoanalysis would have it, her past is in her present and as such her 
yie\\S are coloured. Of course religion is "(1 competing systeln". They do not talk of, 
or resist, the sciences in the way that they do religion. 
AdaI11 Phillips, in Eqllals. has a different attitude towards religion than in his earlier 
\\'ork. a sign that his yiews are dynalnic. Like Thon1e in the person-centred tradition 
he is in a process of working through how to locate, and be comfortable with, what 
he docs. He talks liberally about psychoanalysis as an ideology because this is safe, 
secular telTitory. Phillips appears to suffer from similar insider blindness to that of 
Coltat1 and as noted above each uses religious analogies. However, each remains 
con1n1itted to the superficial ground of psychotherapy as 'it is like a' religion but is 
not a religion. In a silnilar vein to Coltart, Phillips is critical of and is willing to 
e\:pose the \\'orkings of psychoanalysis, but is equally selective: 
And it has, perhaps, been an exemplary profession in the way that it keeps the whole question 
of superiority - of the nature of prestige and dictatorship - on the agenda. 412 
This is yery honourable indeed, but my sense is that in paying attention to such 
things he is ignoring others, which are perhaps more fundamental. This delusion, 
\\"hich although inevitable when one has a question which directs the project, is 
bound to e\:clude things which on the surface seem of no significance. (The givens, 
the tacit assumptions of the insider). Freud was acutely aware of the importance of 
\\'hat \\'e perceive as the ordinary. In all traditions there is so much taken for granted 
by those on the inside that it is only when questioned by an outsider that the extent of 
their tacit knowledge is exposed. The belief that talking about things is equal to 
acting on them is a common mistake and one which Phillips and Coltart both make, 
albeit in different ways. Simply by owning up to the hierarchy does not give 
psychoanalysis moral high ground. When psychoanalysis itselftums literacy into 
praxis things will have made a significant shift. 
Phillips states: 
.+12 Phillips (2002) pI9 
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I t ,is as though people a re deemed to be something - to have something inside them _ that is 
ot equal \'alue; and of a \'alue greater than any worldly assessment can encompass .. m 
This "as though" statenlent is an 'it is like a' statelnent, indicative of his resistance , 
un\yillingness, in sonle areas, to nlove beneath the surface of what appears. The 
other\\"orldly thing, which he inlplies but cannot bring himself to say, would justify 
religiousness. The "nounlenal" as Bollas calls it~l~ is left largely unspoken. 
Phi llips is happy to condenln psychoanalysis for not acknowledging its participation 
in social and political spheres but does not nlention religion in what he calls their 
illusion: 
PS~'dw~1llalysis of course was not conceived as, is not supposed to be, a political training 
C~llnp; but that it has pretended not to be one, that it has at its worst created the illusion that it 
is p\.)ssible to exempt oneself ft~om group life, from politics, has, I think, been more damaging 
and misleading than need be.-+ 1) 
Psychoanalysis is a political training camp if only with a small p. Phillips although 
critical and forward looking cannot really Inake up his mind about where 
psychoanalysis belongs. So far he has had it in languages, in the arts, as "the only 
religion in \\"hich you are not allowed to believe in God", and as phenomenology and 
more recently has Freud as a literary giant416 • However, he could just as easily locate 
it in religion if as he has said himself "psychoanalysis is the only religion in which 
you are not allowed to believe in God". Religion and its ilnpact on psychoanalysis, as 
\\"ell as psychoanalysis as a religious movement, could be explored in ways which 
are nlore useful than the superficial treatInent that they receive at the mOlnent by 
insiders. 
Phillips. e\Oen "hen describing the process of psychoanalysis, has to draw on words 
\\Ohich he has to justify using. For example: 
... if it is the unacceptable, para?oxically, tl~at ~ight make us more acceptable to ourselves -+ 17 
and others, then a remarkable pIece of magIC, mdeed secular alchemy, has been performed. 
His use of the word alchemy is immediately qualified by declaring it secular. Yet he 
is almost evangelical about his secularism and appears not to see it as a distancing 
ploy. He borrows such words but does not care to ask why this may be- to ask why 
his own discipline lacks words to describe their own work. If it is such a secular 
-+ \3 Ibid p21 . 
-11-1 Bollas (1999) pI 0 The "Noumenal" was first coined by Emmanuel Kant but was explored m some 
depth by Rudolph Otto in The Idea Of The Holy. 
-lI5 Phillips (2002) p 28. 
416 Edinburgh International Book Festival. 17/08/05 
-lI7 Ibid p46 
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activity then \\'hy do they qualify it? Secularists do not describe then1selves as such 
unless they are called to question. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are constantly 
being called to question, this in itself a sign that others require that it justify itself. In 
the Saine \\'ay as \\'hen people n1ake the clailn that they are atheists they, albeit 
inadY(Ttently, give credibility to the idea oftheisln. Without theism there would be 
no requirelnent for atheisn1. 
A.nd yet later in this san1e work Phillips draws upon the work ofT.S. Eliot whose 
criticis111s expose the lin1its of psychoanalysis, with which Phillips is in agreement. 
Eliot states that \yith psychoanalysis: 
' ... the material is so clearly defined ... there is no possibility of tapping the atmosphere of 
unknown terror and mystery in which our life is passed ,418 
Phillips states: 
and I think Eliot is right about this - psychoanalysis is too rational an account of inationality. 
It displaces that atmosphere of unknown terror and mystery that is so precious to Eliot. 419 
It seen1S paradoxical to me that Phillips, whilst seelning to embrace this idea from 
Eliot. is else\vhere still intent on dismissing the dimension to which this belongs. 
Phillips makes the mistake of generalising about both writers who are 
psychoanalytically infonned, and writers who happen to be Christian. He seems to 
think that each \"ill hold fast to a rigid framework, a very narrow view indeed. If we 
arc to belieye in Phillips' other work on contingency, led by their particular 
paradigmatic beliefs, and the language which accompanies this for example, he 
claims: 
\Iy paraphrase of Eliot's remarks is: people who are psychoanalytically informed - people 
who ha\'e been convinced (if not converted) by Freudian explanations - are likely to phrase 
their accounts in particular language ... Where as the only conviction a Christian writer will 
bring to his work will be a conviction of mystery. As Augustine says in one of his sermons, 
. Sin~e it is God we are speaking of, you do not understand it. If you could understand it it 
b d ,·Pi) would not e Go -. 
In his last sentence Phillips gives more credibility to the idea of psychoanalysis as a 
religious movement in so far as psychoanalysts claim that psychoanalysis is itself 
beyond understanding. If God is beyond understanding and psychoanalysis is also 
beyond understanding then they have more in common than has been possible to 
entertain. Phillips, by referring to psychoanalysts as potential converts, and in using 
~J8 ibid pl0S. 
419 ibid P 106. 
420 I . 
OC.CIt. 
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the quotation froll1 St Augustine, highlights, and indicates the post-secular terrain 
\yhkh, arguably, psychoanalysis is entering. Den10nstrated in the works of those 
contell1porary, and past psychoanalysts, who advocate not knowing as an essential 
aspect of their work - in the way that Augustine speaks of God - if one can 
understand psychoanalysis it would not actually be psychoanalysis. It is the essence 
of the proj ed not to understand but to keep open to its endless possibilities. 
Phillips' oscillation between views, which 111ay be described as both modern and post 
-ll1odern, has echoes of Freud hin1self whose views were often contradictory and had 
silni lar e:\.tren1CS. The absence of a serious attitude to what psychotherapists do as 
religious has left a presence in Phillips work which has become glaring. Phillips, like 
his colleagues. sin1ply protests too n1uch. He does this by constantly making it clear 
to his reader just how secular he is, although he does not state exactly what he means 
by this. \\'l1at can \ye infer fron1 this? Is he anti religious and not merely without 
church as thepost-secularists would have it? 
Phillips denies that what people want from Freudian psychoanalysis is to be saved: 
\\Ohat Freudian man and woman want is not to be saved, but to satisfy their forbidden 
. ·CI deSIre ... 
Yet a recent suryey carried out by The University of Abertay422found that in therapy 
people are seeking "permission", "engagement", and "transparency". Psychotherapy 
and counselling seem to provide the approval which perhaps the church once did 
more widely . .f23 Seeking permission is a prerequisite for being saved. Seeking 
"permission" can be about relinquishing power, looking for someone to whOln we 
may abdicate responsibility. This is a return to a parental template, stored in our 
memory. whose appropriateness in adult life is open to question. However, it may 
also empower someone to do things from which they had hitherto been inhibited. 
Phillips in making such a claim does not acknowledge that this process, 
paradoxically, can be the very saving of someone or that the satisfaction of desires 
may well' save' someone. Phillips also argues that the Christian God of salvation has 
~21 Phillips.(2002)p108 . . 
422 This study was given at the Cosca research conference, which was held in The UmversIty of 
Abertay. 19/09/02, in a paper by Brian Rogers . . ° 
~n I expect that not only does psychotherapy provide approval - I.e the good bIts of what the church 
did but also some of the constraints and disapproval. 
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a lkstination, \vhereas, in his view psychoanalysis does not. In this he echoes Rogers 
\vho bdicvcd in the direction of psychotherapy but that it is without destination. He 
docs conccdc that psychoanalysis has a direction, but can only bring himself to 
describc this as a secular process. This secular process is "something akin to a 
convcrsion cxpericncc ,,-12-1 and Phillips asks how best this process lnay be described 
if not as a convcrsion. Hc has refelTed to this conversion experience as an experience 
of being "convinced,,-I25. Howcver, his description is less than convincing. 
Phillips claitl1s: 
It is the yaluing of the indiyidual despite his social status, and not because of it, that both 
Christianity and democracy promote.4~() 
Such values are an10ng the core of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. In his view 
the ideals of Christianity and den10cracy lnay be that of valuing the individual, in 
theory, but not \\'ithout ties or judgn1ent. He appears not to have noticed the views of 
the religious right in the USA and their promotion of such doctrines as the 'gospel of 
health and \\'ealth'. Phillips takes risks in making generalizations, such as the above, 
and gets a\\'ay \\'ith this largely because of the originality of his work. However, he 
does not. yet. go far enough with his observation. Phillips talks of us each having our 
o\\'n criteria by \\'hich we judge. In other words our individual ideologies lead how 
We regard things in the world and his own ideology excludes the religious. He sees 
the ,,'orld through his secular tinted spectacles. Because this is the case he appears 
not to have noticed that he is himself forging a reputation in psychoanalysis as a 
n1a\'erick thinker. Scaring the orthodox out of their wits, continually sought out by 
the media \\'hen ever they require an expert on psychoanalysis, he is, it would seem, 
on the path of messianism himself. 
Phillips' religious blind spot is problematic, as he, like most, is selective about what 
he sees in any ideology. Those things, which are omitted from his views of 
Christianity, and democracy, are similarly omitted from psychoanalysis. His 
selectivity differs from one to the other but it need not. In this he is not alone as each 
person's anthropological lens inevitably influences what we are willing to see. 
Phillips' unwillingness to see psychoanalysis as a religion, prevents him froin 
424 ibid p 13 1 
425 ibid. p 1 06 
42(, ibid p2I. 
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tnaking con1parisons which he could. His views are so tacitly imbued as anti 
religious as to nlakc it inlpossible to see thenl. Every ideology is vastly different in 
practicc to that which is advocated in theory. For example, Christianity, democracy, 
and psychoanalysis all suffer fron1 a disparity between theory and practice and it is in 
th~ir disparity that their conlnlon ground lies. 
\ \' e ha\'c scen ho\\' Coltart and Phillips approach religion, let us now tum to 
Christopher Bollas \\'hose The A(1'stcIY O/Things, seduces us into a false sense that 
he Inay ha\'c been able to relinquish his own resistance to the notion of religion. To 
choose the word Inystery is to venture into a world which, as he points out is, 
"unkno\\'able". This is the world over which religions have had a monopoly for some 
tilne. and ha\'e been content to live with the unknowable factor. Alas, Bollas is as 
resistant as the others to things religious. There is no mention of religion or 
conlparison of psychoanalysis or psychotherapy with it. In fact there is only minor 
reference to anything connected, an absence which in itself should be a warning: 
This dri n~' is an essential part of one's encounter with the mysteries of life, from the ordinary 
recurring mystery show of dreams, to the secret of the internal world, to the enigmas of the 
uniYerse and of the physical world that inspires scientific curiosity and work427 ... 
FUliher: 
Theological explanations of this world of ours and our place in it is an essential endeavour to 
think about the complexities of life, but its premature vision, sustained now by anaemic faith, 
testifies to the strain of trying to know more than one does.
428 
Bollas leaves us in no doubt about where his allegiance lies. His views on theology 
indicate that he has not read too much contemporary theology where not knowing is 
li,'ed, embraced. His promotion of science over theology, a theme which is common 
among psychoanalysts (who have not yet let go of Freud), echoes that of Freud 
\,'hose raison d' etre was to be a famous man of science. Like Phillips and Coltart, 
Bollas has to draw upon the language of religion in order to best describe 
experiences, which arise in psychoanalysis and for which there are no scientific 
b h " I t fI ,,429 \\'ords or explanations. For example, he talks a out t e noumena rans erence , 
an experience, which he believes, is where one unconsciou~ is c~nnecte~ to another: 
a noumenal to noumenal encounter, a meeting of two immatenallog1cs engagmg one 
another. 
.. 131) 
Bollas describes psychoanalysis: 
427 ibid p9 
·P8 1 . - OC.C1t 
429 ibid p9 
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It is a site of !nystery that will not vanish through the appropriate aims of categorical 
nomination. 4-,1 
In this he echoes Phillips in so far as he implies that understanding psychoanalysis is 
beyond rationality and fixed categorization. Rudolph Otto reached a similar 
conclusion long before either of these n1en. Bollas' only overt mention of a 
connection to religiousness is in talking about the "spirit". And as noted above, he 
ill1plies that e\'en to n1ention such things, he is taking a risk. Both he and Coltart are 
aware of the resistance of their conlnlunity to religion but do not question their own, 
as if they arc not part of the conln1unity and as such immune to judgment. The 
con1n1unity's resistance to religion rel11ains for them son1ething which is out there. 
And yet. it is the unn1entionable which is the very fodder of psychoanalysis - as long 
as it has nothing to do with religion. Perhaps, like Coltart, Bollas is testing the 
tell1perature of the con1nllmity before taking any further risk. However, Bollas, like 
Phillips. also atten1pts to rationalize that which we cannot in claiming: 
In another essay I suggest that under special circumstances the term 'spirit' should be 
introduced in to psychoanalysis, even though there would be many objections to a term 
laden with pre-psychoanalytic meanings ... If however, we understand spirit as the expressive 
moyement of an individual's idiom through the course of his or her life, we may say that 
each of us is a spirit, and that we have spiritual effects upon others - who will indeed carry us 
as such within themselves, and we in tum will be inhabited by the spirits of others. 432 
It \vas \\"orth quoting this again because for Bollas to say such a thing is progress 
indeed. although, it is still somewhat worrying to think that psychoanalysis is fearful 
of things \\"hich are pre-psychoanalytic. (They do not appear to have a problem with 
the raih\-ays). That to only use the term 'spirit' in "special circumstances" implies 
caution, trepidation or fear of it. Phillips, Coltart and Bollas each realize that there is 
resistance within their community to religion but do not go beyond a tentative 
exposition and certainly do not go as far as to agree that it is one. (without 
qualification). As noted, Symington is the only psychoanalyst who has actually said 
that psychoanalysis is a religion, but qualifies this by saying that it is natural and not 
revealed, when it is entirely revealed. He uses the term as if it is inappropriate, that 
he is trespassing. There is more going on here than is being stated. As implied above, 
the denial of anything in psychoanalysis is regarded as a source of work. To unpack 
denial, or resistance, is what psychoanalysis and psychotherapy do. And yet their 
own is not tackled in any meaningful way in current theory. Bollas knows that any 
431 ibid p14 
412 ibid P 157 
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noti()ll oCthe spiritual is a challenge not only to their scientific validity but to Freud 
hitllsc1f. 
Bo 1 las conlnlents on Freud's belief in "universal truths,,433 as if this is a thing of the 
past and not sOlnething which is still around in a different guise. As noted above 
KI.)"c1 still talks of the truth of psychoanalysis and is not the only therapist to invest 
in such an ide-a. 
·m Bollas.(1999) p35 
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Post Feminist Responses 
It is ilnportant to say sOlnething of what felninists and post-feminists have brought to 
the study of religion, as well as to the study of psychotherapy. Their works have 
shown different n1eans of exploring the unknowable unknown. This is exemplified in 
\ y ~1rd' s obstTyations of Cixious: 
Ci:\. iOtls is less a theorist and more a practitioner, in her writing, of a religious way of viewing 
the \\odd. Ci:\.ious's work performs a spirituality. She has written: "When I have finished 
\\Titing, \\hen I am a hundred and ten, all I will have ever done will have been to attempt a 
portrait of God. Of The God. Of what escapes us and makes us wonder ... I mean our divinity 
J\\b\~nd. twisted, throbbing, our own myster/34 . 
Cixious distances herself fron1 the fen1inist model by claiming that she does not want 
to be part of the existing structures to which feminists aspire. Cixious is therefore 
allied \yith post felninisn1, although it is difficult to be such without acknowledging 
the role of fen1inisn1. Her work could prove crucial to the God work in 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. In so far as God is not something which is other, 
but is the' r. "our o\vn mystery". So when Bollas discusses the mystery of things he 
could embrace Cixious's notion of "our own mystery" as God. This is a difficult 
concept to accept if your tradition has never made a place for God in any form other 
than as a neurosis. 
Helene Cixious and Luce Irigary are both versed in psychoanalysis and see beyond 
the church of Freud: 
Contrary to much secular feminist thought, Irigaray is clear that religion cannot be ignored or 
written off: it has to be transformed435 . 
Such transformation, she suggests, is already in the making if it has been recognized 
as necessary. However, talking of such things and acting on them are, as we have 
seen, different genres and require different motivations. Jantzen claims that Irigary 
\,'ould like to see religion being transformed rather than being ignored, but whilst this 
is a move in the right direction it belongs to an attitude which sees religion as the 
problem and not psychotherapy. 
Post feminists are willing to transform their views about religion but at the same time 
rely on a template which could equally be applied to men and indeed religion. All 
categories have been devised as a means of constructing a social group with an 
,1)4 Ward. G.( 1997) Ed. The Post Modern God: A Theological Reader. Blackwell. Oxford. UK. pxxxix 
435 Jantzen in Ward.(l997)p194 
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agenda -+o\(). If God is dead and religion is a social construct, its role, and function 
tl)day is detennined largely by what people who continue to support it need. 
J ant/en's Bccom ing Di1 'i I1C has a good deal to say about psychotherapy and one 
\\'clnders ho\\' n1uch she has been unconsciously influence by it. For example, the title 
of her book sounds like a play on Rogers's fat110us On Becoming ([ Person 437 which 
has been hug('\y influential for psychologists in the USA. It l11ight have been l110re 
llSl'ful for Rogers to h<l\'C said that we are already persons in a process of becoming 
then J ant7cn could ha\'e followed with 'divine and still becOl11ing'. Jantzen is not the 
only one tel den10nstrate ho\\' wc havc each becOlne part of a discourse whose 
boundaries are bluned. Such a blurring of boundaries allows the theologian to 
venture into discussions about philosophy and psychotherapy in ways which would 
not ha\'c been atten1p1cd in the pre fen1inist, pre post-secular arena. 
For c\:aI11ple: 
Contrary to the sociocultural norms of his time, Christ approaches both men and women with 
the same' fi:eedom founded on wisdom rather than logical reasoning. Read or re-read the 
Gospels and try to find the logic of Jesus' words; he continually contradicts everything he 
sa ys. Is this indicatiye' of the importance of an age in transition, or is it these conhoadictions 
th;t allow his message to rise above understanding?438 
Con1parisons. such as she makes, are a sign of the fluidity of disciplines but also that 
the God \vithout church is the religion of freedom. Reason is an example of 
perpetuating those binary, patriarchal needs of the modernist, which she so often 
condemns. Ho\vever, her observations on contradiction, as a way of allowing 
kno\vledge to rise above understanding, l11ay have parallels in the work of Freud who 
often contradicts his earlier work without comment. Freud is often accused of being 
dogmatic. and at times this is the case, but it does not do justice to his complete 
\yorks \yhich are riddled with contradictions which show he could be as open to 
contradiction as he could be dogmatic. 
Irigaray claims that the: . . . 0 
.. .irrational in Jesus leads to the liberation of the SpInt, not to lov~, ~ot to nothI~gness 01 to 
the spiritual and mystical torture that probably originates in the stlflmg, paralysIs of 
11
' 439 
becoming, particularly along sexua mes . 
436 Ortner. S. Sherry Ortner wrote about the way in whic? WomC>1l are to .Men as ~atll,.e is ~~ ClI;tllre: 
A paper which dispels biological determinism as the mam source of our .IOles. JudIth Butler. s G(;ndel 
Trouble is an analysis of trouble caused by gender stereotyping and has Itself become a ventable 
sacred text. . fl' B 
4~7 R C R (1961) On Becoming a Person. Houghton Mif m. oston. . 
438 J a~~~~~ in' Ward p203 In this chapter Jantzen is discussing the work whIch Ingaray has done on 
Schussler Fiorenza. 
oB9 ibid .p203 
171 
Freud argued this in secular ternlS in that the unknown unconscious which he 
bel iC\'t~d \\'as the repository of the irrational, when uncovered, could allow the patient 
to feel a nc\\' kind of liberation. 
Finally PaIllela Sue Anderson on the work of Kristeva: 
The psychoanalytic discourse of love takes the place occupied by religious discourse. 44o 
This is problenlatic as it presupposes that there is such a thing as a psychoanalytic 
discourse of lO\'e and not that there are l11any discourses which mayor may not 
inc lude different t:ypes of loving. In this essay Anderson portrays Kristeva as having 
a . golden age' l11entality, as she wonders whether this "therapeutic age" will be able 
to reco\'er the "positi\'e \'alues once found in religion,,441. This as if there is 
honlogeneity in each age and that religion has at some point been without problems. 
Anderson continues: 
Today re ligious belief can be, if necessary, replaced by a fundamental trust in a loving 
analyst and eventual separation. Is this the agency of agape, the post modem God?442 
This also a return to a religious golden age as if such a thing existed. This need in the 
"Titer to find something in the past which was superior and to which we should 
aspire is unusual in feminist discourse - and yet those post-secular scholars, drawn 
together in \\T ard' s anthology, seem to. Their going "before and beyond church" 
seems dominated by their need to have an era which was Eden like. 
-Wi Anderson in Ward (1997) p216 
HI ibid p219 
-+42 ibid p219 
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Conclusion 
It is ironic that. given their interest in the dynmnics of the human mind , 
psychotherapists have until very recently failed to notice that their own relationship 
\vith religion has relnained rather static. Psychotherapists have been influenced in a 
peculiar \vay by their founders a way which has prevented them from embracing 
religion and its associated spirituality. Yes, they have entertained the comparisons 
\vhich others have n1ade of psychotherapy with religion, and even gone so far as to 
agree but never \\'ith conviction, only with, as Jones noted, the certainty that the grain 
of truth in such a cOlnparison was not really a threat. As so often is the case, with 
grains of truth, n10re becon1es of them than is supposed and this has been the case 
with psychotherapy. 
\Yhilst those psychotherapies discussed above have yet to relinquish themselves to a 
religious paradign1, they have moved some way from Freud's original criticism of all 
religion as neurosis. Those who have become forerunners in contemporary 
psychotherapy realise that making changes to the canon of their founder has involved 
risks, not least of which is expulsion from the community. That they have managed 
to do this and remain forerunners is perhaps indicative of the maturation of their 
tradition. Psychotherapists who have deemed such changes necessary have 
recognised the rise in demand for things spiritual but, more importantly, the absence 
of this phenomenon in their own work. To respond positively to this demand for the 
spiritual, \vithout overtly rejecting the doctrine of their founder, has been problematic 
and has taken some time. 
Contemporary psychotherapy has a problem with religion, in so far as it has censored 
out any positive significance religion may have, instead choosing to relate to it as 
something to be treated or ignored. However, as the prologue above testifies, 
psychotherapy has since its beginnings been compared to religion, although never as 
a form of flattery. The resemblance between psychotherapy and religion is more 
significant than those merely superficial analogies which have been made since its 
conception. Jones noted the grain of truth in such analogies but denied, as many 
others have, that the grain belies something more substantial. There are different 
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k\'cls of religiousness at work in psychotherapy; one level is the structure of these 
1110\'Clnents, or approaches, which is parallel to those of religious traditions; the 
sccond is their function as religious n10ven1ents; the third is that what they do is 
religious: they cure souls, and the way in which this it executed is also religious. In 
addition, those nleaning of life questions which they address have long been in the 
rca1111 of religious traditions. 
Freud's relationship to and beliefs about religion were the initial source of these 
difficulties. Freud and Rogers were each inspirational figures whose own negative 
relationship \\'ith religion prevented thenl fron1 seeing a bigger picture. Although 
both \\'(TC in the business of alleviating the bad faith of others, they were unable to 
sec it in the discipline itself. Their intensity of feeling about religion has clouded 
their vision so nluch as to have left a damaged legacy. This legacy denies their 
indebtedness to religious traditions, especially to that of the cure of souls: confession. 
In addition, psychotherapy denies its parallel function to religion and demonstrates 
very little response to the spiritual needs of clients or practitioners. Freud and Rogers 
each claimed to be lTIen of science. However, they each ventured into the domain of 
the unknowable \\'hich proved to be a particular kind of problem. As scientists it was 
impossible for them not to respond to the unknown as a challenge to be solved. 
Consequently each denied that the 'it' or X factor was beyond knowing. Neither of 
thelTI \\"as n10tivated to experience lTIOre of the unknowable, as this would have 
forced thelTI to relinquish their conviction that 'it' was solvable, and in so doing 
rejecting the scientific paradigm to which they were committed. Each had his own 
reasons for his conviction to science and each left a legacy which required that their 
followers continue their scientific quest. Their quests have taken a long time to come 
to fruition. However, as with the great religions of the world, there are a few 
mavericks who have believed it to be worth the risk to relinquish their own 
convictions to psychotherapy as science and tentatively venture into the domain of 
mystery in a way which does not presuppose that they solve it. 
Freud's followers had to overcome their adopted belief that all religion is indicative 
of illness, and Rogers' followers knew, until his final years, that religion was a taboo 
subject. The behaviour of these followers goes beyond that of people of science. The 
quality of a psychotherapist's commitment is not fully illustrated by simply exposing 
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those superficial intra and inter tensions between purist and eclectic and integrative 
den01llinations. Even when practitiQners display their inter-faith tolerance their 
underlY'ing nl0tivation relies on the perceived truth of their tradition. The 
conl1nitInent and conforn1ity of practitioners to a specific founder and theory is a 
significant indication of their being part of a faith community and not to a scientific 
one. The absence of particular actions, for fear of being accused of blasphemy, is still 
present today, However, as we have seen, now there are those who have taken the 
risk to transcend the authority of their tradition and, as such, follow the mystics who, 
in order to beconle so called, had also to reject authority. 
\Yith the work of Neville Syt11ington we have seen the beginnings of a dialogue in 
psychoanalysis \vhich inc ludes religion in a meaningful way. His clainl of 
psychoanalysis as a natural religion is a good sign. However, it also remains 
superficial by denying the importance of those rich sources of the Judaeo Christian 
traditions \vhich \vere the foundations upon which Freud, and others in his time, 
relied. Psychoanalysis is a revealed tradition which borrowed a good deal from these 
traditions: not least of which was the cure of souls. 
Carl Rogers' movement was born of his disenchantment with Christianity and the 
patriarchal standards of psychoanalysis. His lTIOVement, although held in opposition 
to psychodynamic psychotherapy, has none the less followed a similar route to Freud 
and the Freudians. Rogers, like Freud, left a legacy of anti- religious sentiment 
beyond indifference: a complete dismissal which led his followers to realise that 
religion was an area which was not open for discussion. Rogers' eventual claim that 
omitting the mystical had been a mistake, has given tacit permission for practitioners 
to \'enture beyond theory. Brian Thome has been the most committed to this, and 
behaves as ifhe is the high priest of person-centred therapy. Although his 
ascendance could not be described as a trouble free journey, he appears to have 
survived his early turbulence and arrived at a position of self assurance which allows 
him to adopt a manner of address which is messianic. His lectures are delivered as 
sermons and to have an audience with him is akin to being in the presence of a guru. , 
Thome's posture is reverential and his movements are deliberate and measured. His 
devotion to Julian of Norwich allows him to emulate a model of mysticism. 
175 
Until Thorne, the followers of Rogers have had a similar attitude to religion as to that 
of their psychodynatnic counterparts. Each founder had set his scene by rejecting his 
o\\'n religion and disregarding its significance. The suppression of the importance of 
religion has been a serious n1istake, and in today's world where spirituality is all 
around, it is difficult for psychotherapists, of whatever persuasion, to continue to 
ignore this area or to reinvent then1selves as being pro religion. Post modernity has 
created a space in which psychotherapists can question the dogmatism of their own 
atheisn1 and has exposed it as an unjustifiable way to survive. The exponential rise in 
things spiritual cannot be ignored by even the most committed psychotherapist. A 
walk do\\'n any high street is enough to demonstrate a market flooded with 'spiritual' 
products \\'hich c1ain1 to rescue the ailing soul from impending doom, and the talking 
cure has becon1e only one of many products on which disposable income may be 
spent. 
In the so called post-secular era when almost anything, it seems, may be regarded as 
spirituaL and if God is without church, and no one has a monopoly on the spiritual, 
can psychotherapists continue to deny that which has become so pervasive? The 
ans\ver is of course, "no", and as demonstrated above, psychotherapists themselves 
are beginning to address what they have termed the "unknowable", and they are 
talking about "moments of meeting". Freud himself even noted that no amount of 
skill or technique could in itself make his psychoanalysis work. It was the 
relationship between patient and practitioner that he believed tipped the balance of 
success. However, he could not identify what it was that would make it so. This 
"unknowable", these "moments of meeting", the 'it', "relational depth", or the X 
factor are what people in therapy have repeatedly referred to as "revelatory", 
"spiritual", or "epiphanies". These changing attitudes are essential developments for 
the mental health of psychotherapy itself. In their continued denial of religion, active 
denial which suggests that there is something at stake emotionally, psychotherapists 
are denying social reality just as obviously as do their clients. Psychotherapists pride 
themselves on being the custodians of realities which their clients have yet to access: 
that they have the real and the client suffers delusions. In respect of religion this 
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sccn1S rc\'crsed. So their new uncovering of the spiritual, whatever they choose to 
call it. can only be of benefit to then1. Psychotherapy has been suffering from this 
lying condition since Freud, and for it to survive must take this omission seriously. 
Such change can only be made from the inside. Symington and Thome are beginning 
to 111ake this happen. 
:\s \\'c ha\'c seen, even the n10st radical insiders have been unable to identify their 
0\\,11 delusions by yirtue of the nlental attitude which had been prescribed for their 
approach, an attitude which has been beautifully preserved both by Freud's followers 
and by those \\'ho claim to have no allegiance to him. Psychotherapists have been 
blinded by their conlnlitnlent to their founder, an attitude which goes well beyond the 
bounds of the scientific relationship. 
Psychotherapists' resistance to religion is all the more bizarre in the light of what 
nlany of thenl do, \yhich is to hear any manner of testimonies including those of 
cril11inals and will tolerate hearing of mental torture and, it seems, hear lies and 
assume that all are suffering. They appear not to be unduly disturbed by such 
testinl0nies. However, they are disturbed by religion: to be religious is still a self 
imposed taboo. To use Freud's own work "Totem and Taboo" as a template for how 
psychotherapy may improve its own health seems ironic. If psychotherapists could, if 
only metaphorically, devour their founder, they would be able to let go of their 
scientific pretensions and be what they are. They have made Freud their totem and 
haye subverted the nature of their movement and practice, and as with most things 
\\-hich are subverted (driven underground) they eventually surface with more power 
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